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To West Africans, may their bravery inspire all.
To women, to those who succeeded, and to those who were forgotten.
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This dissertation studies the nexus between weak institutions, epidemic disease and con-
flict.
In the first chapter I provide descriptive evidence of an empirical pattern found across
countries that introduces the two main chapters of the dissertation. Countries with higher
incidence of disease outbreaks are more likely to exhibit civil violence, conditional on pop-
ulation and income. This effect varies, however, with institutions and health expenditure.
The relationship disappears in countries with above average political rights or above aver-
age civil liberties. There is some evidence that health investments last year also diminish
the relationship between disease outbreaks this year and civil violence next year. This de-
scriptive evidence suggests that while disease outbreaks are associated with social unrest,
this depends on the particular institutions at hand and there is scope for public policy
interventions that halt both the burden of disease and civil conflict.
The second chapter, co-authored with Elena Esposito, seeks to identify the causal im-
pact of a rapidly spreading epidemic on civil violence in the context of the largest Ebola
outbreak in history, in Western Africa. The identification strategy relies on the epidemio-
logical features of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). We exploit the dynamics of the disease
and weekly frequency data at the local level to analyze the effect of new infections on riots,
protests and violence against institutional authorities. The impacts are large, localized
and tied to containment efforts. The results suggest that state coercion and demand for
public goods are mechanisms fueling conflict. Containing the epidemic requires a change
in cultural practices which leads to social unrest, especially for groups facing higher costs
of cultural adaptation, low trust in institutional authorities and depending on the response
of the state. This further deepens mistrust in institutions after the epidemic, especially
among these communities.
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In the third and last chapter I study the impact of local radios on the spread of a major
epidemic in the context of the Ebola outbreak in Guinea in 2014-16. This is a unique
setting to explore the role of media as a coordination device to change cultural norms in a
high stakes environment. Using original data collected in Guinea and a quasi-experimental
design based on exogenous variation in radio signal reception by distinct media outlets,
combined with the precise timing of distinct information campaigns about Ebola, I seek
to identify the effect of local radios on the spread of the disease, social resistance and
treatment uptake. The results show that sustained access to a local radio program in-
forming about protective measures, encouraging treatment, addressing Ebola rumors and
new burial practices, lowered social resistance behavior, increased treatment uptake and
led to a drop in infected cases seven months after the start of the campaign. Access to
local radios affected cultural norms, such as burial practices, and facilitated technological
adoption, but there is no evidence of impacts on private actions, such as chlorine use.
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Chapter 1
Epidemic Disease and Conflict:
Stylized facts
“Na ikaraka, como un grillo que se esconde en la noche: la verdad
se oculta ante todos nosotros y solo tiendo a intuirla, a sentirla.
Oigo su sonido lejano o cercano. Creo ser poseedor de ella, creo
que es segura, creo que está alĺı, escondida, na ikaraka.”
(Na ikaraka, like a cricket hiding in the night: the truth conceals itself
from us all and I only tend to sense it, feel it. I hear its noise, near or
far. I think I possess it, I think it is certain, I think it is there, hidden,
na ikaraka.)
Edjanga Jones Ndjoli, Heredarás la Tierra
1.1 Introduction
The last decades have seen the emergence or re-emergence of infectious disease outbreaks
throughout the world, with devastating consequences for developing countries, especially
affecting the young, and causing worldwide alarm fearing contagion1. While the im-
1The 1918 influenza pandemic took the lives of 50 million people, HIV/AIDS killed over 35 million.
While other epidemics, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, H1N1 in 2009 or
the Ebola epidemic in 2014-15, had lower death tolls, they led to huge social and economic disruption
(GHRF, 2016).
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mediate effect of epidemics are clearly illness and death, their economic and political
consequences are more complex and are at the center of the debate on why poor countries
are poor (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007). Developing countries
are not only poorer and have weaker institutions than rich countries, they also have a
higher risk of emerging infectious disease outbreaks and higher rates of civil violence2.
Epidemics can lead to a poverty trap, as the social, economic and institutional disruption
they carry can lead to social upheaval, especially in weak institutional settings, poten-
tially further debilitating the state. On the other hand, depending on the nature of civil
violence and the capacity of the state to respond to a disease outbreak, epidemics can
also create an opportunity for technological and institutional change3. Understanding the
drivers of civil violence and the state response to an epidemic is therefore critical to our
understanding of economic development.
This chapter searches for empirical patterns that relate epidemics and civil violence
throughout countries and diseases, and studies whether this relationship changes with
institutions or health expenditure. The purpose is to provide descriptive evidence to
study the generality of the findings of the main two chapters of the dissertation.
First we explore cross-country correlations between disease outbreaks and civil conflict, for
Africa and a subset of countries in America and Asia, using data on disease outbreak alerts
scraped from the World Health Organization (WHO) website and data on civil conflict
constructed using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)4. We
then study whether this relationship varies for years and countries with better institutions
2Civil violence is perpetrated collectively by citizens or civilian organizations. Interpersonal and
collective violence kills 12.3 people in 100’000 per capita in low income countries, compared to 2.6 people
in 100’000 per capita being killed by interpersonal or collective violence in high income countries (WHO,
2015). On institutional determinants of poverty across countries vid. North (1990); Acemoglu et al.
(2005, 2009); on evidence of emerging infectious disease outbreaks increasing mostly in the developing
world vid. Jones et al. (2008).
3The Plague in 16th century Europe created an opportunity to develop better institutions, through
its effect on raising the salience of public goods (Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2016).
4ACLED Version 6 - 2016, for conflicts from 1997-2018 in Africa, South and South-East Asia. Addi-
tionally, Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) are used for robustness. From 1990-2016 for Africa,
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean (Salehyan et al., 2012)
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using the Freedom House Index on civil liberties and political rights and the Polity IV
score on political regime characteristics and transitions (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002),
or varying levels of yearly health expenditure at national level, using World Bank data.
Secondly, in a panel estimation framework that relies on a Granger causality argument,
we explore whether new disease outbreak alerts in a given year are predictive of greater
conflict incidence in the next year, conditional on prior disease outbreaks, and whether
this relationship changes with institutions or health expenditure.
The results show that countries with higher incidence of disease are more likely to exhibit
civil violence, conditional on population and income. This effect varies, however, with
institutions and health expenditure. The relationship disappears in countries with above
average political rights or above average civil liberties. There is some evidence that greater
health investments last year also diminish the relationship between disease outbreaks this
year and civil violence next year. This descriptive evidence suggests that while disease
outbreaks are associated with social unrest, this depends on the particular institutions
at hand and there is scope for public policy interventions that halt both the burden of
disease and civil conflict.
This chapter adds to the empirical literature on the determinants of conflict, thoroughly
reviewed by Blattman and Miguel (2010). It is most related to recent evidence studying
the impact of endemic diseases, pathogens and infectious diseases on conflict incidence.
Cervellati et al. (2016) provide first evidence of vector-borne endemic diseases as drivers
of civil conflict5, using cross country variation in exposure to human pathogens. They
suggest that the impact of endemic diseases on conflict incidence is a direct effect of
health. Cervellati et al. (2017, 2018) investigate the effect of malaria on civil conflict in
the African continent using data at sub-national grid-cells, studying long-term impacts,
as well as effects at yearly frequency exploiting variation in climatic conditions favorable
5In some cases they are recurrently epidemic, such as malaria in some regions. Vector-borne diseases
require vectors of transmission, which are living organisms that can transmit infectious diseases between
humans or from animals to humans; for example mosquitoes.
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for the transmission of malaria6. They suggest a health shock and a negative income
shock as potential mechanisms and find exploratory evidence on the role of anti-malarial
policies in lowering conflict incidence. This chapter seeks to contribute to this literature
by showing that the impact of disease on conflict highly depends on the institutions at
hand.
The next Section 1.2 describes the data. Section 1.3 provides descriptive evidence of the
main correlates of civil violence. The event study is presented in Section 1.4. Section 1.5
concludes.
1.2 Data
The observations include 69 countries over 1997-2016 in Africa, South and South East
Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico. In some cases, due to data avail-
ability, we restrict the sample to 2004-2016 and exclude three outliers. The outcome of
interest, civil conflict, is constructed using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
Project (ACLED)7. Additionally, Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) is used for
robustness. The main explanatory variable, disease outbreak alerts, are scraped from the
World Health Organization (WHO) website by the author. Three measures of institutions
are used. The Freedom House Index provides an measure of civil liberties and political
rights. Greater values of these scores indicate better institutions. Civil liberties include
freedom of expression and belief, associational rights, rule of law and individual rights;
political rights are an aggregate indicator of the electoral process, political pluralism and
participation, and a functioning government; with higher values indicating more liberties
or rights. Political transitions and regime characteristics (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002),
are measured by the Polity IV index (version 2) from the Center for Systemic Peace. It
captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (autocracy)
6They exploit the fact that the specific features of the malaria epidemiology imply temporary spikes
in malaria transmission risk that are related to weather conditions and confined in time and space.
7ACLED Version 6 - 2016, for conflicts from 1997-2018 in Africa, South and South-East Asia. From
1990-2016 for Africa, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean (Salehyan et al., 2012)
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to +10 (consolidated democracy), with anocracies or mixed regimes8 taking values -5 to
+5 and other regimes taking value 0. Other covariates include population and GDP in
2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD). Finally, health expenditure at national
level is taken from WHO Global Health Expenditure data. This includes public health
expenditure, defined as recurrent and capital spending from government budgets, external
borrowings and grants (incl. donations from international agencies / NGOs), and social
(or compulsory) health insurance funds; as well as private health expenditure, which in-
cludes direct household (out-of-pocket) spending, private insurance, charitable donations,
and direct service payments by private corporations.
1.3 Correlates of Civil Conflict
This Section provides evidence of three correlates of conflict and in the next Section
we study how they are interrelated. Firstly, we study the relationship between disease
outbreak alerts and conflict incidence in Africa and a subset of countries in America
and Asia. Secondly, we plot a well established relationship between weak institutions
and conflict. Thirdly, we look at the correlation between health expenditure and conflict
incidence.
We begin by showing descriptive statistics, Table 1.1. There is an average of 112 conflict
events per year per country in the sample period 1997-2016, of which 35 are violent, 48
are riots and 2.5 describe an event that is explicitly health or disease-related, according
to the description of the event9. Conflicts generate an average of 283 fatalities, 8 of which
are due to riots in particular. In the sample period there are on average 0.5 new disease
outbreak alerts per year for a given country.
Next we show a scatter plot of average yearly conflict and new disease outbreak alerts over
8An anocracy is loosely defined as a political system which is neither fully democratic nor fully
autocratic, often being vulnerable to political instability.
9The description should include any of the words {Health, hospital, doctor, Ebola, malaria, disease,
plague, cholera, AIDS, HIV, sick, illness}.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics - Yearly Averages for all countries - 1997-2016
All All* Africa All** 2004/16
Conflicts: All 112.5 83.64 96.43 84.34
(394.6) (196.7) (208.3) (200.4)
Conflicts: Violent 35.19 29.36 33.85 29.20
(101.9) (74.65) (79.21) (75.54)
Conflicts: Riots 48.60 28.70 33.09 30.57
(255.8) (102.7) (109.6) (107.2)
Conflicts: Health/Disease-Motivated 2.493 1.310 1.510 1.374
(14.87) (4.152) (4.424) (4.307)
Conflicts in 100’000 per capita 4.200 4.119 4.749 4.032
(10.73) (10.72) (11.39) (10.63)
Fatalities due to Conflict 283.0 253.1 291.9 226.1
(968.0) (898.0) (958.5) (828.1)
Disease outbreak (excl. updates) 0.572 0.577 0.490 0.419
(2.248) (2.267) (1.297) (0.856)
Disease outbreak (incl. updates) 1.366 1.382 1.255 1.293
(4.813) (4.855) (4.569) (4.592)
Disease outbreak in 100’000 per capita (excl. updates) 0.0318 0.0324 0.0348 0.0282
(0.131) (0.132) (0.140) (0.126)
Civil Liberties 27.01 27.09 27.26 27.20
(11.32) (11.41) (11.64) (11.44)
Political Rights 16.11 16.13 16.22 16.17
(10.11) (10.18) (10.02) (10.24)
Polity IV 1.144 1.128 1.137 1.222
(5.207) (5.207) (5.058) (5.206)
Population in 100’000 492.0 469.9 212.7 476.2
(1636.9) (1644.3) (281.5) (1660.4)
GDP per capita in 2010 constant US dollars 4615.6 4623.4 4745.1 4702.8
(5914.0) (5969.5) (6348.5) (6069.7)
GDP in 2010 constant US dollars in 100’000 (PPP) 694214.8 675129.3 386391.6 697854.4
(2160805.8) (2176516.4) (774305.3) (2241425.7)
Public Health Expenditure (% of GDP) 2.528 2.560 2.704 2.600
(1.387) (1.380) (1.399) (1.405)
Private Health Expenditure (% of GDP) 3.023 3.041 3.056 3.065
(1.628) (1.638) (1.716) (1.666)
Observations 645 633 549 577
By Country per Year. * Excluding Pakistan and Somalia. ** Excluding Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan.
Observations: 69 countries over 1997-2016 in Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the
Caribbean and Mexico. Data Sources: Conflicts: average number of yearly Conflicts (ACLED). Disease
outbreak alerts (WHO). Population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD). Public
Health Expenditure: recurrent and capital spending from government budgets, external borrowings and
grants (incl. donations from international agencies / NGOs), and social (or compulsory) health insurance
funds; Private Health Expenditure includes direct household (out-of-pocket) spending, private insurance,
charitable donations, and direct service payments by private corporations (WHO Global Health Expen-
diture). Civil Liberties: civil liberties, aggregating freedom of expression and belief, associational rights,
rule of law, individual rights; Political Rights: electoral process, political pluralism and participation,
functioning government, with higher values indicating more liberties or rights (Freedom House Index).
Polity IV (2): captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (autocracy)
to +10 (consolidated democracy), (Center for Systemic Peace).
the sample period. Figure 1.1 shows a significant and positive correlation between disease
outbreaks and conflict incidence, conditional on income per capita and population. This
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relationship could be due to conflict spreading new diseases or vice-versa, due to disease
outbreaks fueling social unrest, a channel studied deeply in Chapter 2, or third factors
influencing both. This is a stylized fact that holds also specifically for violent conflicts
or disease-motivated conflict. The correlation is even larger when conditioning on civil
liberties and political rights10, but it becomes somewhat smaller when controlling for
public and private health expenditure11, suggesting that these are important variables
underlying the relationship between epidemics and conflict incidence. The next Section
1.4 proposes an event study to explore the effect of institutions and health expenditure
on the relationship between epidemics and conflict.
In this Chapter we study whether institutions affect the disease-conflict relationship.
We begin by studying institutions in isolation. Figure 1.2 shows another stylized fact,
namely that greater civil liberties are strongly associated with less likelihood of conflict.
Civil liberties include freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational
rights, rule of law and individual rights. Political rights, which include the right to an
electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and a functioning government,
are also negatively related with conflict incidence, but the correlation is not significant
overall, although it is within the African continent, Figure 1.3. This stylized fact is very
intuitive, since better institutions can discourage the initiation of conflict, due to the
threat of punishment, for instance, and also the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict
is higher with better institutions. However, the threat of war can lead to greater political
rights (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Weinstein, 2005; Blattman and Miguel, 2010) and
there is also evidence that the electoral processes can lead to social unrest in developing
countries (Travaglianti, 2014), therefore the relationship with political rights appears to
be ambiguous. Similarly, whether the country is a democracy or an autocracy is not
related to conflict, 1.4.
Finally, we hypothesize that the disease-conflict relationship depends on the provision of
1084 slope for all countries with a p− value < 0.1% and 67 slope for Africa with a p− value < 0.5%.
1162 slope with p− value < 5% for all countries and 50 slope with p− value < 5% for Africa.
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healthcare. Figure 1.5 gives suggestive evidence in this direction. In particular, it shows a
negative relationship between public health expenditure and conflict, and a positive rela-
tionship between private health expenditure, both of which are weak and not statistically
significant. Health expenditure is expressed as % of GDP and the scatter plots condition
on population and income per capita. This evidence would be consistent with private
health expenditure, which includes charitable donations, being disbursed during disease
outbreaks, which are correlated with conflict, while public health expenditure reflects the
amount of preventive public healthcare invested in a given country. In the next Section
we will study whether health expenditure affects the disease-conflict relationship.
16 Chapter 1
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Adj. R2 = 0.51
Slope = 54
p−value = 0.032
Notes: Conditional on average population, GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD).
Definitions: Conflicts: average number of yearly Conflicts (ACLED). Disease outbreak alerts (excluding
updates) (WHO). The slope is conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars
(World Bank/OECD). Observations: 67 countries over 1997-2016 in Africa, South and South East Asia,
Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico (excluding the outliers Pakistan and Somalia).
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Adj. R2 = 0.57
Slope = −2.4
p−value = 0.0087
Notes: Conditional on average population, GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD) and
new disease outbreaks (WHO). Definitions: Conflicts: average number of yearly Conflicts (ACLED).
Civil Liberties: civil liberties, aggregating freedom of expression and belief, associational rights, rule
of law, individual rights, with higher values indicating more liberties or rights (Freedom House Index).
Observations: 67 countries over 1997-2016 in Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the
Caribbean and Mexico.
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Adj. R2 = 0.53
Slope = −1.9
p−value = 0.094
Notes: Conditional on average population, GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD) and
new disease outbreaks (WHO). Definitions: Conflicts: average number of yearly Conflicts (ACLED).
Political Rights: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, functioning government, with
higher values indicating more liberties or rights (Freedom House Index). Observations: 67 countries over
1997-2016 in Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.
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Adj. R2 = 0.5
Slope = −1.4
p−value = 0.6
Notes: Conditional on average population, GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD) and
new disease outbreaks (WHO). Definitions: Conflicts: average number of yearly Conflicts (ACLED).
Polity IV : ”autocracies” (-10 to -6), ”anocracies” (-5 to +5 and three special values: -66, -77 and -88),
and ”democracies” (+6 to +10); Polity IV (2): replaces the three special systems with value 0, (Center
for Systemic Peace). Observations: 67 countries over 1997-2016 in Africa, South and South East Asia,
Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.
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Adj. R2 = 0.33
Slope = 9.7
p−value = 0.3
Notes: Conditional on average population, GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD). Data
Sources: Conflicts: average number of yearly Conflicts (ACLED). Public Health Expenditure: recurrent
and capital spending from government budgets, external borrowings and grants (incl. donations from
international agencies / NGOs), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds. Private Health
Expenditure: direct household (out-of-pocket) spending, private insurance, charitable donations, and
direct service payments by private corporations (WHO). Observations: 67 countries over 1997-2016 in
Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico (excluding the outliers
Pakistan and Somalia).
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1.4 Event study
Disease and Conflict
This Section uses an event study design to explore the effect of disease outbreaks this year
in a given country on conflict incidence in the following year. The analysis is intended as
exploratory and descriptive of the main patterns found throughout countries and diseases.
Equation (1.1) summarizes the empirical strategy.
Conflicti,t+1 = β DiseaseOutbreaki,t + Xi,t Γ + αi + λt + µr,t + εi,t (1.1)
The effect of interest β measures the predictive power of a new disease outbreak starting
last year t in a given country i on number of conflicts in the next year, conditional on
covariates Xi,t, country αi, year λt and continent×year µr,t fixed effects.
The outcomes of interest are either the total number of conflicts, without making a dis-
tinction between conflict events, riots in particular, which is a violent form of protest,
and conflicts specifically described as disease-motivated. DiseaseOutbreak is the number
of new disease outbreak alerts published by the WHO. We exclude outbreak alerts that
are repetitive (i.e. they are identical to an immediately preceding disease outbreak alert),
in order to reduce the potential problem that our effect captures the international interest
conceded to a given disease outbreak.
Xi,t is the information set available at t. It includes disease outbreaks, population and
income in the previous year (t−1). We control for correlates in the previous year in order
to avoid controlling for a variable that is potentially affected by our treatment of interest,
disease outbreaks at t. Disease outbreaks in the past year are included as controls in order
to account as far as possible for omitted variables affecting the spread of disease. This
means that β will capture the effect of new disease outbreaks at t, net of other things that
affected the likelihood of disease spread over the past year. Standard errors are clustered
by country, the cross-sectional unit of observation. We study 69 countries over 20 years,
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from 1997-2016.
There are several reasons why equation (1.1) is not a causal study. First, the measure of
disease outbreak alerts are not patient records and conflict incidence can either reduce or
increase the salience of disease outbreaks for the WHO. Secondly, we are pooling various
diseases that can themselves be an outcome of previous conflicts and that potentially
exhibit different spreading dynamics. Thirdly, there are omitted variables that could
affect this relationship at the year by country level. We can somewhat reduce these
concerns by studying the full event study, looking at the correlation at different lags and
leads of the outcome, i.e. equation (1.2).
Conflicti,t+h = βh DiseaseOutbreaki,t + Xi,t+h−1 Γ + αi + λt + µr,t + εi,t (1.2)
for all h ∈ [−4,+4]
If new disease outbreaks increase the likelihood of conflict, βh > 0 for h > 0. If conflict
generates new disease outbreaks, βh > 0 for h < 0. If we find contemporaneous effects,
β0 > 0, it is hard to say in this setting which causes the other. Note that Xi,t+h−1 controls
for disease outbreaks prior to (t+ h).
Institutions
We next study the hypothesis that the disease-conflict relationship changes with better
institutions. Firstly, better institutions, such as greater civil liberties or political rights
could make conflict a relatively sub-optimal solution to solve a bargaining process between
two groups12. Secondly, if some types of conflict, such as civil violence, are a form of ex-
pression of social dis-contempt, we should expect freedom of expression to be a substitute
12The measure of institutions used is the Freedom House Index on civil rights or political rights and the
Polity IV score in the past year. Greater values of these scores indicate better institutions. Where civil
liberties aggregate freedom of expression and belief, associational rights, rule of law, individual rights;
and political rights aggregate the right to an electoral process, political pluralism and participation, a
functioning government. Higher values indicate more liberties or rights (Freedom House Index). Polity
IV (2) captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (autocracy) to +10
(consolidated democracy) (Center for Systemic Peace).
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of civil violence. The empirical strategy is summarized in equation (1.3).
Conflicti,t+1 = β DiseaseOutbreaki,t + γ Institutions
High
i (1.3)
+ δ DiseaseOutbreaki,t × InstitutionsHighi + Xi,t Γ + αi + λt + µr,t + εi,t
Where InstitutionsHighi is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the average measure of
institutions for a given country over time is above the mean for all countries. The effect
of interest is δ, which measures the change in the effect of disease outbreaks on conflict
incidence, for countries with above average level of institutions, conditional on covariates.
The measure of institutions is the average over time of the Freedom House Index on civil
rights or political rights and the Polity IV score. Greater values of these scores indicate
better institutions13. The covariates included in Xi,t are the same as in equation (1.1)
above, except that disease outbreaks at (t− 1) are interacted with Institutions.
Public Health Expenditure
Finally we also test the hypothesis that the effect of disease outbreaks on civil conflict is
mitigated by the provision of health care. Health care reduces the detrimental effect of
a disease by reducing morbidity and mortality. Therefore, if the link between epidemics
and conflict is driven by social unrest or demand for public goods, we expect the effect
of disease outbreaks on conflict incidence to be smaller for greater availability of health
care. As a proxy for health care we use the % of GDP committed to health expenditure
in the past year. The empirical strategy is summarized in equation (1.4).
Conflicti,t+1 = β DiseaseOutbreaki,t + γ HealthExpenditurei,t−1 (1.4)
+ δ DiseaseOutbreaki,t ×HealthExpenditurei,t−1 + Xi,t Γ + αi + λt + µr,t + εi,t
13Civil Liberties: civil liberties, aggregating freedom of expression and belief, associational rights,
rule of law, individual rights; Political Rights: electoral process, political pluralism and participation,
functioning government, with higher values indicating more liberties or rights (Freedom House Index);
Polity IV (2): captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (autocracy)
to +10 (consolidated democracy) (Center for Systemic Peace).
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The effect of interest is δ, which measures the change in the effect of disease outbreaks on
conflict incidence, due to an increase in health expenditure in the past year, conditional
on covariates. The measure of health expenditure is the % of GDP committed in the past
year14. The covariates included in Xi,t are the same as in equation (1.1) above, but we
also add health expenditure in the previous year (t− 1) and both population, income and
prior disease outbreaks at (t− 1) are interacted with health expenditure at (t− 1).
Unless health expenditure perfectly predicts new disease outbreaks, other than due to
prior disease outbreaks, δ should be a satisfactory approximation of the mitigating effect
of health expenditure on the disease-conflict relationship.
Results
The results show a positive relationship between new disease outbreaks and conflict in-
cidents in the following years. The effect is not precisely estimated for conflict incidents
overall until three years ahead, Table 1.2, but it is significant at the 5% level for riots or
for health or disease-related conflicts in the next year and in the following years, Tables
1.3-1.4. A new disease outbreak in a given year is followed by 66 additional riots next
year or a 15% increase and by 2.5 additional health or disease-related conflicts, or a 12%
increase in these events15. With an average of 0.4 disease outbreak alerts each year, Table
1.1, this suggests that an average of 26 riots follow disease outbreaks each year and only
1 of them is explicitly disease or health-related according to the newspapers reporting on
the event. Results for an alternative specification with a count data model is shown in
Table A.13. The effect of disease outbreaks on conflict incidence in this specification is
more precisely estimated.
When accounting for heterogeneous effects by institutions or health expenditure the cor-
relation between epidemics and conflict is larger and more precisely estimated, suggesting
14We study either total, private or public health expenditure.
15Observations are weighted by population. Since population changes over time we use the first available
population data. Results are equivalent when using the average population over the time period.
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that these are potentially important mechanisms underlying this relationship, Tables 1.5
and A.1-A.2 and Figures 1.6 and A.2-A.3. The effect of disease outbreaks on conflict inci-
dence disappears in countries with above average political rights or civil liberties16. The
effect is somewhat larger in countries that are democratic, compared to autocratic coun-
tries, but the difference is not statistically different from zero. It is smaller in countries
with greater freedom of expression, but the effect is not statistically different from zero.
We also see a smaller but not statistically significant effect of disease outbreaks on conflict
incidence when a greater proportion of the GDP is dedicated to health expenditure in the
past year.
These patterns are suggestive of important heterogeneities across political institutions and
public policies underlying in the effect of shocks such as epidemics on conflict incidence
in developing countries.
Table 1.2: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Conflict
Conflicts
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disease(t) 7.260 -22.56 13.38 -13.29 -5.629 52.28 130.0 242.1∗ 50.27
(14.16) (23.96) (15.97) (18.28) (49.48) (34.48) (88.48) (139.68) (65.64)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.748 0.651 0.680 0.669 0.889 0.881 0.870 0.873 0.889
Mean 65.10 80.70 95.54 116.7 516.5 555.5 602.0 658.9 727.6
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), Disease(t+j-1), Disease(t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016 in Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the
Caribbean and Mexico (excluding Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan).
16This is not apparent when using within country variation of institutions fluctuating over time instead
of the country average, Tables A.8, A.6
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Table 1.3: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Riots
Conflicts
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disease(t) 5.988 -20.02 11.03 0.148 4.338 66.25∗∗ 127.3 212.3 48.45
(6.62) (17.56) (12.03) (11.18) (44.37) (30.54) (80.66) (128.32) (58.73)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.559 0.482 0.547 0.541 0.896 0.886 0.874 0.876 0.893
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), Disease(t+j-1), Disease(t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016 in Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the
Caribbean and Mexico (excluding Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan).
Table 1.4: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Health or Disease-related Conflict
Conflicts
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disease(t) 0.278 -0.542 0.109 -0.455 -0.580 2.438∗∗ 5.839∗ 10.72∗ 2.496
(0.22) (0.46) (0.42) (0.58) (1.99) (1.15) (3.43) (6.35) (2.94)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.546 0.556 0.590 0.479 0.885 0.876 0.864 0.865 0.880
Mean 0.845 1.128 1.466 2.316 19.18 20.76 22.61 24.85 27.58
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), Disease(t+j-1), Disease(t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016 in Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the
Caribbean and Mexico (excluding Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan).
1.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to show a novel empirical pattern found across countries
and disease outbreaks, namely that while disease outbreaks are associated with greater
likelihood of conflict, this relationship highly depends on political institutions and po-
lices, such as public health expenditure. The second chapter seeks to causally identify
the impact of an epidemic on civil violence and the role of the state response and trust in
authorities in determining this relationship. The third chapter, on the other hand, studies
the effects of a particular policy, namely local media, on the spread of an epidemic, and
explores its role as a coordination device to change cultural practices.
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Table 1.5: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Riots
Heterogeneous effects by Institutions / Health Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
disesase(t) 12.58 67.34∗∗ 66.25∗∗ 57.06∗ 177.9∗∗ 139.9∗∗∗ 63.65 74.04∗∗
(19.56) (31.09) (30.54) (31.12) (74.78) (35.59) (49.89) (32.31)
disesase(t) × Polity IVHigh 28.28
(90.63)
disesase(t) × Political RightsHigh -308.6∗∗
(133.63)
disesase(t) × Civil LibertiesHigh -127.1∗∗∗
(44.17)
disesase(t) × Freedom of ExpressionHigh -16.13
(65.35)
disesase(t) × Health Expenditure (t-1) -14.88
(21.01)
Observations 648 577 577 577 577 577 577 577
R-squared 0.814 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.901 0.887 0.888 0.887
Mean 427.6
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year × Continent FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population(t-1),GDP(t-1) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
disease(t-1) Y Y Y Y Y Y
(1, disease(t-1)) × Institutions(t-1) Y Y Y Y
(1, disease(t-1)) × Health Expenditure(t-1) Y
(Robust SE) clustered by country
Where Institutions are demeaned variables.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD)
at (t − 1), and disease outbreaks one year before and also at (t − 1). Weighted by average population
over the sample period. For full specification equation (1.3). Definitions: Conflicts: disease-motivated
conflicts according to the description of the event (ACLED). Disease outbreak alerts (excluding updates)
(WHO). Civil Liberties: civil liberties, aggregating freedom of expression and belief, associational rights,
rule of law, individual rights; Political Rights: electoral process, political pluralism and participation,
functioning government, with higher values indicating more liberties or rights (Freedom House Index);
Polity IV (2): captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (autocracy)
to +10 (consolidated democracy) (Center for Systemic Peace). Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016
in Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico (excluding Somalia,
Pakistan (outliers) and South Sudan (incomplete data on civil liberties)).
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Figure 1.6: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Riots
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Conditional on political rights (demeaned) × (1, disease outbreaks)
Notes: Conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD)
at (t − 1), and disease outbreaks one year before and also at (t − 1). Weighted by average population
over the sample period. For full specification equation (1.2). Definitions: Conflicts: average number of
yearly Conflicts (ACLED). Disease-motivated conflicts according to the description of the event. Disease
outbreak alerts (excluding updates) (WHO). Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016 in Africa, South




Evidence from the Ebola outbreak in
Western Africa
“If the sun refuses to rise we will make it rise.”
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, Half of a Yellow Sun
2.1 Introduction
Numerous acts of civil violence are reported in newspapers following the spread of epi-
demics throughout the African continent today1. Mobs, riots and attacks often target
government authorities, health personnel and social workers aiming to contain an epi-
demic2. Since these episodes are especially likely to happen in weak institutional settings,
under the presence of latent conflict, and poverty and conflict can facilitate the spread of
disease, establishing causal evidence is difficult, yet of great policy relevance. Identifying
the drivers of civil violence in the context of an epidemic and the type of state response
1We have identified riots, protests and violence against civilians following the spread of cholera,
malaria, Ebola, HIV/AIDS, or unidentified diseases, in Congo, DRC, Kenya, Nigeria, Mozambique,
Uganda, Tunisia, Somalia, South Africa, from newspaper reports in the Armed Conflict Location and
Event Data Project, 1997-2015.
2Examples are provided in the Supplementary Appendix Table D.3.
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that fuels or mitigates this effect is ever more important for policy makers, as infectious
disease outbreaks are on the rise in developing regions and greater humanitarian aid is
needed to respond to them (Jones et al., 2008).
In this paper we seek to identify the impact of an epidemic on civil violence and the role
of the state response and trust in authorities in determining this relationship. In doing
so we aim to learn about determinants of conflict and in particular the part played by
perceived state coercion and demand for public goods in fueling social unrest. We also
study the consequences for long-run trust in institutions.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop strategies to identify both the impact
of an epidemic on the likelihood of conflict and precise channels underlying this effect.
We also show long-run consequences by studying its impacts on trust in institutions. We
study the state response or emergency assistance and provide new evidence on drivers
of civil violence. We do this in the context of the Ebola epidemic in Western Africa in
2014-15, described as the largest, most severe and most complex outbreak in the history
of the disease (WHO, 2015). The outbreak was a major shock that generated a great
influx of state capacity3, through foreign aid, and required the adoption of new medical
technologies, as well as a change in cultural practices to halt the spread of the disease.
Numerous riots, protests and violence against government officials, medical personnel and
social workers were reported in newspapers. We exploit detailed data available at weekly
and localized level on Ebola infections, conflict events and intervention measures, com-
bined with the precise dynamics of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) and the timing of
distinct intervention measures to identify the impact of the epidemic on civil violence
for different containment efforts in the countries most affected by the epidemic, namely
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The setting further allows us to track the impact of the
3Including financial resources, medical technology and infrastructure and military aid, coordinated
under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO). The total worth of direct and in-kind
contributions to WHO for the Ebola response was US$459 million from over 60 donors between March
2014 and 22 April 2016, www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/funding/en updated April 2016. We see
this as a permanent shock in state capacity, since it led to an improved public health system that is now
ready to contain future Ebola outbreaks. Moreover, community responses were key in containing the
epidemic and this experience can have permanent effects on containing future disease outbreaks.
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epidemic shock on civil violence under varying levels of ethnic diversity, religious beliefs
and trust and measure long-run impacts on trust in institutions.
Epidemics affect the relationship between civilians or between civilians and the state.
These changes can lead to social unrest. We conjecture that an epidemic in which the
state intervenes or is expected to intervene changes citizens’ perception of the state and
demands from it in at least three ways. First, it leads the state to adopt coercive mea-
sures, in order to halt contagion. Second, it generates a demand for public goods, as
people need health treatment. Third, it requires a change in cultural practices, such as
burial practices, and these are induced by state authorities. We hypothesize that these
changes are important drivers of civil violence targeted against institutional authorities
in the context of an epidemic, and whether they are perceived as threats and ultimately
lead to civil conflict depends on beliefs, trust in institutions and the response of the state.
Epidemics also tear families apart and affect the relationship between citizens, fearing
contagion. In this paper we highlight the importance of institutional channels, those that
are influenced by policy makers, through the choice of a particular emergency response.
These mechanisms mean that epidemics are more likely to lead to civil conflict in weak
institutional settings4. Moreover, they can deepen mistrust in institutions, therefore fur-
ther weakening the state.
We test our hypotheses empirically and approach this by combining several data sources.
The explanatory variable, the number of Ebola infections, are patient records from the
World Health Organisation (WHO) and the National Ebola Response Ebola Center
(NERC) in Sierra Leone. This data was collected in Guinea for Chapter 3 and for Sierra
Leone it was shared by Fang et al. (2016). For Liberia we use publicly available data and
additional data scraped from Situation Reports from the Liberian Ministry of Health. Our
4With low access to public goods, low trust in leaders and settings in which state coercion is perceived
as illegitimate.
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outcome variable are riots, protests and violence against civilians that are large enough
to be recorded in local, national and international newspapers, provided by the Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data Project5. The intervention measures were published
during the Ebola outbreak to facilitate containment efforts by the United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the Red Cross and the WHO.
We also use two rounds of Afrobarometer survey data, pre and post-epidemic.
We use two main sources of variation to identify the impact of the epidemic on conflict
incidence. First, the epidemic had a clear beginning, in December 2013, and a clear
end, in April 2016. The timing and location of the first human being infected with the
virus in Guinea is an exogenous shock, created by the very unlikely event of animal-to-
human transmission. The geographic spread throughout the region, prior to significant
control efforts is largely due to pre-existing road and trade networks, mobility patterns
and population density. Despite enormous efforts by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)
to control the epidemic, their capacity was largely overwhelmed by the speed of the
disease spreading throughout the region until the international community committed a
large amount of resources eight to nine months after the patient zero was infected at the
borders in the intersection of three countries. We exploit this in a difference-in-difference
design to look at the overall impact of the epidemic on conflict incidence. We look at the
change in civil violence taking place before and after the start of the epidemic, comparing
places hit by Ebola with different levels of intensity measured by the cumulative number of
cases at the end of the outbreak. The identification relies on a parallel trends assumption
and the exogeneity of the first index case. We strengthen our identification to address the
possibility of ex-post selection into treatment by instrumenting the end-level of Ebola in
a given location with the geographic distance to the first index case.
Second, the virus spread from human-to-human through body fluids under precise dy-
5We also did the same exercise using as outcome variable social resistance data, which was scraped
from Situation Reports during the Ebola outbreak collected in Guinea Chapter 3. We also find a positive
impact of Ebola infections on social resistance using this measure. At this stage they are omitted from
the paper.
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namics that we know from the epidemic models and that we observe at weekly level for a
given location. We use this high-frequency panel to identify the impacts of new infections
on riots in subsequent weeks, conditional on time, location and month per region fixed
effects6. Identification relies on the arrival of new cases being random with respect to
conflict, conditional on fixed characteristics and past incidence. We use two instrumental
variables strategies to strengthen our identification. First, we instrument the number of
new infections in a given location by the turning on and off of the epidemic in neighbor-
ing locations, to ensure that our findings are not driven by time-varying confounders with
persistent effects in a given location. Secondly, we construct a predicted Ebola measure
from the medical literature that relies on the geographic position of each location, infec-
tions several periods in the past and fixed characteristics, with the aim to address the
possibility of non-standard measurement error in infections.
To study the role of the state response in determining civil violence, we exploit an ex-
ogenous shock in state capacity, following the emergency assistance package. It included
military aid, new medical technologies and improved public health systems7. This gives
us precise timing and location of containment efforts that allow us to study the role of per-
ceived state coercion and demand for public goods in generating civil conflict. The impact
of military district quarantines is studied in a difference-in-difference setting relying on
the timing being independent of predicted conflict and on a parallel trends assumption8.
The role of demand for public goods is measured by looking at the differential impact of
new Ebola infections on conflict incidence for locations with varying levels of demand for
health facilities, before and after their implementation9.
6This is robust to controlling for infections in contiguous weeks, cumulative infections or past conflict
incidence.
7We see this as a permanent shock in state capacity, since the public surveillance and response system
that was put in place in West Africa is now ready to contain future outbreaks. Moreover, community
responses were key in containing the epidemic and this required mobilizing local communities, as well as
learning, halting the spread of rumors and changing burial practices, salutation and improving hygiene.
This experience can have permanent effects on containing future disease outbreaks.
8We provide evidence that this is the case by showing parallel trends prior to their implementation.
We also restrict our sample to ever quarantined districts in an event study. The results are robust to
conditioning on areas with sufficient level of epidemic incidence.
9The decision of the international community to intervene serves as a timing event that is exogenous
with respect to the local spread of Ebola and conflict incidence. The end-level of public good provision
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The impact of trust and beliefs in the relationship between epidemics and conflict is
studied by looking at the impact of new infections on conflict incidence for areas with
varying levels of trust, religiosity, ethnic diversity and other expected correlates of civil
violence. We hypothesize that religious beliefs are a predictor of civil violence in the
context of an epidemic, as it requires a change in cultural practices, which is more costly
for these groups.
Finally, we study the effect of the epidemic on trust in institutions. We compare trust
levels before and after the Ebola outbreak for locations with different levels of Ebola inci-
dence and we also explore how this varies by religiosity10. If changes in cultural practices
are a driver of civil violence in the context of an epidemic, we expect trust in institutional
authorities to drop especially for communities with strong religious beliefs.
The results show that one new Ebola infection in 100’000 per capita increases the like-
lihood of conflict in the next period by 10% in a given location11, from a baseline mean
incidence of 0.013 at two-week level, for a given location12. Our estimates mean that
moving from no cases to the average Ebola incidence for locations that were hit by the
epidemic in the first year doubles conflict incidence in a matter of weeks13. The type of
conflict that arises is subversive violence, since the object of attack are institutional and
medical authorities.
The impacts of this epidemic shock on civil violence are localized and its biggest impacts
occur at the peak of the international intervention. Military district quarantines have a
large impact on increasing the likelihood of riots and protests, beyond the impact of new
is a measure of the ideal level of health centers if the great amount of financial aid was available at the
beginning of the outbreak. We use this to study the impact of new infections on conflict incidence for
varying levels of public good provision at the end of the outbreak, before and after the arrival of aid.
10We study religiosity as measured prior to the outbreak.
11Conflict is measured as the number of conflicts in 100’000 per capita in a given location. Ebola is
measured at county, chiefdom and sub-prefecture level and conflict is measured at district, chiefdom and
sub-prefecture level, for Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, respectively.
12In our tables we look at the incidence of conflict in one million per capita to let the reading of the
tables be easier, so the baseline incidence in that case is 0.13.
13The average Ebola incidence for locations that were already hit in 2014 is 8 cases in 100’000 per
capita.
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infections. Prior to the arrival of a significant amount of emergency assistance, areas with
more end-level of public goods have higher conflict incidence as a consequence of new
Ebola cases, and the opposite effect thereafter14. The results indicate that civil conflict
is fueled by perceived state coercion and demand for public goods. Lower trust in leaders
and strong religious beliefs makes civil violence more likely to arise as a consequence of
new Ebola cases15.
The epidemic further deepens mistrust in institutional authorities. Two years after the
outbreak there are lower levels of trust across measures compared to pre-epidemic levels.
In particular the epidemic led to lower trust levels for locations that were hardest hit
by the epidemic, especially for strong religious communities, which face larger costs of
cultural adaptation.
Literature
We seek to contribute to several sets of literature. This paper adds to the empirical
literature on the determinants of conflict, thoroughly reviewed by Blattman and Miguel
(2010)16. We contribute to recent evidence studying the impact of endemic diseases,
pathogens and infectious diseases on conflict incidence. Cervellati et al. (2016) provide
first evidence of vector-borne endemic diseases as drivers of civil conflict17, using cross
country variation in exposure to human pathogens. They suggest that the impact of en-
demic diseases on conflict incidence is a direct effect of health. Cervellati et al. (2017,
2018) investigate the effect of malaria on civil conflict in the African continent using
14This holds when controlling for cumulative cases or allowing for heterogeneous effects for locations
with varying end-level Ebola.
15Areas with strong religious beliefs do not have higher rates of civil violence at baseline.
16This paper is most related to a large literature studying economic determinants of conflict (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003; Miguel et al., 2004; Bellows and Miguel, 2006; Burke et al., 2009; Brückner and Ciccone,
2010; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Berman et al., 2017), as well as a literature studying the role of ethnic
diversity as a correlate of civil violence, collective action and the provision of public goods (Easterly
and Levine, 1997; Posner, 2004; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Esteban and Ray, 2008; Eifert et al., 2010;
Glennerster et al., 2013).
17In some cases they are recurrently epidemic, such as malaria in some regions. Vector-borne diseases
require vectors of transmission, which are living organisms that can transmit infectious diseases between
humans or from animals to humans; for example mosquitoes.
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data at sub-national grid-cells, studying long-term impacts, as well as effects at monthly
frequency exploiting variation in climatic conditions favorable for the transmission of
malaria18. They suggest a health shock and a negative income shock as potential mecha-
nisms and find exploratory evidence on the role of anti-malarial policies in lowering conflict
incidence. This paper contributes to the evidence on the impacts of infectious diseases on
civil conflict, methodologically, as well as more deeply by providing precise mechanisms
underlying this effect. Ebola is a virus, does not require a vector of transmission and it is
not driven by climatic variation19. In this way we isolate the impact of an epidemic from
climate shocks driving conflict (Hsiang et al., 2011, 2013; Harari and La Ferrara, 2013).
The Ebola epidemic is sufficiently large to generate social distress, but it did not affect
the population size significantly20. In our context we are therefore able to rule out the po-
tential effect of the epidemic acting through population changes (Acemoglu et al., 2017).
Most importantly, the Ebola epidemic provides a unique opportunity to study a new epi-
demic to a large region21, track it from the first index case to the last contagion, study
the role of the state response to it and provide precise mechanisms linking the impact of a
major epidemic outbreak to civil conflict. We suggest that epidemics trigger civil conflict
as they affect the relationship between civilians or between civilians and the state. In the
case of the Ebola outbreak the major influx of emergency assistance allows us to study
the role of the state response in fueling civil violence. In particular, we provide evidence
of perceived state coercion and demand for public goods as drivers of subversive violence,
contributing to the discussion on the role of state capacity as a determinant of conflict
18They exploit the fact that the specific features of the malaria epidemiology imply temporary spikes
in malaria transmission risk that are related to weather conditions and confined in time and space.
19Humidity can help its transmission, but the spread of the virus is driven by the contact with the body
fluids of an infected person. After the first index case from animal-to-human, the spread is exclusively
through to human-to-human contact and is largely driven by proximity to the epicenter
20The deceased population is 0.05% of the total population in the three most affected countries over
2-3 years, compared to an annual population death rate of 1% in Guinea and Sierra Leone or 0.7% in
Liberia (CIA World Factbook, 2017). The total cumulative number of Ebola infections was 0.13% of the
total population, and 2% is the maximum cumulative percentage of infected people in one location over
the 2-3 years.
21The three most affected countries in West Africa comprise a total population of 23 million people.
Discovered in the 1970s, the Ebola virus has caused around twenty outbreaks to date, all in Africa, but
this was its first time turning into an epidemic and it was the first time it hit West Africa, therefore
constituting an unknown disease to the population affected.
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(Fearon and Laitin, 2003). This further suggests that perceived state coercion and little
sensitivity to local customs is a complementary explanation to the impact of humanitarian
aid on civil conflict, other than aid stealing by armed groups (Nunn and Qian, 2014). We
also highlight the importance of religious beliefs in triggering civil violence in the context
of an epidemic, due to a greater cost of changing cultural practices. This is consistent
with the role of religious beliefs in spreading rumors or exerting violence (Miguel, 2005).
Finally, we show that the epidemic lowers trust in institutional authorities, especially for
religious communities. This provides further evidence of epidemics triggering civil con-
flict through their impact on changing citizens’ perception of the state and adds to the
evidence on determinants of trust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).
Secondly, this work contributes to a literature on the role of the spread of diseases for
social and institutional change (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2003;
Young, 2005; Alsan, 2014). We zoom into the short-run dynamics of institutional change
driven by an epidemic. Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2016) find that Plague outbreaks in 16th
century Europe shifted local politics in a few years, creating salience for public goods, and
this paper increases our understanding of this process in the short-run, showing how riots
and protests might arise immediately to demand public goods. This is related to work
on protests and institutional change that finds an effect of changing beliefs on protests
and collective action (Barbera and Jackson, 2016; Cantoni et al., 2017). Our findings
are consistent with evidence of low health uptake in developing contexts (Dupas, 2011;
Greenwood et al., 2013; Alsan and Wanamaker, 2016) and resistance to adopting new
medical technologies (Caprettini and Voth, 2017). By studying the behavioral response
to emergency assistance, we contribute to evidence of institutional determinants of the
spread of infectious diseases (Adda, 2016; Morse et al., 2016).
Finally, this paper contributes to a long discussion among historians, on the role of epi-
demics as social toxins. Historians have noted two distinct types of civil violence that
emerged as a consequence of epidemic outbreaks. Some epidemics have led to violence
against civilians, such as ethnic violence or targetted at victims of the disease, notoriously
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the Black death in 14th century Europe and to some extent also later Plagues, the US
smallpox epidemic or the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the early 20th century (Cohn, 2016).
Epidemics in such contexts have sparked ethnic violence that lasted for centuries through
cultural persistence (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Jedwab et al., 2017). Other epidemics
have led to subversive violence, targetting government authorities, medical personnel and
social workers. This is the case of the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa, there is ample
historical evidence of similar violence arising during epidemic outbreaks in Europe, Rus-
sia or North America22, and is recurrent throughout epidemic outbreaks in the African
continent today23. Evans (1988) notes that “the general coincidence of cholera epidemics
with years of upheaval and revolution has proved too obvious to ignore”, however the
direction of causality remains to be demonstrated. This paper gives proof of an epidemic
leading to subversive violence and precise channels underlying this effect24. We provide
empirical evidence of institutional mechanisms linking epidemics to civil violence in weak
institutional settings and its long-run effects on trust.
The paper is structured as follows. In the following Section 2.2, we provide a brief back-
ground on the Ebola outbreak. The data sources are described in Section 2.3. The
empirical set-up and results are presented in Section 2.4. First, we search for causal
evidence linking the epidemic to civil violence, Subsection 2.4.1. Second, we provide em-
pirical evidence on drivers of civil violence, Subsection 2.4.2. Third, we show long-run
impacts of the epidemic on trust, Subsection 2.4.3. Robustness checks are presented in
Subsection 2.4.4. We conclude in Section 2.5.
22Cholera riots similar to the Ebola riots in Western Africa were the norm during the cholera outbreaks
in 19-20th century Europe, North America and Russia. On further historical evidence of epidemics fueling
civil violence, vid. Evans (1988); Voigtländer and Voth (2012); Cohn (2016); Richards (2016)
23See examples in the Supplementary Appendix Table D.3.
24Understanding what makes ethnic rather than subversive violence more likely to arise is an interesting
question for future work. We do not have the counter-factual of ethnic violence in the case of the Ebola
outbreak. Which type of civil violence arises could depend on the response by the state, as this can affect
the salience of the out-group. A relevant theoretical framework is provided by Esteban and Ray (2008,
2011b).
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2.2 Background
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a severe disease with a fatality rate varying from
25 − 90% at different stages of the outbreak. The virus is transmitted through physical
contact with the blood, organs, secrecations, or other body fluids of infected humans or
animals, such as fruit bats or primates, as well as infected objects, such as needles and
syringes. The disease is characterised by initial flu-like symptoms, which rapidly progress
into vomiting, diarrhea, stomach pain and haemorrhage25. The incubation period, i.e. the
time from infection with the virus to the onset of symptoms, is estimated at an average
of 8-12 days in the 2014 Western African Ebola outbreak (Van Kerkhove et al., 2015),
but it can potentially take up to 21 days. The virus can only be detected after symptoms
arise, even in the laboratory, and it is hard to detect at early stages26. Infectiousness
increases at later stages, with deceased bodies being the most contagious. Patients die
within one or two weeks after onset of symptoms or recover becoming immune. Ebola
survivors suffer with persistent medical conditions after recovery, including joint pain, lost
of sight, headaches, and other chronic health issues, as well as social stigma.
Discovered in the 1970s, the Ebola virus has caused around twenty outbreaks to date, all
in Africa, but this was its first time turning into an epidemic27. The 2014 West African
Ebola epidemic is the largest in history, causing over over 28,600 infections and over 11,300
deaths, between December 2013 and April 201628. Within less than a year the disease
spread through Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, small outbreaks reached Nigeria, Mali
and a few cases were exported to Europe and the US. Halting an Ebola outbreak requires a
25www.who.int/ebola or www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola
26 “Diagnosing Ebola in a person who has been infected for only a few days may be complicated. The
early symptoms of Ebola infection are difficult to distinguish from other, more common infectious diseases
such as such as malaria, influenza, and typhoid fever. Ebola virus is detected in blood only after onset of
symptoms, most notably fever, which accompany the rise in circulating virus, however, it may take up to
3 days after symptoms begin for the virus to reach detectable levels.” from Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/laboratories/specimens.html
27Definition of epidemic : affecting or tending to affect a disproportionately large number of individuals
within a population, community, or region at the same time
28http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/, accessed April 1, 2017.
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great effort to treat symptomatic individuals, isolate infected people, trace their contacts,
ensure safe burials and change population behaviors towards protective habits (Fast et al.,
2014). This proved to be especially difficult in the present context of weak state capacity,
slow international response, unfamiliarity with the disease and religious or cultural habits
that facilitated the spread, especially through traditional burials.
Evidence suggests that the first index case29 occurred in the Forest region in Guinea in
December 2013 at the borders of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Subsequent cases spread
exclusively through human-to-human contact. For eight to nine months these countries
with very weak health systems and state capacity, tried to deal with the outbreak, with
soaring death rates. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), who scaled up their intervention,
called it an ‘unprecedented Ebola epidemic’ already by end of March 2014. It was not un-
til August 2014 that the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared it an ‘international
public health emergency’, followed by financial aid from international donors. By the time
international aid reached the affected countries, over 4,000 cases had been confirmed. In-
ternational aid coordinated by the WHO implemented specialized medical infrastructure,
contact tracing, surveillance systems and awareness raising campaigns. The peak of the
outbreak due to the effectiveness of the interventions was reached by the end of 2014. The
outbreak came to an end mid-2015, except for Guinea, which had a significant amount
of cases until end of 2015. New infections still appeared in April 2016, but at that point
new medical infrastructure and surveillance systems were in place to avoid another major
outbreak and the epidemic was officially declared to an end in the summer of 2016.
Numerous riots, protests and violence erupted to counter medical interventions that were
opposed by the civilian population. A few examples of violence during the Ebola outbreak
include (Cohn and Kutalek, 2016) :
“[In Guinea], Macenta on 5 April 2014, urban youth attacked the towns
first [Ebola] clinic constructed a week earlier, and threatened fifty or more of
29The first contagion to humans is zoonotic, i.e. entering in contact with a reservoir host, such as bats,
for instance by eating rare bush meat.
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the centres personnel. The protesters claimed [Ebola] did not exist or was
spread by outsiders [...]. Then on 16 September, at Womey, West Africa expe-
rienced its worst [Ebola] atrocity when 8 members of a high-level delegation
of doctors, politicians, and journalists were killed and their bodies dumped in
a latrine [...]. At Matainkay, east of Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 20 September
2014, villagers assailed health workers while they buried [Ebola] victims, and
in December, the Red Cross reported further attacks on their burial teams
with damages to their vehicles. In Liberia at Westpoint, a poor township in
Monrovia, an angry mob overran a health care facility, brought out all patients
isolated there and looted the clinic.”
Containment efforts were opposed by the civilian population either because they were
coercive, such as military quarantines or forced detainment in Ebola treatment units
(ETUs); the intentions of emergency assistance were misunderstood, through the spread
of rumors; or they went against people’s most fundamental beliefs, surrounding the burial
of the deceased family members. This allows us to identify three main sources of distress
associated to an epidemic.
The first source of distress is military or police action. Their activity included maintaining
checkpoints, patrolling country and locality borders, enforcing village-level and district-
wide quarantines, and taking punitive measures against individuals found in violation
of government mandates for burials, case reporting, and caregiving30. Military district-
quarantines, curfews or area blockades, for instance, meant that people could not leave a
given area, while knowing that they are surrounded by other people infected with Ebola.
The population size of an area blockaded varied. It could affect a village, chiefdom or a
whole district31. The decision is taken in some cases at government level, sometimes at
chiefdom level.
30In some cases security forces were doing required public health actions, in others they showed an
abuse of power. In either case, these activities received a variety of responses, from acceptance to
outright resistance (Hofman and Au, 2017).
31In our dataset the average size of a geographic unit quarantined is 50’000 people.
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The second source of distress is demand for health treatment, on one hand, and rumors
surrounding it, on the other. Ebola patients need to be isolated to avoid contagion and
treatment requires special equipment, including the use of personal protective equipment
(PPE) by doctors. This meant that patients could not be treated in hospitals and instead
required the establishment of ad-hoc health centers, known as Ebola treatment units
(ETUs). According to our interviews with social workers in Guinea, the biggest source of
rumors and conspiracy theories was around what was happening inside ETUs32. Given
that Ebola was a new, unknown disease to the region, that early Ebola symptoms are
very similar to other endemic diseases in the region and that people died in ETUs with a
very high fatality rate at the beginning at the outbreak, it is not surprising that rumors
spread33. At later stages of the outbreak, when the public health systems were improved,
including the establishment of laboratories that allowed for rapid testing, death rates went
down and the benefit of seeking treatment in an ETU became prevalent. In some cases an
alternative method emerged, known as Community care centers (CCCs), for first patient
care of suspect patients. These were opened spontaneously by the communities and led
by traditional caregivers, rather than professional staff.
Third, changes in cultural practices were associated with social unrest. Traditional burial
practices involved washing the deceased by close family members. Since the Ebola virus
disease is most infectious in dead bodies, changing this practice was a first priority. In
Liberia cremations were imposed (Richards, 2016) and in the other countries the first
attempt was to impose safe burials, which did not allow for traditional or religious customs.
The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, who were in charge of conducting safe
burial practices, received significant violent opposition. In Guinea alone, reported attacks
against Red Cross volunteers averaged ten per month in the last six months of 201434. Safe
32According to their accounts, an important way to halt the spread of rumors was for family members
to come and see what was happening inside the ETUs.
33In pure observational probabilistic terms entering an ETU was a death sentence at the start of the
outbreak, especially for patients that arrived when symptoms were already advanced.
34IFRC, website. The had to use personal protective equipment (PPE) to avoid their own contagion
with the virus, which has a very impressive effect, as the whole body is covered and you are not able to
see the face of the person.
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burials were progressively adapted to local customs, such as involving religious leaders,
leading to what became known as safe and dignified burials.
Social unrest or resistance against the health interventions, on the other hand, can lead to
lower health uptake and affect the spread of the disease. Anthropology studies, medical
reports (Moon, 2015) and own-collected evidence from interviewing health personnel,
social workers and public officials in Guinea, suggest that informing, persuading and
involving communities, religious and local leaders in containment activities was key for
the success of the intervention. Chapter 3 shows that places that had access to a prolonged
campaign from local radios designed to stop the spread of Ebola rumors in Guinea had
a decrease in social unrest and a drop in Ebola cases seven months after the start of
the campaign, compared to other areas with access to the same campaign from distant
communities or to areas with access to national or private radio stations.
2.3 Data
The explanatory variable, the number of Ebola infections, originates from patient records
from the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the National Ebola Response Ebola
Center (NERC) in Sierra Leone. The number of Ebola infected cases was collected in
Guinea for Chapter 3 and for Sierra Leone it was shared by Fang et al. (2016). For Liberia
we use publicly available data from WHO and additional data scraped from Situation
Reports from the Liberian Ministry of Health. Ebola cases can be either suspect, probable
or confirmed, depending on the stage at which patients have been identified, based on
symptoms or laboratory testing. We exclude suspect cases, since these are cases that
have not been evaluated by a clinician35. Infections are reported at weekly level and the
date corresponds to the actual or estimated date of symptom onset. Hence, these are
contagions that necessarily occurred prior to the week of report, most likely in a time
35This is strategy is consistent with the reporting practice of the WHO, which publish data of confirmed
and probable cases only. In addition, for Liberia, our measure of suspect cases might contain errors in
timing or double counting, since these are scraped from Situation Reports, published at the time, rather
than from the Patient database. The results are qualitatively similar when adding suspect cases.
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window of 1-2 weeks before. We collapse the data to two-week windows in order to take
into account the possible time-span from contagion to symptom onset. Cases are recorded
at the level of sub-prefecture for Guinea, chiefdom for Sierra Leone and county for Liberia.
Our main measure of infections are new Ebola infections in 100’000 per capita in a given
geographical unit (507) over two weeks (115) from January 2012 - May 2016.
Our outcome of interest, conflict incidence, is constructed using the Armed Conflict Lo-
cation and Event Data Project36 Version 6 - 2015 and Realtime data 2016, which collects
data on intergroup conflict from local and international newspapers, coding the exact
date, geographic coordinates, type of conflict event, actors involved, number of fatalities,
news source and description found in the newspaper37. We consider all conflict types,
irrespective of the number of fatalities involved. During the sample period, the most
common conflict events are intra-state conflict, i.e. civil conflicts, including riots, protests
and violence against civilians. We aggregate conflict events at the level of sub-prefecture
for Guinea, chiefdom for Sierra Leone and district for Liberia. For Liberia, this is a more
disaggregated level than the number of Ebola cases. Since we use population weights in
all our specifications, results are unchanged if we aggregate the number of conflicts to
county level for Liberia. The advantage to use the lowest possible level of disaggregation,
is that we have more variation in pre-determined characteristics to study heterogeneous
effects. Our main outcome variable is the number of conflicts in 1’000’000 per capita in a
given geographic unit (573) over two weeks (115) from January 2012 - May 2016.
Military district-quarantines and movement restrictions at given dates and locations were
collected by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. We consider that a given
location is quarantined if the chiefdom or district is quarantined. Given this definition, the
average size of a quarantined area in our dataset is 50’000 people, compared to an average
population of 40’000 people. The implementation of laboratories and health treatment
36www.acleddata.com
37We also did the same exercise using as outcome variable social resistance data, which was scraped
from Situation Reports during the Ebola outbreak collected in Guinea for Chapter 3. We also find a
positive impact of Ebola infections on social resistance using this measure. At this stage they are omitted
from the paper.
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units, such as Community care centers (CCCs) and Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) are
from the WHO and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA). Election dates and results to study the role of political grievances in
fueling civil violence were scraped from newspapers. To study the possibility of economic
mechanisms being at play we use food price statistics collected by Glennerster et al.
(2016).
Population data is taken from the 2014 census in Guinea and Sierra Leone. We projected
the 2008 census to estimate the population in 2014 for Liberia, based on a combination
of prior population growth rates for each district and the growth rate for Liberia overall
from 2008 to 2014. To study heterogeneous effects we use predetermined covariates prior
to the start of the outbreak. Household survey data are taken from the Afrobarometer,
Rounds 5, 2012-2013 and 6, 2015-2016. We construct averages for each variable by sub-
prefecture, chiefdom and district for the respective countries.
Descriptives
We first give a graphical representation of the data in Figure 2.1. The Figure plots the
timeline of conflict events and number of new Ebola infections per week for two highly
populated districts in Sierra Leone. The vertical lines show the timing of the WHO
intervention and containment efforts. Across districts in our sample we observe a higher
frequency of conflict events at times and districts with more Ebola infections. Oftentimes,
a conflict event follows an intervention. Figures for all other district are found in Figures
D.1-D.4. The geographic spread of conflict is shown graphically in Figures B.1- B.2.
Descriptives for the aggregate number of Ebola cases are shown in Table 2.1. Ebola
incidence varied widely across the three most affected countries38. The first index case
38In this paper we are not able to explain these differences. Population, population density, mobility
patterns and distance to the first case are predictors of the spread of Ebola and epidemiologists have shown
that the intervention was key in halting the spread of the outbreak. While the emergency assistance was
initially led by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and then coordinated under the auspices of the WHO in
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Notes: Weekly timeline of the number of new Ebola infections (left-axis, black line) and
of conflict events (right-axis, red dots) for two highly populated districts in Sierra Leone,
Western Area Urban (left), and Bombali (right). The vertical lines show the first time the
WHO declared Ebola a global health emergency (blue), the imposition of military district
or chiefdom quarantines (red), the establishment of Ebola treatment units (ETUs) and
of Laboratories (green).
occurred through a contact with an animal reservoir of the Ebola Virus, in Guinea in
December 2013. We observe the first cases after January 2014 and in the main descriptive
statistics the sample is split into the two years prior to the start of the outbreak and the
two years and a half since then, January 2012-May 2016.
Descriptives for the aggregate number of conflicts, namely riots, protests and violence
against civilians, are shown in Table 2.2. A simple accounting of conflict incidence in the
two years after the start of the outbreak shows a 50% increase in conflict compared to
two years prior to the start of the outbreak. This is driven by the countries with highest
rates of Ebola cases, namely Liberia and Sierra Leone.
all three countries, there were significant differences in the Ebola response across countries due to distinct
national institutions and international donors taking the lead in each response.
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Table 2.1: Descriptives - Aggregate Ebola cases
Number of Ebola cases
Confirmed + Probable Total incl. Suspect Deaths Population Pop./km2
Guinea 3,814 3,814 2,544 12.3 mn 41
Liberia 5,044 13,416 4,810 4.4 mn 35
Sierra Leone 8,358 11,903 3,956 6.3 mn 79
TOTAL 17,166 29,133 11,310 23 mn
Notes: Total number of cases: confirmed, probable and suspect cases. In our main
analysis we use the sum of confirmed and probable cases, since these have been evaluated
by a clinician.
WHO-Definitions: Suspect case: (1) any person alive or dead, suffering or having suffered
from a sudden onset of high fever and having had contact with a suspect case or a dead
or sick animal; or (2) with sudden onset of high fever and at least three Ebola symptoms;
or (3) with inexplicable bleeding; or (4) with sudden, inexplicable death. Probable case:
suspect case that has been evaluated by a clinician or with an epidemiological link with
a confirmed case. Confirmed case: suspect or probable case with a positive laboratory
result.
To illustrate the type of conflict events in our data, we show here one such example:
“Thousands of protesters marched on the main Ebola hospital in
Kenema and threatened to burn it down and remove the patients af-
ter a rumour spread about “cannabalistic rituals” occurring there;
police fired tear gas to disperse the crowd.” Kenema, Sierra Leone,
Reuters, July 2014
Our outcome variable is the sum of all such events occurring every two weeks in a given
chiefdom. A list of examples on Ebola and non-Ebola related civil violence during the
Ebola outbreak is reported in Supplementary Appendix Tables D.1-D.2.
Summary statistics to each of our empirical strategies are provided in Tables B.1-B.4.
2.4 Empirical strategy
In this Section we search for a causal relationship between epidemics and conflict, Sub-
section 2.4.1, precise drivers underlying this effect, Subsection 2.4.2, and impacts of an
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Table 2.2: Descriptives - Aggregate Conflict events
Pre-Ebola During Ebola During Ebola All
2012-2013 2014-2016/5 2014-15 2012-2016/5
Number of Conflicts
Guinea 89 91 73 180
Liberia 72 168 146 240
Sierra Leone 18 53 43 71
TOTAL 179 313 262 491
Likelihood of Conflict per year per obs. unit (573)
TOTAL 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.19
Notes: Number of conflict events reported in newspapers throughout a given
period in each country. Conflict events are riots, protests and violence against
civilians.
epidemic on long-run trust, Subsection 2.4.3. Robustness checks are given in Subsection
2.4.4.
2.4.1 Epidemic spread and civil violence
To identify the effect of Ebola infections on the likelihood of conflict, namely riots, protests
and violence against civilians, we use two main sources of variation. The first source of
variation comes from the first index case of Ebola, due to the contagion from animal
to human being a random and extremely rare event. We exploit this first index case
as a random timing event defining our pre-treatment period in a difference-in-difference
strategy, as well as geographic variation in total disease incidence, Subsection 2.4.1. The
second source of variation comes from the spread of Ebola at high frequency. We exploit
the short-run dynamics of the disease to study the impact of new infections on conflict
incidence in a panel at high frequency with location, time and region per month fixed
effects, Subsection 2.4.1. Alternative specifications and robustness checks are discussed
in Subsection 2.4.4.
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Difference-in-Differences
In order to study the overall impact of the epidemic on civil violence, we study the change
in civil violence after the start of the outbreak, comparing locations hit by Ebola with
varying levels of intensity. We do this in a difference-in-difference design with continuous
treatment given by the total cumulative number of Ebola cases at the end of the outbreak.
The first Ebola case gives us a random timing event defining our pre-treatment period.
conflicti,τ = β ebolaTotali × PostEpidemicτ + λτ + αi + νi,r,τ (2.1)
Equation (2.1) describes this first identification strategy. conflicti,τ is the number of
conflicts in one million per capita in location i in yearly quarter τ . The cumulative
number of Ebola infections in location i measured at the end of the outbreak is given
by ebolaTotali. PostEpidemicτ defines the post-treatment period, taking value 1 at the
first quarter of the year 2014 and 0 before that39. Standard errors are clustered at the
level of a location i, or a group of locations, such as regions or districts r, to allow for
serial and spatial dependency40. The coefficient of interest is β. It measures the change in
conflict incidence after the start of the outbreak for one additional Ebola case in 100’000
per capita.
The identification relies on a parallel trends assumption and the exogenous timing of
the event. To allow for the effect to vary over time, we use a more flexible specification
than (2.1), using yearly quarter time dummies. This also allows us to provide graphical
evidence of parallel trends in conflict incidence for areas with varying levels of Ebola,
39The epidemic started at the end of the last quarter of the year 2013. The first index case is believed to
be a child infected on December 26, 2013. We take this into account in our flexible estimates specification.
The results do not change if we take December 2013 as the start of the outbreak and in fact, given our
flexible specification results, this seems to be a more conservative exercise.
40The sample analyzed are 507 locations in the 3 most affected countries, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra
Leone. In particular, each location refers to chiefdoms in Sierra Leone, sub-prefectures in Guinea and
districts in Liberia. A group of locations or region is a larger unit of analysis, namely districts in Sierra
Leone, prefectures in Guinea and counties in Liberia.
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τ + λτ + αi + νi,r,τ (2.2)
Compared to the previous equation, we replaced the post-treatment dummy with several
time dummies Iτ for each yearly quarter, ranging from 2012 to 2016, with the first quarter
of 2012 as omitted category. The coefficient βτ gives us the difference in conflict incidence
at each quarter of a year due to one additional Ebola case in 100’000 per capita.
A potential concern is the possibility that post-treatment selection into high Ebola in-
cidence is driven by factors that also change conflict incidence over time. Most of the
changes occurring in the months after the first index case are driven by the epidemic and
we interpret them as channels underling the impact of an epidemic on civil violence. For
instance, an unequal distribution of new health centers or military aid can affect both
Ebola incidence and conflict events. This is one of the main channels we stress in this
paper driving the impact of an epidemic on civil violence. To address the possibility of
time-varying conditions affecting both the spread of Ebola and conflict incidence, such
as movement of police forces unrelated to the epidemic, we instrument the end-level of
Ebola in each location with the geographic distance to the first index case, also known
as epicenter. In particular we use the linear and quadratic geographic distance interacted
with the post-treatment dummy and an indicator variable for each country, to allow for
non-linear effects in distance and heterogeneity across countries41. Geographic distance
41We add the first stage shown in equation (2.3) to our equation (2.1) above.
ebolaTotali × PostEpidemicτ =
∑
c=Country




γc × I(c)×DistEpicenter2i × PostEpidemicτ + λτ + αi + νi,r,τ
Where DistEpicenteri, DistEpicenter
2
i are the linear and quadratic geographic distance to the epicenter.
Note that there are only three countries. The quadratic term allows for non-linear effects in distance and
provides a more flexible specification. The indicator variable for each country, I(c), allows the effect to
vary for each country. Other specifications, such as using only the linear distance interacted with each
country and the capital lead to similar predictions. Using the simple distance is not predictive of the
total cumulative number of Ebola cases, which suggests that there are non-linear effects in distance and
heterogeneity across countries.
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measures to the first index case are a predictor of the total cumulative number of Ebola
infections and it is used in other contexts to study impacts of epidemics, such as Oster
(2005) for the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The exclusion restriction is that time-varying un-
observables arising after the start of the outbreak are not driven by the distance to the
epicenter. We show that the incidence of conflict prior to the start of the outbreak is
uncorrelated with distance to the epicenter, Table B.6. Expected correlates of civil vio-
lence that appear statistically associated with the distance to the epicenter are added as
controls, interacted with the post-treatment dummies.
Results on the impact of the epidemic over yearly quarters
Descriptive statistics in yearly quarters are shown in Table B.1. The difference-in-difference
results are shown in Table 2.3 for all countries. Columns (1) and (2) show no differential
trend in conflict incidence prior to the start of the outbreak in areas with higher Ebola
incidence in comparison to areas with lower incidence.
The difference-in-difference results are reported in Columns (3)-(5). They indicate that
one additional Ebola case in 100’000 per capita increases the likelihood of civil violence
by 0.006− 0.01 or by 0.8− 1.3% from a baseline mean (standard deviation) incidence of
conflict in one million per capita of 0.76 (8.64) over a quarter of a year. With a mean
incidence of 50 Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita this means that a location moving from
no cases to the average level of infections increases the likelihood of conflict by 40− 66%
or by 0.3 − 0.5 additional conflict events in one million people per capita within three
months. In some locations the Ebola incidence was as high as 2105 in 100’000 per capita.
The 2SLS results are similar in magnitude compared to the OLS results. The slightly
larger coefficient is plausibly due to measurement error in the number of infections42. The
first stage is shown in Table B.5. Areas that are closer to the epicenter have higher Ebola
incidence, but there is a non-linear effect in distance. Adding pre-determined covariates
42We have patient records for Sierra Leone and Guinea, but for Liberia our measure is from the WHO
website and it is aggregated at county level. There was a large number of suspect cases in Liberia that
have not been classified yet.
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Table 2.3: Difference in Differences relative to the first index case in West Africa
Outcome: conflict(quarter) Pre-Ebola Pre/Post Ebola
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
ebolaTot × Trend 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002)
ebolaTot × PostEbola 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗ 0.0100∗∗ 0.0092∗
(0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0043)
N 4672 4672 10512 10512 3870 3870
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Chiefd FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Restr. Y
(Clustered SE) by Dist; Controls Restr.: sample restricted to locations with household survey data.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: conflict is the number of conflicts in each yearly quarter in 1 million per capita.
ebolaTotal is the total cumulative number of Ebola cases measured at the end of the
outbreak for each location in 100’000 per capita. PostEbola is a post-treatment dummy
taking value 1 from 2014 on, after the first Ebola case is observed.
2SLS results use the geographic linear and square distance to the first index case as
instrument for the total cumulative number of Ebola infections. First stage F-Statistic:
10.24, Table B.5.
Controls: Traditional religion, trust in leaders and votes or preferences for the incumbent
measured pre-epidemic and interacted with the post-treatment dummy. The choice of
these controls is based on the fact that they are correlated with the geographic linear and
square distance to the epidemic, potentially affecting the likelihood of conflict, Table B.6.
expected to be correlates of civil violence, interacted with the post-treatment dummy does
not change our coefficient, compared to the sample restricted to locations with household
survey data used to construct those covariates43. Our preferred specification is the simple
OLS, given that both strategies lead to similar results, that we observe parallel trends in
conflict incidence prior to the outbreak and that most unobservables are interpreted as
mechanisms driving civil violence in the context of the epidemic.
The difference-in-difference design with flexible time coefficients is shown graphically in
Figure 2.2 for all countries and Figure 2.3 for Sierra Leone. The Appendix Figures B.8-
B.5 summarize results for Liberia and Guinea. We find evidence of parallel trends in
conflict incidence prior to the start of the outbreak and a spike immediately following
43Controls: Traditional religion, trust in leaders and votes or preferences for the incumbent measured
pre-epidemic and interacted with the post-treatment dummy. The choice of these controls is based on the
fact that they are correlated with the geographic linear and square distance to the epidemic, potentially
affecting the likelihood of conflict, Table B.6.
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Yearly quarters since first Ebola case, 2013:q4 (Dec 26, 2013)
95% conf. intervals
Difference-in-Difference : all countries
Notes: Coefficients on the total end-number of Ebola cases in one location × dummy for
a yearly quarter. Calendar time since first case. Omitted category: 2012:q1.
the first cases arriving in Liberia, March 2014, and Sierra Leone, May 2014. This does
not hold overall for Guinea, which had a much smaller infection rate as percentage of the
population. However, a similar pattern arises for Guinea when we use the arrival of the
epidemic in each prefecture as a reference point to study its impact on each sub-prefecture,
Figure B.644. The effects for each country indicate an increase in conflict incidence ranging
from 0.01 − 0.04 or 1.3 − 5.2% from a baseline mean incidence of conflict in one million
per capita of 0.76 per quarter of a year, with the larger effect representing Liberia45. We
see the largest impacts during the last three quarters of 2014, namely throughout the
core of the outbreak. The effects fade over time, indicating potential non-linearities or
a change as the state response evolves over time. We can think of periods 0-2 in Figure
2.2 as pre-intervention periods. Strictly speaking, the pre-intervention period corresponds
to periods 0-1 only, before the epidemic is officially declared in Guinea in March, 2014
following a laboratory test in Lyon, France, that confirmed the Ebola virus. However, MSF
44We do the same for Sierra Leone, using the first arrival of the epidemic in a district to study its
impact on each chiefdom, Figure B.7; but not for Liberia, since we do not have Ebola data at lower than
county level.
45See interpretation in the paragraph above.
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was quickly overwhelmed and the states had little capacity to respond to the outbreak
until the international aid package started arriving in August 2014, namely period 3. We
observe the first military district-quarantines in that month too.
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Yearly quarters since first Ebola case, 2014:q2 (May 21, 2014)
95% conf. intervals
Difference-in-Difference : SLE
Notes: Coefficients on the total end-number of Ebola cases in one location (chiefdom)
× dummy for a yearly quarter. Calendar time since first case in Sierra Leone. Omitted
category: 2012:q1.
High frequency Panel data
Next we exploit the short-run dynamics of the disease to study the impact of new infections
on civil violence at high frequency. The main panel data specification is summarized in
equation (2.4).
conflicti,t = β ebolai,t−1 + Xi,t−1Γ + αi + λt + µr,τ + εi,r,t (2.4)
The time dimension is at two-week level t. We aggregate our weekly data at that level to
reduce possible measurement error in the number of infections due to the improvement
of medical and testing conditions changing over time. We choose two weeks because
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Ebola symptoms arise on average within 8-12 days after infection with the virus. In this
specification conflicti,t is the number of conflicts in one million per capita in location i in a
two-week period t. ebolai,t−1 is the number of new Ebola infections in location i in period
t − 1. In our main specification we do not add any covariates. We will consider basic
covariates Xi,t−1, namely past infections, cumulative infections and past conflict incidence,
for robustness. Our specification conditions on location αi, time λt and month×region
fixed effects46 µr,τ . Standard errors are clustered at the level of a group of locations r,
to allow for serial and spatial dependency47. The coefficient of interest is β. It measures
the change in conflict incidence in the next two weeks for one additional Ebola case in
100’000 per capita in the past two weeks.
Our main identification strategy is a simple OLS. We rely on the spread of new Ebola
infections in the past two weeks being exogenous at two-week level, conditional on location,
time, region×month fixed effects, and possibly other time-varying covariates48. Most time-
varying confounders we can think of are related to the epidemic and are interpreted as
channels. For instance, if the imposition of safe burial practices in areas with more Ebola
incidence leads to significant opposition against preventive measures, this could generate
new infections in the future and drive conflict incidence. In fact this paper suggests that
a state response with little sensitivity to local customs is an important reason explaining
why Ebola drives subversive violence.
We discuss a number of alternative strategies in Subsection 2.4.4 on Robustness checks.
In particular we use two instrumental variables strategies to strengthen our identification.
First, we instrument the number of new infections in a given location by the turning on
and off of the epidemic in neighboring locations, to ensure that our findings are not driven
by time-varying confounders with persistent effects in a given location. Second, we con-
struct a predicted Ebola measure from the medical literature that relies on the geographic
46Note that region is necessarily at a higher level of aggregation than our location. Instead of month
we will consider three time periods, corresponding to six weeks.
47When we look at each country separately or when we condition our sample to regions for which we
have household survey data, we cluster at location level instead, in order to avoid having too few clusters
48OLS identifying assumption: E(εt,i|ebolai,t−j , Xi,t−j , αi, λt, µr,τ ) = 0 for all j.
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position of each location, infections several periods in the past and fixed characteristics,
with the aim to address the possibility of non-standard measurement error in infections.
We also estimate the model by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), allowing for dy-
namic effects. The results are similar across specifications and our preferred specification
is the simple OLS.
We next motivate the particular the choice of ebolai,t−1 at time t − 1 as our measure of
interest. In theory new infections could cause distress in any future time period. We
conjecture that Ebola has an impact in matter of few weeks, since people die or recover
within four weeks after infection, that is, within two weeks after symptom onset. However,
we can answer this question empirically. We estimate the equation above (2.4) several
times for conflict incidence in different time periods in the future, conditional on Ebola
and conflict incidence in the past. The logic follows that of a local linear projection
proposed by Jordà (2005)49. The strategy is summarized in equation (2.5).






ρj conflicti,t−j + αi + λt + εi,r,t (2.5)
for h ∈ [0, H].
The coefficient of interest βh measures the impact of new infections on civil violence h
periods from now, net of other things affecting Ebola or conflict incidence in the past
J = 9 periods. We plot βh for each time horizon h ∈ [0, 10]50. These plots give us an
impulse response function indicating that new infections in 100’000 per capita impact the
likelihood of civil violence only in the next period. This provides an empirical justification
to our main specification (2.4).
49This is similar to controlling for different lags in infections, but provides a more complete analysis of
the impact of Ebola infections on conflict incidence. We also show results for our baseline specification
(2.4) and controlling for several lags in Ebola, discussed under robustness checks.
50We choose H = 10 future time periods and J = 9 lags and the results are robust to different choices
of H,J
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Results on the impact of the epidemic at high frequency
Descriptive statistics for our panel specification are shown in Table B.2.We first give a
graphical representation of impulse responses for the extensive margin and intensive mar-
gins. The extensive margin tells us whether the presence of the epidemic, ebola ∈ {0, 1},
has an impact on civil conflict, Figure 2.4, left-hand-side. The impacts are concentrated
in the two periods after new infections emerge. Locations hit by the epidemic have on
average 0.26 more conflict in one million per capita in the following four weeks compared
to locations not hit by the epidemic in that time period. The intensive margin is the
impact of new Ebola infections in 100’000 per capita on conflict incidence, Figure 2.451,
right-hand-side. The effect is statistically significantly different from zero one period after
new infections hit a given location, motivating our specification (2.4). The figure shows
that one new case in 100’000 per capita increases the likelihood of conflict incidence by
0.01 from a baseline mean incidence of 0.117 pre-epidemic or 0.128 for the whole period,
thus a 7.8− 10% increase in the likelihood of conflict incidence in one million per capita.
There is suggestive evidence of persistence, but the long-run effects are not statistically
significant.
The main results on the impact of new infections on conflict incidence are summarized
in Table 2.4, which includes several specifications discussed in detail Subsection 2.4.4
under Robustness checks. The epidemic generates a large short-run immediate effect on
increasing the likelihood of conflict. Conflict in one million per capita in the next two
week rises by 0.012 − 0.013 in a given location as a consequence of one new infected
person in that location52. This supposes a 9− 10% change in the incidence of conflict for
one additional Ebola infection in 100’000 per capita, from a baseline incidence of 0.117
pre-epidemic or 0.128 for the whole period. The results are therefore identical to the local
projections in which we control for 9 lags in Ebola and conflict. The average number of
51We show the effects for the 10 future periods in the Appendix, Figure B.9
52Ebola is measured at county, chiefdom and sub-prefecture level and conflict is measured at district,
chiefdom and sub-prefecture level, for Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, respectively. All regressions are
population-weighted.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse response for the presence of the epidemic, or extensive margin
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LHS graph: Impulse response for the presence of the epidemic, or extensive margin,
on conflict incidence for 10 future time periods. The coefficients of ebolat−1 ∈ {0, 1} in
equation (2.5) are plotted, with 90% and 95% confidence intervals. We condition on 9
lags in ebola and conflict (two-week frequency).
RHS graph: Impulse response for local projections for the impacts of ebola infections
in 100’000 per capita (intensive margin) on conflict incidence for 4 future time periods.
The coefficients of ebolat−1 in equation (2.5) are plotted, with 90% and 95% confidence
intervals. We condition on 9 lags in ebola and conflict (two-week frequency). The effects
for the 10 future periods are shown in Figure B.9.
Ebola infections for locations that were already hit by the epidemic in 2014 is 8 cases in
100’000 per capita in a two-week period. The maximum is 500 cases. These estimates
mean that moving from no cases to the average level of Ebola during the first year of the
outbreak increases the likelihood of civil violence by 0.112 within the next two weeks, thus
doubling the mean incidence of conflict in a matter of weeks. We find only a suggestive
impact of cumulative Ebola cases, much smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated
than the impact of new infections, Table B.8. This provides further evidence that the
main effects are immediate. The results are robust to different specifications. Robustness
checks and details on all specifications are discussed in detail in Subsection 2.4.4.
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Table 2.4: High-frequency panel: Summary of Results for All countries
Outcome: conflict(t) All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS GMM IV-eb(t-2) IV-ebOthers(t-2)
ebola(t-1) 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗ 0.00756∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0049) (0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0076)
conflictOthers(t-2) 0.0971
(0.0754)
N 66576 66574 65990 66576 65404 61320
R2 0.125 0.143 0.144 0.145 0.130
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Chiefd FE Y Y Y Y Y
Reg × Month FE Y Y Y





∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of Ebola infections over time. Column (4) estimates a dynamic
panel of conflict on past Ebola using all possible lags as GMM-type instruments for the
difference equation. Column (5) uses only ebola(t − 2) as instrument for ebola(t − 1).
Column (6) uses the presence of the epidemic in neighboring locations in periods {t −
2, t− 3, ..., t− 10} interacted with country, capital and district-capital as instruments for
ebola(t− 2). Results using only {t− 2} as instrument are shown in the Appendix, Table
B.11. conflictOthers(t − 2) ∈ {0, 1} is the presence of conflict in the region except the
own. First stage: R2 = 0.21, F − Statistic = 84.12.
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2.4.2 Drivers of civil violence
Once we have established that the epidemic leads to civil violence, in the previous Sub-
section, we now test our hypotheses on precise channels underlying this effect.
Epidemics affect the relationship between citizens or between citizens and the state. They
change citizens’ perception of the state and demands from it in at least three ways. First,
they move the state to adopt coercive measures, in order to halt contagion. This supposes
an immediate threat to citizens, which leads to social unrest. If this coercion is regarded
as illegitimate, or excessive, it can increase the benefits from a riot aiming at countering
these measures. Second, they generate a demand for public goods, as people need health
treatment. This lowers the opportunity cost of engaging in violence, or creates a benefit
of doing so if this eventually led to the establishment of treatment centers. Third, they
require a change in cultural practices, such as burial practices, which are induced by state
authorities. Changing them is more costly for people with strong religious beliefs and the
potential benefits of adopting new cultural practices are less clear if there is low trust
in institutional authorities. We hypothesize that these changes are important drivers of
subversive violence in the context of an epidemic. Epidemics also tear families apart and
affect the relationship between citizens, fearing contagion. In this paper we highlight the
importance of institutional channels, those that are influenced by policy makers, through
the choice of a particular emergency response.
To study these potential channels we first look at the main patterns in our data. What
type of conflict was affected by the epidemic, who were the actors involved? We then study
how the shock propagates over time and space. We also analyze whether the impacts vary
over different time periods corresponding to distinct intervention phases and by country.
We interpret results from these exercises as suggestive. Secondly, we study the impact of
the state response and emergency assistance that followed. Finally, we study the role of
trust and religious beliefs as determinants of civil violence in the context of an epidemic.
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Main patterns
We start from the observation that the Ebola outbreak was associated with a particular
kind of conflict, namely subversive violence, such as riots, protests and violence against
institutional authorities. Tables 2.5-2.6 suggest that most conflict events are violent, but
also non-violent protests arise, they are directly related to the epidemic outbreak and
they involve either civil actors or both civil and state actors, in line with medical records
and anthropologists accounts of violence emerging as a consequence both of social unrest
and the state response to it.
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The impact of an epidemic on violence is very localized, as shown in Table B.18, and
spillovers from neighboring areas are not significantly different from zero, which is in line
with the geography of the countries, in which chiefdoms, sub-prefectures and counties or
districts are relatively far from each other53.
We study how the shock evolves over time, according to the different intervention phases.
This is shown in Table 2.7. The results show that the epidemic generates violence in
all phases, pre and post-intervention. They provide suggestive evidence of these being
largest in August and September 2014, which are the most convulsive months as emer-
gency assistance arrives and a major state response is set in place. The difference is not
significantly different from the main effect, when comparing each period separately, col-
umn (3). In search for a structural break we study whether the effect changes in August,
September or October, columns (4)-(6). We find that the impact of a new Ebola case
on conflict incidence is significantly reduced in the post-October period, compared to the
period before. This shows that the epidemic generated civil violence at early stages, when
the epidemic was unknown, prior to the huge influx of emergency assistance, column (4).
It also provides suggestive evidence in favor of numerous accounts by anthropologists and
people involved in the Ebola response, that as the state response evolved, taking into
account local customs, social unrest was diminished, column (6). A competing explana-
tion is that social unrest subsides after the peak of the epidemic outbreak is reached. In
Table B.19 we provide evidence against this competing explanation. The structural break
is not driven by the peak of the epidemic, defined as the period in which a region hits
the maximum of Ebola cases, column (6). The shock does fade over time column (7).
This is consistent with both the state response adapting to people’s culture and people’s
beliefs and customs evolving, a channel shown in Chapter 3 using exogenous variation
in exposure to radio campaigns. There are some non-linearities, but they are of small
magnitude, for instance including a square term or studying the impact of cumulative
number of Ebola cases, Table B.20. In fact, whether there is any Ebola case in a given
53Corresponding to our measures of location for Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, respectively
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Table 2.7: Conflict throughout the outbreak
Outcome: conflict(t) No omitted cat. Vs Before
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ebola(t) 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗ 0.0104∗∗ 0.0182∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0058) (0.0049) (0.0071) (0.0067)
ebola(t) × preJuly2014 0.0135∗∗
(0.0058)
ebola(t) × Aug2014 0.0274∗∗ 0.0139
(0.0135) (0.0136)
ebola(t) × Sep2014 0.0203∗∗ 0.00675
(0.0091) (0.0109)
ebola(t) × postOct2014 0.00594∗∗ -0.00759 -0.0146∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0059) (0.0062)
ebola(t) × postAug2014 0.00380
(0.0067)
ebola(t) × postSep2014 -0.00610
(0.0085)
Mean 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187
N 66576 66576 66576 66576 66576 66576
R2 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142
(Clustered SE) by Dist; Time, Chiefd, Reg × Month FE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The period before the huge emergency assistance package corresponds to pre-July
2014. Our prior is that August and September 2014 are the most convulsive months as
emergency assistance arrives and a major state response is set in place. This response
evolves in the months following October 2014. The epidemic peaks in September in
Liberia, in November in Sierra Leone and in December in 2014.
region, generates a lot of distress, Table B.19, column (5).
The epidemic generates different effects for each country. The impacts are largest for
Sierra Leone and a bit smaller for Liberia, in both cases statistically significant, Table
B.21. For Guinea the mean effect is small and not statistically significant, as in our
difference-in-difference estimates. Guinea is also the country with least number of cases
and fatalities and the role of information campaigns in halting social unrest and the spread
of Ebola is studied in Chapter 3.
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State response
We now study the role of the state response, or emergency assistance, in fueling social
unrest. In particular we test whether perceived state coercion and demand for public
goods are drivers of civil conflict and study the effect of military district quarantines
and the establishment of health treatment centers on conflict incidence. This has direct
policy relevance, since they depend on the particular type of emergency assistance that
is provided.
Epidemics change the relationship between citizens and the state and the particular state
response can in principle dampen or fuel social unrest. Halting the outbreak requires
treating patients and preventing further contagion. Some of the measures adopted by the
state are coercive, they can are misunderstood, considered illegitimate, or in the context
of weak state capacity, they are insufficient, such as limited amount of health facilities.
Perceived state coercion, such as military presence, can lower the probability of success of
a mob, discouraging it in the first place. This is a similar argument to the role of military
and police resources discouraging insurgency in Fearon and Laitin (2003). However, the
role of state coercion in this context can potentially further undermine the state, rather
than strengthening it. Quarantines are in general a form of coercion, which could have
public benefits54, but they have private costs. People that are not infected or whose
infectiousness is not confirmed with a laboratory result have restricted movement and
are often exposed to other infected people. Military district quarantines are an extreme
form of state coercion in the context of an epidemic (Moon, 2015; Richards, 2016; Hofman
and Au, 2017). With low trust in authorities, this can impact the spread of rumors and
low uptake of other protective measures, such as resistance against the imposition of safe
burial practices or contact tracing, isolation and patient care.
This means that the opening health treatment centers could lead to a rise in social unrest,
54Whether they are optimal depends on the type of quarantine and on the citizens response to it.
If they lead to civil violence and low health uptake, they can be very counterproductive (Moon, 2015;
Richards, 2016; Hofman and Au, 2017).
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due to this previous experience with the state. This is especially the case if people are
uninformed about the benefits of treatment centers or if they are in fact very low because
there is under-capacity or soaring death rates. The opening of treatment centers should
lead to a rise in civil violence in that case. However, the epidemic generates an exogenous
demand in public goods, due to the need for health treatment. We should expect a drop
after the establishment of treatment centers, if people trust the state, they are informed
about the benefits of treatment centers and there is enough access to them. In that
case, we should see a drop in riots. This depends in principle on how the state response
is perceived, which relies on previous experience with the state. Finally, this can have
long-term effects on trust, further undermining weak states.
Empirical strategies to disentangle these channels are discussed next. Descriptive statistics
for the state responses we observe are shown in Tables B.3-B.4.
State coercion
To study the role of perceived state coercion as a driver of civil violence we measure
the impact of military district-quarantines on civil violence. Our empirical strategies are
in the spirit of a difference-in-difference design. First, we look at the change in conflict
after a quarantine, comparing locations that have one to those that do not. We restrict
the sample to locations that have sufficient level of Ebola incidence, to have comparable
locations. Secondly, we look at the conflict incidence during the time of a quarantine in
a standard panel specification with location and time fixed effects. Thirdly, we restrict
the sample to ever-quarantined districts and compare the incidence in conflict at different
points in time for these districts. Finally, we corroborate our results with graphical
evidence in an event study design. The main strategy is summarized in equation 2.6.
conflictsi,t = γ0PostQuari,t × EverQuari + Xi,tΓ + αi + λt + εi,t (2.6)
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The treatment dummy EverQuari indicates whether a location i has ever been quaran-
tined. PostQuari,t is a treatment dummy that takes value 1 if a location i has already
been quarantined and 0 otherwise. Note that EverQuari is redundant, we add it here
for clarification. Only time-varying factors or only location-varying factors are captured
by the fixed effects. γ0 gives us the change in conflict incidence for quarantined locations
after they are quarantined, compared to non-quarantined locations. Alternatively we will
replace this by a dummy WithinQuari,t that takes value 1 only if the location i is in a
quarantine in at time t. In that case the γ0 measures the change in conflict incidence
for quarantined locations during the quarantine, compared to other periods without the
quarantine. We run the simple specification without covariates and then include Ebola
as covariate to ensure that the results are not driven by the spread of Ebola.
Identification relies on parallel trends and the assumption that quarantines are set up
by the state to stop the epidemic outbreak, not to solve conflict incidence. We provide
evidence of no trend differential for quarantined locations prior to the establishment of
the quarantine, compared to other locations, Figure 2.5. Additional graphical evidence
for parallel trends and immediate impacts of the quarantine in several event studies using
either calendar time since first quarantine or actual time that a location is quarantined are
shown in Figures 2.5-B.15. Table B.22 shows that quarantines are established in locations
based on potential disease spread, such as distance to the epicenter, and access to roads.
There is no evidence of strategic placement of quarantines to hurt opposition members or
other strategic motives, Table B.23. However, they are placed in locations with low trust
in the army, in leaders and in local institutions, hence potentially further exacerbating
trust in the long-run.
The main results are summarized in Table 2.8. We restricted the sample to locations
that have at least 20 cumulative cases of Ebola in order to have comparable units. There
is no significant trend difference prior to the establishment of a quarantine, even after
controlling for prior Ebola cases, columns (1)-(2). While more conflictual locations are
more likely to have a quarantine, there are parallel trends in conflict incidence prior to
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Notes: Conflict incidence for ever-quarantined and never-quarantined locations.
their establishment and we see a rise in conflict incidence thereafter. The results indi-
cate a huge rise in civil violence in weeks in which area blockades are in place, compared
to other weeks, columns (3)-(4). We see the same effect when looking at the change in
conflict incidence for the whole period after the establishment of a quarantine, columns
(5)-(6). The point estimates indicate that having a quarantine in place means 0.3 − 0.5
higher conflict incidence than not having it. This effect is 1.5 − 2.5 times larger than
the effect of being hit by the epidemic in a given week, column (5) in Table B.19. The
results also indicate that the impact of new Ebola infections is stable and statistically
significant. We provide results restricted to locations that were ever quarantined in Table
B.24. The results are identical. Graphical evidence is provided in Figure B.12. It shows
the change in conflict incidence over time due to an additional quarantine in 100’000 per
capita. We see a spike in conflict during the six weeks following the first time quarantines
were imposed, in June/July 2014. Similar strategies using the time of the quarantine in
each location show similar results. They are shown in Figures B.13-B.14, conditioning on
having at least 5 and 10 cumulative Ebola cases. We interpret these results indicating that
perceived state coercion generates social unrest, with potential impacts on health uptake
of other measures. They show that the immediate threat of state coercion is stronger
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Table 2.8: Military district-quarantines - OLS results (including all locations)
Outcome: conflict(t) Pre-Quar Pre/Post-Quar





PostQuar × Trend 0.00473 0.00595∗
(0.0028) (0.0030)
EverQuar × Trend -0.000642 0.0127
(0.0046) (0.0247)
ebola(t-1) 0.00828∗∗∗ 0.00755∗∗ 0.00806∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0026)
ebolaCum(t-2) -0.00143∗∗ -0.00162∗∗ -0.00140∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
N 2218 2000 2218 2000 2218 2000
R2 0.288 0.313 0.287 0.311 0.288 0.312
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Chiefd FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
cumEbola> 20 Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Dist
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of cases in 100’000 per capita. WithinQuar is a dummy variable
taking value 1 if the location is currently under a military quarantine and 0 otherwise.
PostQuar takes value 1 if the location has already been quarantined once and 0 otherwise.
EverQuar takes value 1 if the location will ever be quarantined and 0 otherwise.
than its potential benefit from discouraging civil violence.
Public goods
To learn about the role of the demand for public goods as a driver of conflict, we measure
the impact of the epidemic on conflict incidence for varying access to Ebola treatment units
(ETUs), community care centers (CCCs) and laboratories. Ebola patients were treated
in Ebola treatment units (ETUs), which were established first by MSF and then under
the auspices of the WHO and created ad-hoc for treatment purposes. Laboratories were
set in place for rapid testing of the virus and their establishment rapidly increased with
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the influx of emergency assistance. They were also decided at national and international
level. Community care centers were local hospitals that turned into transit centers for
first care of Ebola patients. They were opened spontaneously by local communities, as
opposed to Ebola treatment units and laboratories. We therefore see an opportunity to
study the implementation of ETUs and laboratories as a shock to study its impact on
civil violence. On the other hand, we will also ask whether conflict incidence throughout
the epidemic predicts the amount of CCCs that opened. Since this last exercise is not
causal we interpret the results as suggestive.
The role of demand for public goods is measured as a heterogeneous treatment effect of
new Ebola cases on conflict incidence. The main specification is summarized in equation
(2.7)




+ γ1 ebolai,t−1 ×NearETU endi + γ2 ebolai,t−1 ×NearETU endi × PostEmergencyt
+ Xi,tΓ + αi + λt + εi,t
Table B.22 shows that public goods are established in locations based on potential disease
spread, such as distance to the epicenter, population density and access to roads. CCCs
are established in locations with prior access to health centers, mechanically. There is
no evidence of strategic placement of public goods to benefit members of the incumbent
group, Table B.23.
Identification relies on the fact that treatment centers were new, established ad-hoc to
counter the spread of Ebola and decided externally by international organizations, with
their greatest availability following the influx of money nine months after the start of the
outbreak, when the international community realized the epidemic was a global health
concern. The decision of the international community to intervene serves as a timing
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event that is exogenous with respect to the local spread of Ebola and conflict incidence.
PostEmergencyt takes value 1 after September 2014. The end-level of public good pro-
vision is a measure of the ideal level of health centers if the great amount of financial aid
was available at the beginning of the outbreak. This is given by NearETU endi , which is
the normalized inverse distance to the closest treatment center ever available to a given
location. Our main effects of interest are first γ1, which measures the impact of new
infections on conflict incidence for locations with high potential demand for public goods,
before the arrival of the main package. Secondly, γ2, which gives us the effect for these
locations, after the arrival of health centers. We expect γ1 > 0 if there is a high demand
for those public goods and or there are rumors surrounding the few treatment centers
that are present. Moreover, we expect γ2 < 0, if the arrival of public goods lowers the
incidence of social unrest.
A potential confounder is the epidemic itself. If only locations with a sufficient level
of Ebola have conflict incidence, access to treatment centers could be picking up this
effect. We therefore control for the cumulative level of Ebola and also add another term
to our specification, which would capture differential effects for high and low infected
regions, ebolai,t−1×HighEbolaendi and ebolai,t−1HighEbolaendi ×PostEmergencyt, as well
as HighEbolaendi × PostEmergencyt for consistency with a fully specified model.
The main results are summarized in Table 2.9. There is a lower incidence of conflict due
to the epidemic after a significant amount of aid arrives in the ground, column (1). Prior
to this moment, the epidemic causes civil violence in locations with a high demand for
Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs), column (2). The effect is three times larger for locations
with high demand of public goods, than the average effect, 0.037 compared to 0.012.
However, after this, there is a drop in civil violence. The estimates are stable when
we control for cumulative Ebola cases or allow for heterogeneous effects for high and
low incidence areas, Tables B.25-B.26. They are also stable when controlling for other
public goods, column (5) in Table 2.9. The impacts are of similar magnitude and sign for
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Laboratories, but not statistically significant, column (3). This is consistent with the role
of rumors in fueling distress around ETUs before there are enough of them. Moreover,
ETUs are for patient care and suppose a more immediate benefit, whereas laboratories are
for prevention of future spread, therefore implying benefits that are deferred. Community
Care Centers (CCCs) have the opposite sign but are not precisely estimated. These were
local hospitals that were spontaneously turned into first patient care for Ebola patients.
We interpret this as suggestive evidence, that wherever the state or the international
organizations cannot reach, this leads to social unrest and potentially allows people to
organize to develop own strategies within the local community (Richards, 2016).
A simple correlational exercise studying whether conflict throughout the epidemic pre-
dicts access to ETUs, laboratories or Community care centers, shows that areas with
higher conflict incidence during the Ebola outbreak also had higher access to CCCs. As
expected, conflict incidence is not predictive of higher ETUs or laboratories, which are
established by international organizations with the objective to halt the spread of Ebola.
These results are summarized in Table B.27. We interpret the combination of these find-
ings as indicative of subversive violence arising in demand of public goods.
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Table 2.9: Public Goods: Heterogeneous effects with Health Centers
Outcome: conflict(t) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t)
ebola(t-1) 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.00214 0.0195∗∗ 0.0301 0.0140
(0.0071) (0.0039) (0.0079) (0.0192) (0.0098)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg -0.0177∗∗∗ -0.00343 -0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0309 -0.0172∗
(0.0059) (0.0039) (0.0056) (0.0194) (0.0102)
ebola(t-1) × NearETUend 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0376∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0093)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg × NearETUend -0.0209∗∗∗ -0.0226∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0087)
ebola(t-1) × NearLabend 0.0270 0.00133
(0.0360) (0.0369)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg × NearLabend -0.0188 0.00789
(0.0378) (0.0386)
ebola(t-1) × NearCCCend -0.0102 -0.0154
(0.0211) (0.0099)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg × NearCCCend 0.0178 0.0175∗
(0.0209) (0.0101)
N 36480 33516 33516 36480 33516
R2 0.010 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.014
(Clustered SE) by Dist; Excl. capital; only Epidemic period; Time FE, Chiefd FE, Reg × Month FE
Omitted: ETU*PostEmerg, Lab*PostEmerg, CCC*PostEmerg
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of cases in 100’000 per capita. PostEmerg is a post-treatment
dummy taking value 1 after September 2014, when a great amount of emergency assistance
is released. NearETU endi is the normalized inverse distance to the closest Ebola treatment
unit (ETU) ever available to a given location. NearLabendi is the normalized inverse
distance to the closest Laboratory for rapid testing of the Virus ever available to a given
location. NearCCCendi is the normalized inverse distance to the closest Community Care
Center (CCC) ever available to a given location.
Trust levels and Religious beliefs
Here we study the role of trust and religious beliefs as determinants of civil violence in
the context of an epidemic. The epidemic requires a change in cultural practices and
the adoption of new medical technologies to halt its spread. This moves institutional
authorities to respond and induce a behavior change. Civil disobedience targeted at
doctors or social workers, trying to stop the outbreak, suggests not only a role for state
coercion and demand for public goods driving civil violence in the context of an epidemic,
but also of misinformation or mistrust in authorities. Whether the state succeeds in
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inducing the required changes to halt the outbreak, depends on costs and benefits of
cultural change. The imposition of safe burial practices has a larger cost for communities
with strong religious beliefs. The perceived benefits of the change in practices depend on
trust in authorities.
We approach this by looking into heterogeneous effects of new Ebola cases on conflict in-
cidence for varying levels of trust or religiosity in a given location55. The effect of interest
are new infections interacted with each of our covariates. We control for new infections
interacted with the distance to the epicenter and square distance in order to diminish
the threat that we are capturing differences in cultural traits due to the random event
of the first index case arising in a particular location, or differences due to the epidemic
generating more distress for locations that were hit first56. We construct summary index
statistics to group several variables of interest, following Anderson (2008). The covariates
are constructed from survey data from the Afrobarometer and measured pre-epidemic
and aggregated at the the level of our unit of observation, i.e. chiefdom, district and
sub-prefecture for Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, respectively. The results should be
interpreted with caution due to the small sample size per cell, namely around 28 surveyed
individuals on average in each of our locations. We adjust our p-values for multiple infer-
ence following Anderson (2008), Tables B.31-B.32.
55To study heterogeneous effects we start from our baseline high frequency panel specification. We are
interested in teasing out patterns in the data, based on pre-existing covariates. Equation (2.8) summarizes
the specification.





+ γ1 ebolai,t−1 ×DistEpici + γ2 ebolai,t−1 ×DistEpic2i + αi + λt + µr,τ + εi,t
We are interested in βk, the impact of new infections in areas with a greater share of covariate k. The





56We used distance and square distance as an instrument for the total cumulative number of infections in
Subsection 2.4.1 when looking at the overall effect of the epidemic on conflict incidence, in the difference-
in-difference strategy. In this case we are in our high frequency panel specification looking at impacts of
new Ebola infections every two weeks, conditional on fixed characteristics. The distance to the epicenter
is a fixed characteristic that is predictive of the spread of Ebola in the long-run. The interaction of new
Ebola infections with the distance to the epicenter will capture this potential for long-run spread. By
controlling for it, we are studying the impact of new Ebola infections on conflict incidence for locations
varying under a given dimension, conditional on their potential long-run spread.
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The main results are presented in Table 2.10. The most robust result across specifica-
tions is that locations with low trust in leaders have higher rates of civil violence as a
consequence of the epidemic, columns (4)-(5). This holds across specifications and con-
trols. This is consistent with low trust in institutional authorities leading to lower health
uptake. We see a positive coefficient on high trust in local institutions in column (4), but
this effect depends on the specification. The coefficient is not statistically different from
zero when we control for other variables, column (5).
Strong religious beliefs are associated with a greater likelihood of civil violence as new
Ebola cases emerge, columns (1), (2), (5). These areas are not more violent at baseline,
however, Table B.29. There is no difference when looking at differences across the three
most prevalent religions in the affected countries. This is consistent with the fact that
people from any religion face costs to cultural changes57.
We also study other expected correlates of civil violence, such as ethnic diversity and
potential income channels. Ethnic polarization is associated with a higher likelihood of
civil violence, columns (3) and (5) in Table 2.10. We construct a summary index statis-
tic for ethnic salience, grouping questions on ethnic rather than national identification
and perceived discrimination of the own ethnic group. We find that ethnic salience has
no effect, columns (3) and (5). Note that ethnic fractionalization and polarization are
measures of the distribution of ethnic groups and they do not necessarily capture ethnic
cleavages58. Prior conflicts and political grievances have little explanatory power in this
57Safe burial practices that were imposed could be more costly for traditional African beliefs, or Mus-
lims, due to the custom of family members washing the deceased, but also cremations, traditionally
against Christian views, were imposed in Liberia, which has a Christian majority.
58Fractionalization is a Hirschman-Herfindahl index, given by F =
∑m
i=1 ni(1− ni), where m number
of groups, (ni, nj) size of each group. It ranges from 0, with all people belonging to the same group,




i (1 − ni). It takes
its maximum value when two equally sized groups face each other. They are negatively correlated at
low values of fractionalization, not correlated at intermediate values and positively correlated at positive
values.
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Table 2.10: Correlates of civil violence
Outcome: conflict(t) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ebola(t) 0.0133∗∗ 0.0132∗∗ 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.00320
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0031) (0.0052)
ebola(t-1) × Strongly Relig. 0.00314∗ 0.00358∗∗ 0.00557∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0028)
ebola(t-1) × Tradit. Relig 0.0000767 0.0000973
(0.0001) (0.0001)
ebola(t-1) × Ethnic Fractional. -0.0519∗∗ -0.0333
(0.0231) (0.0231)
ebola(t-1) × Ethnic Polariz. 0.0546∗∗ 0.0841∗∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0284)
ebola(t-1) × Ethnic Salience 0.00942 0.0108
(0.0103) (0.0111)
ebola(t-1) × Trust Leaders -0.0199∗∗ -0.0323∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0106)
ebola(t-1) × Trust Local Instit. 0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0161
(0.0064) (0.0101)
ebola(t-1) × Trust President -0.00479 -0.00706
(0.0058) (0.0058)
ebola(t-1) × Trust Opposition 0.00247 -0.00740
(0.0098) (0.0126)
ebola(t-1) × Trust Army -0.0228∗∗∗ 0.00411
(0.0081) (0.0126)
ebola(t-1) × Trust People 0.000379 0.00187
(0.0014) (0.0015)
Mean 0.0968 0.0968 0.0968 0.0968 0.0968
N 24852 24852 24852 24852 24852
R2 0.0508 0.0508 0.0510 0.0518 0.0528
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Chiefd FE Y Y Y Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Dist; Time, Chiefd; Control: ebola × DistEpic, ebola × DistEpic2; Excl. capital
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. The
covariates are Afrobarometer data measured pre-epidemic and aggregated at the level
of our unit of observation, i.e. chiefdom, district and sub-prefecture for Sierra Leone,
Liberia and Guinea, respectively. Ethnic salience is a summary index statistic grouping
questions on ethnic rather than national identification and perceived discrimination of the
own ethnic group. Strongly religious is the perceived importance of religion. Traditional
religion is a religion that is a traditional African religion and is neither a branch of
Islam nor of Christianity. Trust in people is a summary index statistic grouping trust in
neighbors, in other citizens, family members.
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context, as we see from studying prior voting outcomes, expressed political views for the
incumbent or the opposition or conflict incidence during the Civil Wars in Liberia and
Sierra Leone, columns (3) and (5), or Table B.30. The prize of the riot is a public good,
for instance it can defeat a military quarantine. In this case polarization should matter
more than fractionalization according to a theory proposed by Esteban and Ray (2011a).
To rule out that possible income channels are driving the main results, we look at the
impact of the epidemic on conflict incidence for varying levels of wealth and we also
study whether food prices drive our results. The aim of this exercise is to rule out
that pre-existing wealth or varying prices are the only drivers of civil violence in the
context of an epidemic. The impact of the epidemic on civil violence does not change by
the inclusion of contemporaneous food prices, Table B.28. This suggests that changing
economic conditions measured (imperfectly) in price levels of two important commodities
for food consumption (imported rice and palm oil) are not driving the results, for areas
for which we have data on prices. We also study the role of pre-existing infrastructure in
interaction with Ebola incidence and see that worse infrastructure is not associated with
more civil conflict, Table B.30.
2.4.3 Long-run Impacts on Trust
The epidemic changes the relationship with the state, affects beliefs, and a costly change
can potentially undermine trust in institutions. We study the long-term impacts on
trust in institutions comparing two rounds of Afrobarometer survey data, pre and post-
Epidemic. The effects on long-run trust are studied in a simple difference-in-difference
strategy, comparing trust before and after the Ebola outbreak for locations with varying
levels of Ebola incidence. If the epidemic affects conflict incidence through a change in
citizens’ perceptions of the state, we expect a drop in trust levels. We look at the impact
of the epidemic on trust for areas with strong religious beliefs in third differences. If
cultural change is a major source of social distress, we should be expect a further drop in
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Table 2.11: Trust Levels Pre/Post Ebola
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: Trust in Leaders Local Institutions President Opposition Army
PostEbola -0.730∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ 0.0378 -0.126∗∗
(0.153) (0.044) (0.057) (0.052) (0.055)
EbolaTotalpc × PostEbola -0.000254 0.0000145 -0.000811∗∗ 0.0000942 0.000210
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean 2.55 1.47 1.85 1.29 1.73
N 457 457 457 457 457
R2 0.67 0.80 0.81 0.70 0.71
(Clustered SE) by Chiefd*Year; Chiefd FE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: We compare two rounds of Afrobarometer data, pre and post-Epidemic.
EbolaTotalpc is the total cumulative number of Ebola cases measured at the end of the
epidemic in 100’000 per capita. PostEbola is a post-treatment dummy taking value 1
from 2014 on.
trust levels for groups with high costs of cultural adaptation.
Results are shown in Table 2.11. Simple correlational evidence shows that there are lower
levels of trust in leaders, in local institutions and in the President after the epidemic,
compared to one or two years prior (first row). In difference-in-differences we find that
areas that were harder hit by the epidemic experience a drop in trust in the President,
column (3). We further look at interaction effects with levels of religiosity as measured
prior to the outbreak, Table 2.12. The epidemic leads to a drop in trust in leaders for
areas that are strongly religious, third row in column (1).
A potential implication of these findings is that epidemics affect weak institutional set-
tings through their impact on social unrest and trust levels, especially for groups with
significant costs of cultural adaptation. State coercion and weak public good provision
exacerbates this effect and since lower trust in authorities is associated with more civil
violence, especially among these groups, this widens the cleavage between them and the
state authorities.
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Table 2.12: Trust Levels Pre/Post Ebola - interaction with Religiosity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: Trust in Leaders Local Institutions President Opposition Army
PostEbola -0.855∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.067) (0.091) (0.060) (0.059)
EbolaTotalpc × PostEbola 0.000536 0.000142 -0.000312 -0.000310 0.0000808
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
StronglyRelig × PostEbola 0.244 0.0690 0.439∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗ 0.0814
(0.290) (0.093) (0.106) (0.084) (0.108)
EbolaTotalpc × StronglyRelig × PostEbola -0.00229∗∗ -0.000268 -0.000483 0.000559 0.000783
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mean 2.55 1.47 1.85 1.29 1.73
N 457 457 457 457 457
R2 0.68 0.80 0.83 0.72 0.72
(Clustered SE) by Chiefd*Year; Chiefd FE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: We compare two rounds of Afrobarometer data, pre and post-Epidemic.
EbolaTotalpc is the total cumulative number of Ebola cases measured at the end of the
epidemic in 100’000 per capita. PostEbola is a post-treatment dummy taking value 1
from 2014 on.
2.4.4 Robustness checks
We provide a number of robustness checks on our high-frequency panel specification (2.4).
Firstly, the main concern to our OLS specification is unobserved serial correlation in
conflict or the possibility of conflict affecting the future spread of Ebola. We address
these concerns with a number of strategies leading to similar results.
In all our specifications we cluster standard errors at a given region or location, allowing
for time dependency. For robustness we add cumulative Ebola and past Ebola cases and
lagged conflict as control Xi,t−j and show that our coefficient of interest β is stable. Given
that we have many time periods and that we study the impact of infections, conditional
on several lags in our explanatory variable, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
is unlikely to affect our coefficient of interest significantly59. The Jorda local projection
specification also addresses these concerns including several lags in Ebola and conflict
incidence and clustering standard errors at a given location.
We also run an OLS regression of conflict on Ebola incidence with flexible coefficients on
59The limited influence of lagged dependent variables on other covariates of interests in long panels has
been shown using Monte Carlo simulations by Judson and Owen (1999); Beck and Katz (2004).
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βj ebolai,t+j + αi + λt + µr,τ + εi,r,t (2.9)
Since ebolai,t+j for j ≥ 0 are post-treatment variables affected by our explanatory variable
of interest, ebolai,t−1, they are bad controls and our coefficient of interest β−1 is likely to
be biased under this specification. Therefore, our main specification does not include
future Ebola incidence. We provide OLS results for equation (2.9) as a placebo exercise
strengthening our results. In particular it allows us to test whether future Ebola is
predictive of conflict today, when we condition on past Ebola incidence.
Furthermore, we test whether conflict incidence generates new Ebola infections in the
future by estimating equation (2.10).
ebolai,t = ρ ebolai,t−1 + β0 conflicti,t−1 (2.10)
+β1 conflicti,t−1 × ebolai,t−1 + αi + λt + µr,τ + εi,r,t
In particular, conflict cannot generate new infections unless there are already Ebola infec-
tions, since all infections after the single first index case were through human-to-human
transmission. We also know that this needs to occur within the two weeks in which an
infected individual has symptoms. Therefore our coefficient of interest is β1 and we expect
β0 not to be statistically significantly different from zero.
On the other hand, we can also allow for the possibility of dynamic effects estimating a
dynamic panel by General Method of Moments (GMM). Causal inference in a dynamic
model relies on the weaker assumption that new infections are pre-determined with re-
spect to conflict. That is, while conflict could cause future infections without challenging
our identification, the important identifying assumption is that, conditional on controls,
conflict is not correlated with new infections in the past, for reasons unrelated to the
epidemic. The identifying assumption in a dynamic model with serial correlation in con-
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flict up to l > 0 lags is summarized in equation (2.11). It gives us a long list of moment
conditions used to estimate equation (2.4) by GMM.
E(εt,i|ebolai,t−j, Xi,t−j, αi, λt, µr,τ ) = 0 for j ≥ l (but not for j < l) (2.11)
Secondly, we provide an empirical strategy that addresses the possibility of time-varying
unobservables driving the correlation between new infections and conflict incidence within
the same location. The number of new infections in a given location is instrumented with
the presence of the epidemic in neighboring locations. In particular, our instrument is
a dummy variable taking value 1 if there is any case in neighboring chiefdoms and 0
otherwise. We measure this at time t − 2, a period prior to the Ebola cases of interest
and also at times {t − 2, t − 3, ..., t − 10}, to allow for more flexibility in the impacts
changing over time. We allow for the effect to vary for distinct countries, for capitals,
capital-districts and other locations. The exclusion restriction is that the presence of
the epidemic in neighboring areas does not drive conflict in a given area either than
through its impact on the epidemic. We provide evidence to support this hypothesis by
showing that there are no spillover effects when looking at the number of Ebola cases
in neighboring chiefdoms, conditioning or not for own cases. We add a dummy variable
indicating whether there is conflict or not in the region except the own as control in our
2SLS specification. Although unobserved spillovers are always possible, this instrument
addresses the possibility that time-varying unobservables in the own location are driving
our results.
Thirdly, to address the possibility of non-standard measurement error in infections, we
use a second instrumental variables strategy. In particular, we instrument new infections
with past infections or with predicted infections from the medical literature. The predicted
number of cases is created following Fang et al. (2016)60. The model takes into account the
60We thank Fang et al. (2016) for sharing their code and data to replicate the Poisson transmission
model in their paper. We modify the code in order to remove potential confounders and to generate
out-of-sample predictions in Ebola infections.
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location and time of the first index case and the position of each chiefdom in the geographic
network, to estimate the parameters determining the rates of infection between distant,
neighboring and own chiefdoms in Sierra Leone by Maximum likelihood. Infections follow
a Poisson process and a number of covariates enter non-linearly multiplying the exponent
of the risk ratio. We modify their code to do out-of-sample predictions in Ebola infections
and remove potential confounders. The covariates we include are either fixed over time
and measured prior to the start of the outbreak, or only vary over time for the whole
country61. Our location and time fixed effects would remove their main effect. The
identifying variation in this instrument comes from the position in the network of each
chiefdom and the arrival of past Ebola infections62. We instrument ebolai,t−1 in (2.4)
with the resulting measure of predicted ebola cases. Since the exact timing of Ebola
infections are hard to predict, even ex-post, we need past Ebola cases to predict future
cases. The most conservative predictor is using Ebola infections four weeks in the past to
predict current infections. That is, the exclusion restriction of the instrument is a weaker
version of the fact that past infections should not affect civil violence in the future either
than through its impact on current infections. Given the short-run dynamics of EVD
and that we find only immediate impacts of Ebola on future conflict incidence using the
actual number of Ebola cases for a variety of specifications, we think that this instrument
addresses at least our main concern. Namely it allows us to address measurement error,
61The original covariates included in the model are population density, weekly average temperature
and relative humidity (varying at national level only), treatment centers, distances to nearest primary
roads, secondary roads, railroads, distances to the nearest hospital, coverage percentages of cropland,
forest and shrub, poverty level, three broad intervention phases and primary ethnic groups. We remove
obvious confounders from the model.
62The model is explained in the Appendix to Fang et al. (2016). We provide here a summary. Let
Yi(t) be number of symptom onsets in chiefdom i during week t. Zi(t) =
∑D
d=1 ωdYi(t− d) are infectious
cases. These are cases that have not developed symptoms yet are therefore not able to infect other
people. The probability of infectiousness being d, i.e. within 21 days is given by ωd. The number of
Ebola cases we observe are Yi(t). They follow a Poisson process, Yi(t) ∼ Poisson(Niγi(t)). Where
Ni is population size in chiefdom i and together with γi(t) gives us the average probability of a new
case arriving in chiefdom i at time t. It depends on cases arriving in the own chiefdom i, neighboring
chiefdoms j and distant chiefdoms, as well as on the transmission rate and either pre-determined covariates
or if time-varying only changing at national level. We remove other covariates. The model used is
γi(t) = {γ0 + γ1[Zi(t) + θ
∑
j∈Bi Zj(t)]}e
β′Xi(t). The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. We
choose initial values for γ00 , γ
0
1 , θ
0, and estimate β̂k after k iterations. Given βk, we maximize the Poisson
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reverse causality and serial correlation in conflict incidence.
Finally, newspaper bias is a potential problem when working with the widely used ACLED
dataset. We think that the high-frequency panel specification significantly reduces the
threat of newspaper bias driving the results. In particular, journalists would have to
perfectly predict the epidemic spread63 and move strategically every two weeks into areas
with high Ebola incidence, in order to generate a positive correlation between infections
from medical records and reported conflict at two-week frequency. We give a full list of
newspapers reporting in the two year prior (2012-2013) and during the epidemic (2014-
2015), Supplementary Appendix Tables D.4-D.6. There is some turnover of newspapers
reporting comparing both periods. Our main empirical strategy addresses this potential
concern by exploiting high-frequency variation within locations. Shut-down of newspapers
is taken into account with our time fixed effects. Region × month fixed effects further
take out the variation that might arise at regional level at monthly periods.
Results on Robustness Checks
The main results to various specifications discussed above are summarized in Table 2.4
for all countries. The results are stable across specifications, positive and statistically
significant. We have slightly smaller results in our GMM estimation strategy and slightly
larger results from the 2SLS specification with neighboring chiefdoms, but similar in
magnitude. The point estimates vary from 0.008 − 0.02, implying a 6 − 15% increase in
the likelihood of conflict incidence over the next few weeks due to one additional Ebola
case in 100’000 per capita. The reduced form estimates and first stage results using the
presence of the epidemic in neighboring locations in the last period only are shown in
Table B.11. We find no geographic spillovers, Table B.18.
A simple difference-in-difference strategy exploiting the arrival of the first case in each
63This is very hard, even ex-post for epidemiologists.
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location and the total end-number of Ebola cases in that location shows an overall effect
in conflict incidence of 1% per two-week period for one single additional Ebola case in
100’000 per capita, Table B.10. A similar strategy to the difference-in-difference design
exploiting the first case in each country is done at sub-national level in Figure B.7, using
the time of arrival in a district and the total Ebola incidence in a given chiefdom64.
Results for Sierra Leone are given in Table 2.13, for which we have constructed predicted
Ebola infections as instrument following the medical literature (Fang et al., 2016)65. The
impacts are consistent across specifications, with point estimates varying from 0.010 −
0.017. The baseline incidence of conflict is much smaller in Sierra Leone and these point
estimates imply a 21 − 36% increase in the likelihood of conflict from a baseline mean
(standard deviation) incidence throughout the epidemic of 0.047(1.30), or much larger
in comparison to pre-epidemic incidence, 0.012(0.50). The first stage fit for column (5),
using the predicted Ebola from the medical literature, is shown by plotting the raw data
of new Ebola cases and predicted Ebola, Figure B.10.
We interpret the slightly larger 2SLS coefficients found with instruments using distinct
types of variation, such as the distance to the epicenter in the difference-in-difference
strategy, the presence of the epidemic in neighboring locations and predicted Ebola from
the medical literature as an indication that OLS results are biased downwards due to
measurement error in the number of infections. Our preferred specification are the OLS
results, since they are more conservative estimates and they reflect the impact of confirmed
and probable cases on civil violence. As we will discuss in the Section on drivers, the effect
of the epidemic on civil violence changes over time and space as the state response evolves.
The smaller effect in the GMM strategy could mean that there are feedback effects, in
the sense that conflict amplifies Ebola incidence in the future. We will study this now in
detail.
64This is also shown for Guinea, for which we have sub-prefecture level data in Ebola cases, Table B.6,
but not for Liberia, for which we only have county-level data in Ebola incidence (14 counties).
65We are still working on extending it to Guinea and Liberia
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Table 2.13: High-frequency panel: Summary of Results for Sierra Leone
Outcome: conflict(t) Sierra Leone
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS GMM IV-eb(t-2) IV-Pred.eb
ebola(t-1) 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗ 0.0102∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0109) (0.0058) (0.0081)
N 15369 15218 15369 15218 15369
R2 0.050 0.052 0.050 0.050
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Chiefd FE Y Y Y Y




∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of Ebola infections over time. Column (3) estimates a dynamic
panel of conflict on past Ebola using all possible lags as GMM-type instruments for the
difference equation. Column (4) uses ebola(t− 2) as instrument for ebola(t− 1). Column
(5) uses predicted Ebola following (Fang et al., 2016). The First stage is shown graphically
in Figure B.10.
Results for a regression including several lags and leads in Ebola, equation (2.9), are shown
in Tables B.12- B.13 and Figure B.11. As mentioned this cannot be our main specification
since future cases are bad controls, they are affected by our variable of interest. However,
this serves as a placebo exercise to show that reverse causality is not driving our results.
They indicate that infections in the past two weeks lead to a rise in civil violence and
that conditional on these, leads have no bite. The F-test shows that only past cases are
statistically significantly different from zero, while leads are not.
We study the possibility of conflict incidence directly affecting the spread of Ebola, Table
B.15. First we show that adding a lag in conflict incidence does not affect our coefficient of
interest66. Moreover, the lag is not significant and there is no evidence of serial correlation.
66The limited influence of lagged dependent variables on other covariates of interests in long panels
has been shown using Monte Carlo simulations by Judson and Owen (1999); Beck and Katz (2004). In
particular, without the covariates the bias derived by Nickell (1981) is plimN→∞(ρ̂− ρ) ≈ −(1+ρ)T−1 , with
ρ being the relationship between conflict at time t and conflict at time t− 1. We have T = 115 two-week
periods and ρ̂ = 0.053, so the bias in ρ̂ is −(1+0.053)114 ≈ −0.009. This is an upper bound, since the inclusion
of covariates necessarily reduces this bias (Nickell, 1981). It affects our coefficient of interest indirectly
through the first-stage correlation between lagged conflict and Ebola incidence, estimated to be 0.06. An
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Results for a Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation in panel data suggest no evidence
of serial correlation in conflict incidence, Table B.14. Second, we test whether the spread
of Ebola is affected by conflict incidence, as explained above, equation (2.10). We find no
evidence of this feedback effect, Table B.15.
Finally, our results are robust to using as outcome variable conflict incidence as a dummy
variable taking values in {0, 1}, as well as using as an explanatory variable the total num-
ber of new Ebola cases including suspect cases, Table B.16, or using count data models,
Table B.17.
2.5 Conclusion
The emergence of infectious diseases has been increasing in the last decades and they are
likely to rise in the future as globalization, population growth, environmental degradation
and climate change are affecting human societies and the natural environment in ways
never experienced before67. Extraordinary advances in the medical science have allowed
the international community to intervene in such contexts. The perception of disease
epidemics as a threat to global security, beyond its impacts on human health,68 however,
shapes the objectives and implementation of emergency assistance. The international
community is often accused of intervening too late, once the risks of a pandemic are
undeniable69, and of implementing draconian measures, intended for containment, rather
than minimizing the impact of an epidemic on the local population70.
upper bound to the bias in our coefficient β is −0.06 × (−0.009) ≈= 0.00054 or 4% of our estimated
β̂ = 0.0127 in the regression of conflict on ebola incidence with lagged conflict as control. Taking this
into account, the lower bound impact of new ebola infections on conflict incidence is 0.0122.
67(UNICEF/UNDP/WorldBank/WHO, 2004; Jones et al., 2008)
68(WHO, 2016)
69“The lack of international political will was no longer an option when the realisation dawned that
Ebola could cross the ocean. When Ebola became an international security threat, and no longer a
humanitarian crisis affecting a handful of poor countries in West Africa, finally the world began to wake
up,” Dr Joanne Liu, MSF international president.
70“Whilst social unrest and fears of state collapse ran rampant, we feared that our call [for civilian and
military assets with expertise in biohazard containment] would be misconstrued or intentionally twisted
into a call for armed stabilisation”, Christopher Stokes, MSF general director.
Chapter 2 87
Essays in Development Economics
In this paper we provide empirical evidence that these interventions can potentially af-
fect civil violence in developing countries. We identified numerous acts of civil violence
reported in newspapers, following the spread of cholera, Malaria, HIV/AIDS, in Congo,
DRC, Haiti, Kenya, Nigeria, Mozambique, Uganda, Tunisia, Somalia, South Africa71. We
take the case of the recent Ebola epidemic in Western Africa to provide empirical evidence
of epidemics leading to riots, protests and civil violence against government authorities,
medical personnel and social workers trying to contain the outbreak, and provide precise
mechanisms underlying this effect.
The impacts are large, immediate and have long-run consequences on trust in institutional
authorities. Our results show that the effects are tied to the emergency response, pre-
existing levels of trust and barriers to cultural adaptation. A new infection in 100,000 per
capita raises conflict incidence by 10% in a given location, from a baseline mean incidence
of 0.0128 in 100,000 per capita at two-week level. Moving from no cases to the average
number of infections for epidemic areas at the start of the outbreak roughly doubles the
incidence of conflict within two weeks. Our results suggest that state coercion, demand
for public goods and little sensitivity to local cultural practices are determinants of civil
conflict. We find the largest impacts of the epidemic on civil violence around the beginning
of the international response, when safe burial practices were imposed. Areas with low
trust in leaders and strong religious beliefs, are more likely to engage in such subversive
violence, as they face higher costs of cultural change. State capacity has a large impact
on civil violence in this context. We find large impacts of military district quarantines on
increasing the likelihood of riots and protests, beyond and independently of the impact
of new infections. The results are driven by areas with high demand for health treatment
and access to it lowers conflict incidence, driven by areas closer to them. The epidemic led
to lower trust in institutional authorities, especially for strongly religious communities.
Epidemics in which the state intervenes or is expected to intervene alter citizens’ percep-
tion and demands from the state. Halting an epidemic leads the state to adopt coercive
71The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 1997-2015.
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measures, it generates a demand for public goods and it requires a change in cultural
practices. These changes lead to social unrest, depending on the coerciveness of the re-
sponse, the capacity of the state to contain the outbreak, trust in institutional authorities
and beliefs among citizens. These channels also mean that epidemics are more likely to
lead to civil conflict in weak institutional settings, with low trust, weak public health
systems and state coercion that is perceived as illegitimate. Moreover, depending on the
state response, they lower trust in institutional authorities, therefore further weakening
the state.
These findings have policy implications, as they inform the choice of emergency assistance.
In particular, coercive measures, little sensitivity to local customs and a late intervention
lead to social unrest, undermine containment efforts (Chapter 3) and have long-run effects
on trust.
The possibility to track a shock from the first index case to the last contagion, an exoge-
nous shock in state capacity generated by the influx of emergency assistance, combined
with our fine-grained data and knowledge of the context and circumstances leading to




Local Media and the Spread of
Ebola: Evidence from Guinea
“Chinoziva ivhu kuti mwana wembeva anorwara.”
(It’s the people close to someone that know her/his affairs).
Tsumo (Shona Proverb)
3.1 Introduction
The Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014-16 caused local devastation and global alarm.
In the most affected countries, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, over 28,616 people were
infected, among which 11,310 died1, leading to social unrest and economic losses esti-
mated to US$2.2 billion in 2015 alone2. Weak local medical infrastructure was quickly
overwhelmed, predictions went up to over one million of infected people without fur-
ther action3 and as smaller outbreaks emerged in other parts of Africa and cases were
exported to Europe and the United States, the fear of a pandemic escalated. The inter-
national community eventually recognized it as a global health emergency5 and injected
1http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/, accessed April 1, 2017.
2World Bank 2016, World Bank Group Ebola Response Fact Sheet http://www.worldbank.org/en/
topic/health/brief/world-bank-group-ebola-fact-sheet accessed May 17, 2016
3The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) considered the possibility of a high risk
scenario leading up to 1.4 million infected people by January 2015, echoed by newspapers4.
5The WHO has been widely criticized for acting too late, eight months into the epidemic, and later
acknowledged this as a mistake (WHO, 2016). Doctors Without Borders (MSF) required assistance
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emergency assistance worth US$459 million6, including financial resources, medical tech-
nology and infrastructure and military aid, coordinated under the auspices of the World
Health Organization (WHO). While this influx of humanitarian aid was critical to halt
the outbreak, there was another crucial element. A major issue for epidemic control was
whether or not communities could change their approach to caring for the sick and burial
of the dead (Richards, 2016). Hence, it required the social acceptance of implemented
policies and new technologies and a rapid change in cultural practices. A question that
emerged was how to possibly change cultural practices in a matter of months? Local, na-
tional and international actors tried many strategies, including a massive communication
campaign. They designed radio programs informing, persuading or exhorting citizens to
take protective measures, seek treatment and change burial practices. Can media influence
cultural practices in a matter of months? And if so, what makes broadcast information
particularly effective?
This paper seeks to identify the impact of media on the spread of Ebola. We conjec-
ture that broadcast information serves as a coordination device to change cultural prac-
tices that facilitate the spread of disease. Using original data from Guinea and a quasi-
experimental design based on exogenous variation in radio signal reception by distinct
media outlets, combined with the precise timing of distinct information campaigns about
Ebola, we study the effect of local radios on the spread of Ebola, social resistance and
treatment uptake. We provide suggestive evidence of a coordination mechanism, rather
than a pure information or persuasion effect, exploiting survey data on post-epidemic
beliefs, knowledge and stated treatment uptake, on one hand, and measuring the change
in burial practices in response to radio emissions or social mobilization campaigns, on the
other.
from the international community in March 2014 and alerted that the epidemic was ‘out of control’ in
June 2014. It was only in August 2014 that the World Health Organization (WHO) recognized it as an
‘international public health emergency’ and that the World Bank released emergency assistance funding
of US$200 million, in addition to financial or material aid from international donors, materializing into
infrastructure in the months to follow.
6The total worth of direct and in-kind contributions to WHO for the Ebola response was US$459
million from over 60 donors between March 2014 and 22 April 2016, www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/
funding/en updated April 2016
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Several competing hypotheses have been advanced regarding the possible impact of infor-
mation transmitted through radio on health behavior in particular or cultural practices
more broadly. On one hand, some have argued that media campaigns have no effect in
this context, e.g. Richards (2016) argues: “Devising safer practices is work for community
groups, not radio propagandists.” Galiani et al. (2016) found that mass media alone has
no impact handwashing behavior, unless combined with more intensive community and
school-level activities. More generally, the literature has found mixed evidence on the im-
pact of information on health behavior, ranging from no effect (Kremer and Miguel, 2007;
Duflo et al., 2015) to an effect depending on the type of information provided (Dupas,
2011). On the other hand, we also have evidence of media campaigns affecting divorce,
fertility decisions and other core markers of gender equality (Chong and Ferrara, 2009;
Jensen and Oster, 2009; La Ferrara et al., 2012). This paper seeks to contribute to this
literature by giving light to a potentially important mechanism underlying the heterogene-
ity of results. Health behavior is often associated to cultural norms and we hypothesize
that broadcast information, through its common knowledge aspect is more likely to affect
certain protective behaviors, namely those that require a collective change, compared to
other types of information. However, it should not have an additional impact on private
actions, such as handwashing behavior, compared to private information. While theoret-
ically appealing, it is not obvious that broadcast information would affect cultural norms
in practice. Not all sources of information are necessarily trusted, given a long history
of extractive institutions and oppression against local or traditional practices7, or due to
contradictory messages being disseminated, as scientific knowledge about Ebola evolved;
or the information might be too hypothetical or difficult to follow8. Culture, moreover, is
strikingly persistent under pressure of cultural transmission9.
Set against several possibilities, estimating the causal impact of broadcast information on
health behavior, cultural practices and the spread of a disease is challenging. Firstly, radio
7(Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; McGovern, 2012; Alsan, 2014; Morse et al., 2016)
8If we cannot touch the sick, how do we care for them?
9(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Putnam et al., 1994; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Alesina et al.,
2013)
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access is likely to be correlated with socio-economic, demographic and geographic factors
related to the spread of the disease. Secondly, the information campaigns are potentially
evolving endogenously to the change in behavior and the epidemic spread. Thirdly, the
effect might be confounded with other interventions occurring simultaneously.
This paper addresses these questions using pre-epidemic signal exposure to a local ra-
dio, conditional on having access to other radios, and exploiting the centralized nature of
Guinea, whose local radios officially started their Ebola program at the same time with
roughly similar contents. The main empirical strategy follows the same logic as a stan-
dard difference-in-difference strategy with continuous treatment. We compare areas with
varying access to distinct media outlets that pre-date the start of the epidemic, before and
after a given information campaign starts several months after the beginning of the Ebola
outbreak. More precisely we study the effect of having access to an information campaign
aired in a local radio on the spread of Ebola. Other outcomes studied are resistance be-
havior and a measure of treatment uptake, namely the ratio of Ebola deaths in community
compared to Ebola deaths in an Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU). The epidemiological data
is from the WHO. Radio transmitter location and characteristics were provided by the
telecommunications authority in Guinea (ARPT), while details on information campaigns
were collected during in-person interviews and surveys conducted by the author to radios
across Guinea. Identification relies on a parallel trends assumption, namely that areas
with greater access to a given radio program would have behaved similarly to other areas
in the absence of the information campaign. In fact, we not find only parallel trends, but
also the same evolution of Ebola in areas with varying access to a rural radio from their
own community, compared to areas with access to other rural radios, prior to the start of
the rural radio campaigns10.
Additionally, we provide a number of strategies, intended as suggestive, to test the main
hypothesis, that local radios served as a coordination device to change behavior over
10The evolution of the disease does not follow parallel trends across other media outlets, such as national
or private radio stations, prior to their own information campaigns, and we therefore omit their study.
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time as individuals updated their beliefs about socially acceptable practices, which ul-
timately affected the spread of the disease. We are guided by a conceptual framework
that borrows from the literature on global games and from epidemiological theory and
closely follows Yanagizawa-Drott (2014). Firstly, we provide evidence that our measure
of radio signal reception is correlated with ownership of radio devices and radio listening
patterns, using survey data. We use Afrobarometer rounds 5 (2013) and 6 (2015), as
well as a phone-survey conducted by Internews asking detailed questions to listeners of
an Ebola program. Secondly, we exploit a survey conducted by the National Institute of
Statistics in Guinea on post-Ebola beliefs and stated behavior to assess whether listen-
ing to an Ebola program on the media is related to greater knowledge about the disease
and treatment uptake. We run a simple OLS and then use our radio signal measure as
instrument for hearing about Ebola on the media. Thirdly, we exploit data from the Red
Cross on weekly radio emissions, social mobilization campaigns, safe burials and refused
burials to study in a panel estimation framework based on a Granger causality argument
and selection on observables, whether radio emissions are followed by a change in burial
practices. Finally, we discuss the role of local information in affecting beliefs and behavior
change and provide evidence of a demand-side effect, compared to a supply-side effect of
political accountability proposed in other settings (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Eisensee
and Strömberg, 2007).
The results show that sustained access to a local radio program informing about protective
measures, encouraging treatment, addressing Ebola rumors and new burial practices,
lowered social unrest, affected treatment uptake and cut the epidemic significantly. While
the spread of Ebola evolves similarly for several months comparing areas with and without
access to a local radio, there is a drop in infected cases seven months after the start of the
campaign. An increase by 10 percentage points in access to an own rural radio station
is associated with a drop by 13 − 18% in the number of Ebola cases after the seventh
month following the start of the campaign. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests
that around 303 Ebola infections could have been spared if all areas with access to a
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rural radio station had their own local radio from the beginning of the outbreak, that
is 8% of the total number of Ebola cases. We see a concurrent drop in social resistance
behavior, as well as a rise in treatment uptake, measured as the ratio of Ebola deaths
in an Ebola treatment center (ETU) to deaths in the own community. We then provide
empirical evidence intended as suggestive to test our hypothesis. Descriptive evidence
shows that the constructed radio signal is correlated with ownership of radio devices
and radio listening patterns11. Using survey data on beliefs and stated behavior, we
find suggestive evidence of broadcast information affecting actions that are observed and
punishable by others, such as seeking health treatment, but not private actions, such as
the use of chlorine, which is more related to knowing a victim that had Ebola. Exploiting
data on Red Cross activities over time we find that radio emissions in a given month
are followed by less refused burials in the following month, but we do not see the same
pattern for social mobilization campaigns, which do not have the common knowledge
aspect necessarily. The results suggest that 20 additional radio emissions are needed to
ensure one less burial refusal in the next month in a given prefecture. There is no evidence
suggesting that public goods are provided ad-hoc to areas with higher exposure to local
radios, therefore ruling out a pure supply-side effect. We conjecture that relevance of local
information, trust in local institutions, language and proximity to the own ethnic group
are mechanisms explaining the success of local radios compared to radios from distant
communities, conditional on the same information provided.
Literature
This work contributes to several strands of literature. Firstly, this paper is related to the
political economy of mass media (Strömberg, 2004). Compared to seminal contributions
on the role of local media for greater provision of public goods, through greater political
accountability (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007), the unique set-
11An increase by 10 in access to any radio signal is associated with a 25% increase in the ownership
of radio devices and a 56% increase in the number of times they listen to news on the radio.
Chapter 3 95
Essays in Development Economics
ting of the Ebola outbreak response, coordinated by external actors, allows us to credibly
rule out this channel and focus on the demand-side effects of local media, i.e. its impact
on the perception of the public goods provided12.
A growing literature on the role of media to changing behavior shows that propaganda
exacerbates sentiment and violence (DellaVigna et al., 2014; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014;
Adena et al., 2015) and that broadcast information can reduce social capital (Olken,
2009), improve long-term education in children (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008), influence
fertility decisions (La Ferrara et al., 2012) and provide information to voters (DellaVigna
and Kaplan, 2007; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Casey, 2015). This paper contributes to this
literature by providing evidence on the role of local media inducing a change in cultural
practices, health uptake and the spread of disease in a matter of months.
This paper also contributes to this literature methodologically. While it is similar to
previous literature on media that uses features of the geographic terrain and pre-existing
exposure to radio signal reception to identify the effect of broadcast information on a
relevant economic outcome, it adds two additional dimensions that strengthen the design.
First, we add a time dimension, since we observe the Ebola outbreak for at least six
months before the rural radio campaign starts. Secondly, we add a control group, namely
areas that have access to information from other radio stations, or areas that have access
to the same information campaign from other rural radio stations.
It also relates to a literature on cultural change and transmission. The importance of
culture, a set of preferences, beliefs, and norms that govern human behavior to understand
economic prosperity, has been widely documented (Greif, 1994; Manz et al., 2006; Fisman
and Miguel, 2007; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2016)13. While culture and the impact
12While a possible explanation for local media to impact the spread of Ebola could in theory be due
to a greater provision of public goods through greater political accountability (Besley and Burgess, 2002;
Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007), this is unlikely to be the main channel in this setting. The objective
function of the whole apparatus set in place included the spread of Ebola only, the allocation of laborato-
ries and Ebola treatment centers (ETUs) was allocated on medical grounds, first set up by international
Organizations, such as MSF, and then coordinated under the auspices of the WHO. In fact, the interven-
tion was criticized for taking little account of social unrest and local populations, as illustrated by the
imposition of quarantines and cremations in Liberia (Moon, 2015).
13For recent reviews see Bisin and Verdier (2011); Gershman (2017)
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of institutions on culture is strikingly persistent (Putnam et al., 1994; Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2001; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Alesina et al.,
2013), there is also evidence of a change in culture in a matter of decades, following
institutional variation, (Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007; Fernández, 2010; Fernández-
Villaverde et al., 2014). However, sometimes apparently inefficient cultural norms persist
under pressure of cultural transmission (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981)14. This paper
provides evidence of a rapid change in cultural practices through the impacts of local
media.
This paper contributes to the literature on health in developing countries (Dupas and
Miguel, 2017). There is mixed evidence on the impact of information in shaping health
behavior, ranging from no effect (Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Duflo et al., 2015), to an
effect depending on the type of information provided (Dupas, 2011; Galiani et al., 2016).
We highlight the role of broadcast information on the spread of disease. Given that health
behavior is often tied to cultural norms, it is not surprising that the common knowledge
aspect of providing this information through radio should be important.
This work also adds to the understanding of social and institutional factors of the spread
of infectious diseases (Adda, 2016; Morse et al., 2016; Richards, 2016).
The paper is structured as follows. The following Section 3.2 gives a background on the
spread of Ebola, the sources of social resistance behavior and a snapshot on the media
outlook in Guinea and information campaigns during the Ebola outbreak. Section 3.3
gives a conceptual framework that borrows from the literature on global games and from
epidemiological theory, with the intention to guide the empirical set-up and search for
mechanisms. The empirical set-up and results are presented in Section 3.5. The main
research design is presented in Section 3.5.1, where differences in radio signal reception
14An example of a very costly persistent practice is the case of the kuru virus. The deadly disease
spread among the Fore people of New Guinea as a result of their tradition of eating the bodies of dead
relatives and killed scores of the tribe members until the cause of illness was identified in 1950s and the
cultural practice was discontinued. (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981)
Chapter 3 97
Essays in Development Economics
across Guinea and the timing of different radio campaigns are exploited to identify the
effect of information campaigns transmitted through local radios on the spread of Ebola,
as well as social resistance behavior and treatment uptake. Mechanisms are discussed in
detail in Section 3.5.2. In Section 3.5.3 we provide robustness and validity checks for our
main empirical strategy. We conclude in Section 3.6.
3.2 Background
This Section provides a background on the Ebola epidemic and response, the sources of
distress and resistance behavior, as well as an overview of the media landscape in Guinea
and information campaigns about Ebola15.
The spread of Ebola
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a severe disease with a fatality rate varying from 25−90%
at different stages of the outbreak. The virus is transmitted by physical contact with the
blood, organs, secretions, or other body fluids of infected humans or animals, such as fruit
bats or primates, as well as infected objects, such as needles and syringes. The disease is
characterized by initial flu-like symptoms, which rapidly progress into vomiting, diarrhea,
stomach pain and hemorrhage16. The incubation period, i.e. the time from infection
with the virus to the onset of symptoms, is estimated at an average of 8-12 days in the
2014 Western African Ebola outbreak (Van Kerkhove et al., 2015), but it can potentially
take up to 21 days. The virus can only be detected after symptoms arise, even in the
laboratory, and it is hard to detect at early stages17. Infectiousness increases at later
15We provide a summary in Figure C.1
16www.who.int/ebola or www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola
17 “Diagnosing Ebola in a person who has been infected for only a few days may be complicated. The
early symptoms of Ebola infection are difficult to distinguish from other, more common infectious diseases
such as such as malaria, influenza, and typhoid fever. Ebola virus is detected in blood only after onset of
symptoms, most notably fever, which accompany the rise in circulating virus, however, it may take up to
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stages, with deceased bodies being the most contagious. Patients die within one or two
weeks after onset of symptoms or recover becoming immune. Ebola survivors suffer with
persistent medical conditions after recovery, including joint pain, loss of sight, headaches,
and other chronic health issues, as well as social stigma.
Discovered in the 1970s, the Ebola virus has caused around twenty outbreaks to date,
all in Africa, but this was its first time turning into an epidemic18. The 2014 West
African Ebola epidemic is the largest in history, causing over over 28,600 infections and
over 11,300 deaths, between December 2013 and April 201619. Within less than a year the
disease spread through Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, small outbreaks reached Nigeria,
Mali and a few cases were exported to Europe and the US. Halting an Ebola outbreak
requires a great effort to treat symptomatic individuals, isolate infected people, trace their
contacts, ensure safe burials and change population behaviors towards protective habits
(Fast et al., 2014). This proved to be especially difficult in the present context of weak
state capacity, slow international response, unfamiliarity with the disease and religious or
cultural habits that facilitated its spread, especially through traditional burials and low
treatment uptake.
Evidence suggests that the first index case20 occurred in the Forest region in Guinea in
December 2013 at the borders of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Subsequent cases spread
exclusively through human-to-human contact. For eight to nine months these countries
with very weak health systems and state capacity, tried to deal with the outbreak, with
soaring death rates. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), who scaled up their intervention,
called it an ‘unprecedented Ebola epidemic’ already by end of March 2014. It was not un-
til August 2014 that the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it an ‘international
public health emergency’, followed by financial aid from international donors. By the time
international aid reached the affected countries, over 4,000 cases had been confirmed. In-
18Definition of epidemic : affecting or tending to affect a disproportionately large number of individuals
within a population, community, or region at the same time
19http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/, accessed April 1, 2017.
20The first contagion to humans is zoonotic, i.e. entering in contact with a reservoir host, such as bats,
for instance by eating rare bush meat.
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ternational aid coordinated by the WHO implemented specialized medical infrastructure,
contact tracing, surveillance systems and awareness raising campaigns. The peak of the
outbreak due to the effectiveness of the interventions was reached by the end of 2014. The
outbreak came to an end mid-2015, except for Guinea, which had a significant amount
of cases until end of 2015. New infections still appeared in April 2016, but at that point
new medical infrastructure and surveillance systems were in place to avoid another major
outbreak and the epidemic was officially declared to an end in the summer of 2016.
Resistance behavior
Containment efforts were opposed by the civilian population either because they were
coercive, such as forced detainment in Ebola treatment units (ETUs); the intentions of
emergency assistance were misunderstood, through the spread of rumors; or they went
against people’s most fundamental beliefs, surrounding the burial of the deceased family
members or taking care of the sick.
Ebola patients need to be isolated to avoid contagion and treatment requires special
equipment21. This meant that patients could not be treated in hospitals and instead
required the establishment of ad-hoc health centers, known as Ebola treatment units
(ETUs)22. According to interviews conducted by the author with social workers in Guinea,
the biggest source of rumors and conspiracy theories was around what was happening
inside ETUs23. Given that Ebola was a new, unknown disease to the region, that early
Ebola symptoms are very similar to other endemic diseases in the region and that people
died in ETUs with a very high fatality rate at the beginning at the outbreak, it is not
surprising that rumors spread24.
21Including biohazard protection, such as the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) by doctors
22In some cases an alternative method emerged, known as Community care centers (CCCs), for first
patient care of suspect patients. These were opened spontaneously by the communities and led by
traditional caregivers, rather than professional staff.
23According to their accounts, an important way to halt the spread of rumors was for family members
to come and see what was happening inside the ETUs.
24In pure observational probabilistic terms entering an ETU was a death sentence at the start of the
outbreak, especially for patients that arrived when symptoms were already advanced.
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The other major source of distress was the rapid change in cultural practices required to
halt the spread of Ebola. Traditional burial practices involved washing the deceased by
close family members. Since the Ebola virus is most infectious in dead bodies, changing
this practice was a first priority. In Guinea the first attempt was to impose safe burials,
which did not allow for traditional or religious customs. The personnel conducting the
burials had to use personal protective equipment (PPE) to avoid their own contagion with
the virus, which has a very impressive effect, as the whole body, including the face, is
covered. In Guinea reported attacks against Red Cross volunteers, in charge of conducting
these burials, averaged ten per month in the last six months of 201425. Safe burials were
progressively adapted to local customs, such as involving religious leaders, leading to what
became known as safe and dignified burials.
Media landscape and information campaigns
Guinea ranks 101 in press freedom index with 33.11 points, classified as having a “no-
ticeable problem”, a classification shared with countries like Argentina, Brazil or Italy,
better ranked than Belarus, Mexico or Russia, but worse ranked than Botswana, Roma-
nia or the United States26. There are four broad types of media outlets in Guinea: the
international, the national, the private and the rural radio stations. Among the rural
radios we also need to distinguish between having access to a radio station from your
own community (prefecture) vs. receiving the signal from a rural radio based in another
community. While the contents and signal strength are similar for each group (those indi-
viduals inside and those living outside the prefecture where the rural radio is located), the
difference is that individuals with their own rural radio are listening to people from their
own community, thus are more likely to trust them more, know them better or be more
likely to understand their language. The international radio stations present in Guinea
are the BBC, which is in English27, and Radio France International, which did not con-
25IFRC, website.
26Reporters without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/ranking, accessed September 2017.
27Guinea is a French-speaking country
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duct Ebola sensitization campaigns. The national radio stations are present throughout
the country, but 18 out of 27 transmitters were not functioning for a long period, due to
problems with energy access or other problems. There were 23 rural radio stations at the
beginning of the period, and 11 new rural radios created at the peak of the epidemic. Of
the old ones, 7 were repaired or received additional capacity in January 2015. While a
large part of the whole country receives some signal from some rural radio station, there
were only 23 out of 34 prefectures with their own community radio station until the peak
of the outbreak28. Finally, there are 45 private radio stations, many of which overlap in
the same area. Of these, 35 of them form a consortium called URTELGUI, pre-dating
the epidemic, and that consortium aired Ebola programs.
There were four big broadcast information campaigns on Ebola. The first broadcast
information campaign was conducted by the national radios, starting on April 7, 2014,
four months after the first Ebola case, but less than a month after the official declaration
of the Ebola outbreak in Guinea. This was aired over all national and gradually over
all rural radios in the country as a synergy, which means that all people with access to
that radio are listening to the program at the same time, hence making it difficult to
avoid the information by changing channel. They were mostly reporting on cases in each
location, prohibitions, measures taken and recommending the use of protective measures.
While national radio stations emit programs in French, rural radio stations were adding
complementary information in local languages. The program continued on a daily basis
until the end of the outbreak.
The second broadcast information campaign started officially in the end of June 2014,
coordinated by the directorate of the rural radios in the capital and diffused in local
languages by the rural radios throughout the country. However, many of the rural ra-
dios started their own program on Ebola only later, some as late as end of September
201429. The program improved over time, creating more persuasive content, including
28Within a prefecture, sub-prefectures have more or less access to it.
29To avoid endogenous using a start of the campaign that is endogenous to the spread of Ebola for
each location, we base all our analysis on the official start of the rural radio campaigns, in June 2014.
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Ebola survivors in their talk shows, as well as local, traditional or religious leaders, di-
rectly addressing rumors and giving locally relevant information in local languages. Some
rural radios report adding new elements to their Ebola program as late as November 2014.
The rural radios received significant help from the local branch of a non-governmental or-
ganization based in Switzerland, Fondation Hirondelle. They provided the rural radio
stations with technical assistance and created contents in several local languages that the
rural radio stations would directly upload in their programs. The first time this NGO
shares contents with rural radio stations is in August 2014, although many rural radio
stations incorporated their contents later on30.
Thirdly, the private radio stations did not have a sustained program on Ebola sensitiza-
tion, except for three synergies emitted by private radio stations that were part of the
consortium URTELGUI. These were very short campaigns of a single day in April and
July 2014 and a more prolonged one over several weeks in February 2015.
There was a fourth synergy starting in January 2015, “Ebola Chrono”, conducted by the
international organization Internews, which diffused throughout the national, rural and
a set of private radio stations, three times per week. The contents were similar in spirit
to the rural radio stations at their best time, but the intervention was a bit late in the
timeline of the epidemic.
The main themes addressed in Ebola sensitization campaigns are summarized in Table
3.1.
Table 3.1: Main themes addressed in Ebola sensitization campaigns
First themes Later incorporated
Ebola transmission Addressing rumors about Ebola
Ebola prevention Addressing resistance behavior
Ebola treatment Stigmatization of Ebola victims
How did information change over time? The most significant change, according to a wide
We can think of it as an intention to treat estimate.
30See Supplementary Appendix Figure E.1 for a schedule of the Ebola sensitization campaign for two
rural radios in Guinea.
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variety of actors involved in the Ebola response and interviewed by the author in Guinea,
was going from a factual description of the disease, that was contradictory and facilitated
the spread of rumors, to more persuasive contents that addressed rumors and invited
Ebola survivors and religious and local leaders in the radio shows. Instead of insisting on
low risk habits that are hard to change, such as eating bush meat31, the focus moved to
high risk habits, such as burial practices and low treatment uptake. The type of messages
aired at the beginning compared to after the messages were harmonized at national level
are summarized in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Type of contents
First type of messages aired in radios (e.g. Gueckedou rural radio, March 26, 2014)
– “Ebola is a serious contagious disease, it can kill you. 60 − 90% of people
infected by the Ebola virus die.”
– “We don’t touch or transport dead bodies. We don’t eat bush meat. We don’t
touch body liquids or secretions.”
Sensitization campaign (gradually incorporated by rural radios after June, 2014)
– “Ebola is a deadly contagious disease but you can recover from it and take
preventive measures of hygiene.”
– “You can recover from Ebola if you go to an Ebola Treatment Unit early
enough.”
– “NGOs did not cause the spread of Ebola. They are helping defeat it.”
– “We need to let the Red Cross conduct safe burials for us. They are protecting
us.”
– “People that survived Ebola do not have the Ebola virus. There is no reason
to be scared of them. They should be respected.”
31We have been eating bush meat for decades and never had Ebola. So they are obviously lying to us.
Moreover, how can we substitute for it? (This was also a low risk habit, given that all contagions after
the first case were human-to-human contagions, not zoonotic.).
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3.3 Conceptual framework
This section gives a conceptual framework that borrows from the literature on global
games and from epidemiological theory and closely follows Yanagizawa-Drott (2014). The
purpose is to make explicit the different impact that we expect from information trans-
mitted through radios, compared to other sources of information, on different types of
health behavior. The aim of the information campaigns was on one hand to inform about
the existence of the Ebola virus disease (EVD), its modes of transmission, prevention and
treatment of the disease, and on the other, to persuade individuals to take preventive
measures and treatment in case of contagion with the virus. The first objective is driven
by the fact that Ebola is a new disease to the region and individuals have poor infor-
mation about the actions that are needed to prevent and treat the disease. The second
objective presumes that there is a trade-off in implementing the recommended behaviors.
There are two main trade-offs in the context of a new epidemic. The first trade-off is
that if the information is wrong, some of the recommended behaviors could harm one.
This would be the case for instance, if rumors were correct in that people are killed in
Ebola treatment units, or if the risks of eating bush meat are exaggerated32 and hence
decreasing its intake leads to unnecessary malnourishment. The other trade-off is that
although the information is correct, taking the exhorted behaviors is costly. Some actions
have private costs, such as washing hands with chlorine, in terms of time or incurring
the price of chlorine. Other actions, such as safe burials, have social costs since changing
burial practices violates a cultural norm.
We model the problem as a game of incomplete information, in which individuals’ payoffs
depend their own action, the action of others and the true state of the world. The
proportion of individuals that take protective measures in equilibrium in turn affects the
transmission rate of Ebola and hence the number of Ebola cases at each point in time. In
this framework we can study how broadcast information affects behavior and ultimately
32As mentioned, only the first Ebola case was due to animal-to-human contagion, potentially through
rare bush meat, but all other cases in the West African epidemic were human-to-human contagions.
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the spread of the disease. We take a framework analogue to Yanagizawa-Drott (2014)
based on the static global game structure developed by Carlsson and Van Damme (1993);
Morris and Shin (1998, 2005).
Consider a continuum of individuals in a given location, here in a given sub-prefecture.
Each individual can either refuse to take a protective action or abide by it. For instance,
they can refuse a safe burial for their diseased family member, conducted by the Red
cross, in order to have a traditional burial. If they refuse a safe burial they increase
their own likelihood of contagion and incur a cost of θ but they obtain a social benefit
of abiding with the social norm of α n, where n is the proportion of individuals in their
own community that refuse safe burials and α > 0 captures the net benefit of following
the norm33. In comparison, if they accept the safe burial, they obtain a baseline utility
level normalized to 0. The utility of an individual is given by
ui =
 θ + α n if individual i refuses protective measures0 if individual i accepts them (3.1)
Individuals will refuse protective measures if and only if doing so gives them a positive
expected utility. There is incomplete information about the effect of protective measures
on the likelihood of contagion, captured by the utility cost θ. This is where information
comes in. Following the literature of global games, we assume that individuals have a
diffuse prior on θ on the real line and they update their beliefs based on information they
receive. On one hand, they receive an independent private signal, xi = θ + εi, where εi is
normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2x. On the other, they receive a public
signal, p = θ + ν, where ν is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2p.
Under this simple model we can cover the trade-offs described above. If the true state
of the world is such that refusing protective measures increases the transmission rate,
then θ < 0. However, if the true state is that Ebola does not exist and people are
33The net social benefit is α = αN − θN where αN is the social benefit of conducting a traditional
burial practice and θN is the cost of an increased transmission rate due to others conducting risky burial
practices. Here we are considering the more interesting case αN > θN > 0 which induces a trade-off in
refusing safe burials in the true state of the world with θ > 0.
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killed in Ebola treatment units, then θ > 0. Protective measures that are not observable
by others, such as chlorine use, or for which there is no social norm, have no social cost,
α = 0. Protective measures with strong social norms attached have a social cost, inducing
strategic complementarities in resistance behavior α > 0. On the other hand, one can
imagine some actions to be strategic substitutes, given externalities in health.
Individuals update their beliefs about θ using Bayes rule34. Consider the following switch-
ing strategy for individual i with or without radio j = R,N :
b(θji ) =
 1 refuse if θ
j
i ≥ κj
0 accept if θji < κ
j
(3.2)
From Morris and Shin (1998, 2005) it follows that this is a unique equilibrium under some
regularity conditions35. Therefore individuals whose posterior expectation of θ is above
some equilibrium threshold κj engage in resistance behavior, while those below it do not.
Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) shows that the equilibrium cutoff for individuals with radio
depends on the fraction of other individuals receiving the radio signal r, κR(r)36. In our
context, when the cost of refusing safe burials is large enough (i.e. θ very negative), the
equilibrium number of people refusing safe burials decreases with the fraction of people
that have access to the radio37. There are two main predictions that are relevant here.
First, without strategic complementarities, α = 0, the individual decision is not affected
by others’ decision and one can show that the number of people refusing burials decreases
linearly in the number of people exposed to the radio signal. In this case the radio provides
34For individuals receiving only the private signal, the posterior distribution of θ has mean xi and















35Proofs are identical to Yanagizawa-Drott (2014).
36In particular, for individuals without radio, j = N , the equilibrium cutoff is κN = −α/2. For individ-
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37A sufficient condition for ∂n∂r < 0 is that p < −α/2. Proofs are similar to Yanagizawa-Drott (2014)
and are therefore omitted here.
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a pure information effect, but there is little additional benefit given by the public signal,
compared to the private signal. Secondly, with strategic complementarities, α > 0, the
individual decision to refuse a safe burial is increasing in others’ decision to do so and




is the coordination effect due to the common knowledge aspect of the radio signal, as
individuals know the proportion of other individuals that have learned about the new
state of the world and hence have an expectation of the fraction of individuals that will
refuse burials.
In this setting we can think of r as the fraction of people that have actually listened to the
information via radio. If not everybody listens to the radio every day, r is a function of
the share of a sub-prefecture that has access to a given radio and the months of exposure.
In this case we expect the effect of the radio campaigns to take time to affect behavior.
When comparing different information campaigns we think of ranking them in the pre-
cision of their signal. A local media outlet is more accurate than a media outlet from a
distant community or from the national media outlet (smaller σp) in that it explains bet-
ter the concrete ways in which individuals in a given community are putting themselves
at risk of transmission38.
Finally, the equilibrium number of individuals that take protective measures affects the
transmission rate of Ebola at each point in time. The epidemiological theory applied
to the Ebola virus disease (EVD) suggests that new Ebola infections yd,t in each sub-
prefecture d at time t follow exponential growth with transmission rate βd,t on a fraction
ρ ∈ [0, 1] of past cases (Lekone and Finkenstädt, 2006; Fang et al., 2016). This literature
models the effect of information transmission on the transmission rate βd,t (Funk et al.,
2009; Kiss et al., 2010). We therefore consider the following model of exponential growth
38If a media outlet is biased, for instance because it exaggerates the benefits of taking protective
measures, the error term ν has a mean νp < 0. In this case listeners would adjust for the bias when they
update their beliefs about θ.
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Where the transmission rate βd,t = f(β0, b(rd,t), Xd,t) is a function of baseline transmission
rate β0, the equilibrium strategies b(rd,t) and baseline covariates Xd,t. As described above,
the equilibrium strategies depend on the radio signal rd,t, which we measure as the in-
teraction between radio signal exposure RadioSignald, pre-determined at sub-prefecture
level, and the timing τk in which a particular radio campaign k was launched throughout
the country:
rd,t =
 0 if t < τkRadioSignald if t ≥ τk (3.4)
We further simplify the model above by approximating the transmission rate βd,t with a
linear function β0 + β1 rd,t + β2 Xd,t and taking logs in (3.3):
ln(yd,t) = ρ ln(yd,t−1) + β0 + β1 rd,t + β2 Xd,t + εd,t (3.5)
where εd,t captures the probability that new cases are generated from contagion with




The treatment variable of interest is the share of a sub-prefecture that has access to a
given radio interacted with the timing of the start of an information campaign about
Ebola. The radio signal reception measure is constructed in several steps for each type of
media outlet: rural, national, private and international radios. First, the radio signal is
Chapter 3 109
Essays in Development Economics
constructed using a radio propagation tool used by radio and TV engineers, based on the
Irregular Terrain Model (ITM) / Longley-Rice, standard in the economics literature since
Olken (2009). The signal is calculated for each of a total of 155 transmitters, based on
geographic terrain features, transmitter location and technical characteristics collected
from the National Telecommunications Agency in Guinea (ARPT). Second, we group
radio transmitters by type of media outlet39. The areas covered by each type of media
outlet are shown in Figure 3.1. Third, using the union of radio signals for a given media
outlet, we calculate the share of a given sub-prefecture that has access to it40.
The main treatment variable of interest is the share of a sub-prefecture that has access
to a rural radio from their own community (i.e. prefecture) with a signal strength of
at least 43 dBµV/m41. Figure 3.1 shows the radio signal coverage for any rural radio in
Guinea. The radio signal coverage for their own rural radio is shown in form of descriptive
statistics in Table 3.342. This Table shows that most sub-prefectures have at least half of
their territory covered with at least one media outlet. The most common media outlet
are the rural radios, followed by the national radios. However having access to a rural
radio station from their own community is less common. The median (mean) share of a
sub-prefecture with an own rural radio is 14% (28%). The least common media outlet are
private radios.
The timing and contents of the information campaigns about Ebola by different media
outlets were collected by the author during in-person interviews with the director of the
national radio and television, the director of the rural radios43, the director of the private-
radio consortium, as well as the main private radios, and via phone-interviews and surveys
39Any rural radio, rural radios given pre-epidemic, new rural radios constructed at the end of the
epidemic, national radios, national radios that work, national radios with broken transmitters, private
radio stations, private radio stations in the URTELGUI consortium and those that are not, international
radio stations.
40The procedure is illustrated in Figure C.2
41The reception is measured in field strength dBµV/m, where the signal is deemed as sufficient under
normal circumstances if it is at least 43dBµV/m. The software calculates two signal reception measures,
one based on this threshold and one based in a lower threshold, 33dBµV/m. We use the higher threshold,
as it is considered more relevant for normal receivers.
42Given a signal strength of at least 43 dBµV/m.
43Direction des Radios Rurales de Guineé
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Figure 3.1: Radio signal reception to any Rural radio
Notes: With a signal strength of at least 43 dBµV/m
via email to all rural radio stations and the most relevant private radio stations in Guinea.
Ownership of radio devices, radio listening patterns and baseline covariates are taken from
three sources. Firstly, we use household survey data from the Afrobarometer, namely
Round 5 (2013) of 1,310 individuals. We also show complementary evidence of the radio
signal measure being correlated with radio ownership and listening patterns in Round
6 (2015) with 1,200 individuals. In each case survey weights are used to aggregate at
the level of sub-prefecture. Secondly, we use a household survey on impacts, beliefs
and knowledge about Ebola from a representative post-Ebola survey conducted by the
Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS) of 2,466 people. Survey weights are used to
aggregate covariates at the level of a sub-prefecture. Finally, we give complementary evi-
dence using a phone-survey of 1,000 individuals conducted by Internews, an international
Organization that conducted the last widely-aired Ebola program, “Ebola Chrono”44.
44Evidence based on this survey is interpreted only as suggestive, given that it is not representative
and in addition most individuals are surveyed in the main sub-prefecture within each prefecture, a total
of 35 sub-prefectures.
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Table 3.3: Share of Sub-prefecture covered by each Radio signal (fair signal)
With a radio signal strength of at least 43 dBµV/m
median mean sd min max
Any Radio 0.63 0.59 0.32 0.00 1.00
Any Radio (incl. broken) 0.69 0.63 0.32 0.00 1.00
National 0.18 0.29 0.31 0.00 1.00
National (incl. broken) 0.38 0.42 0.32 0.00 1.00
Private 0.06 0.23 0.32 0.00 1.00
Private-Urtelgui 0.03 0.20 0.30 0.00 1.00
International 0.01 0.16 0.28 0.00 1.00
Any Rural Radio 0.42 0.47 0.32 0.00 1.00
Own Rural 0.14 0.28 0.32 0.00 1.00
Observations 341
Notes: Some transmitters are not working during the time of the outbreak, those are referred
here as broken transmitters.
Epidemic data
The main outcome of interest is the number of Ebola infections, taken from patient
records from the World Health Organization (WHO) in Guinea. Ebola cases can be either
probable or confirmed, depending on the stage at which patients have been identified,
based on symptoms or laboratory testing. Infections are reported at weekly level and
the date corresponds to the actual or estimated date of symptom onset. Hence, these
are contagions that necessarily occurred prior to the week of report, most likely in a time
window of 1-2 weeks before. We aggregate the data at monthly level since we are interested
in the effects of information on the overall spread of the disease and we hypothesize that
information will take time to affect behavior and hence new contagions. This also allows
us to take into account the possible time-span from contagion to symptom onset (2 weeks)
and allow for additional 2-3 weeks, thus reducing the possibility of measurement error in
the timing of contagion. Cases are recorded at the level of sub-prefecture. Our main
measure of infections are the log number of Ebola infections +0.01 in a sub-prefecture
over a month from January 2014 to May 2016 (341 × 29 observations).
Social unrest or resistance behavior45 was scraped from Situation Reports (daily or weekly),
45The term used in the Ebola outrbeak was resistance in English and reticence in French.
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which were conducted by the Guinean Ministry of Health, using simple data-scraping al-
gorithms. Figure C.3 shows one example of a Situation Report recording resistance data.
The data is aggregated at sub-prefecture and weekly level and takes values 1 if one or more
resistance behaviors were recorded in a given week and 0 otherwise. The dichotomous
variable at the weekly level allows us to reduce measurement error due to some Situation
Reports giving more or less geographically dis-aggregated information. We then aggregate
this measure at the monthly level, thus measuring the number of weeks with resistance
behavior in a given month for each sub-prefecture.
Another outcome used is the number of people that die from Ebola in their own community
divided by the total number of individuals that die from Ebola, including those that die
in a treatment center. This gives us a measure of resistance to protective measures or
treatment uptake, suggested by the WHO in Guinea, who provided this data. Similarly,
we study the evolution of refusals to conduct safe and dignified burials (SDB) over the
total number of SDBs conducted by the Guinean Red Cross. This data comes from the
International Federation for the Red Cross and Crescent Movement in Guinea (IFRC). The
data is only available at prefecture × week from April to December 2015. We aggregate
it at monthly level (34 × 9 observations). Summary statistics for the main outcome
variables are shown in Table 3.446.
Other data
The location of laboratories and health treatment units, such as Community care centers
(CCCs) and Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) are from the WHO and the United Na-
tions Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). Population data
is taken from the 2014 census in Guinea. Village location or population, roads and other
46For aggregate statistics see Table C.1. Summary statistics for the main outcome variable by access
to local radios, conditional on access to rural radios, are shown in Supplementary Appendix Table E.1.
They show a higher level of Ebola, as well as a higher ratio of deaths in community compared to deaths
in ETU and more refusal of safe burials.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics - Outcome variables
mean sd min max count
Ebola cases 0.39 3.11 0.00 100.00 9889
Ebola cases per capita in 100k 1.14 10.76 0.00 513.11 9889
Log Ebola+0,01 -4.31 1.33 -4.61 4.61 9889
Resistance behavior 0.07 0.42 0.00 5.00 9889
Ebola total deaths 0.26 2.15 0.00 77.00 9889
Ebola deaths in community 0.11 0.98 0.00 47.00 9889
Ebola deaths in ETU 0.15 1.36 0.00 57.00 9889
Community over ETU deaths ×100 1.48 8.65 0.00 88.89 9889
Sub-Pref × Month from 1.2014-5.2016
Refused burials 0.10 0.65 0.00 8.00 986
Refused burials in 100k per cap. 0.04 0.23 0.00 3.11 986
Pref × Month from from 4.2015-12.2015
geographic data are from l’Observatoire National des Ressources de la Guinee, ONRG.
Prevalence of other diseases is available at prefecture level for 2013 and 2014, from the
Guinean Ministry of Health. Finally, we also use data on the number of radio emissions
and social mobilization campaigns conducted by the International Federation for the Red
Cross and Crescent Movement in Guinea (IFRC). The data is only available at prefec-
ture × week from April to December 2015. We aggregate it at monthly level (34 × 9
observations). Summary statistics for the main covariates are shown in Table 3.5.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
The core of this paper lies on identifying the impact of broadcast information on the
spread of Ebola. In addition we use a number of strategies to support our hypothesis
that the way in which information affects the spread of the disease is through a change in
behavior, in particular preventive measures that are observable, such as treatment uptake
and burial practices.
The main research design is presented in Section 3.5.1, where differences in radio signal
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics - Covariates
mean sd min max count
Number of ETUs 0.08 0.58 0.00 5.00 9889
Number of Labs 0.08 0.58 0.00 5.00 9889
Number of CCCs 0.69 1.60 0.00 5.00 9889
Log-Distance to ETU 11.33 1.95 0.00 13.32 9744
Log-Distance to Lab 11.21 2.03 0.00 12.81 7982
Log-Distance to CCC 8.38 3.78 0.00 11.58 9744
Sub-Pref × Month from 1.2014-5.2016
Total burials 22.27 138.74 0.00 1747.00 986
Red Cross Radio Emissions 0.26 1.87 0.00 29.00 986
Social Mobilis. Response 867.08 3961.57 0.00 41144.00 986
Social Mobilis. Preventive 170.22 1025.98 0.00 12343.00 986
Pref × Month from from 4.2015-12.2015
Population 33119.28 66387.91 6495.00 682610.00 341
Log-Population density 429.91 1043.19 33.73 12310.35 341
Log-Distance to epicenter 12.37 0.72 10.01 13.17 341
Sub-Prefecture in 2014
reception across Guinea and the timing of different radio campaigns are exploited to
identify the effect of information campaigns transmitted through local radios on the spread
of Ebola, as well as social resistance behavior and treatment uptake. Section 3.5.3 provides
a number of validity checks to asses the validity of the design.
Mechanisms are discussed in detail in Section 3.5.2. Firstly, we provide evidence that our
measure of radio signal reception is correlated with ownership of radio devices and radio
listening patterns, Section 3.5.2. Secondly, we use survey data on post-Ebola beliefs and
stated behavior to assess whether listening to an Ebola program on the media is related
to greater knowledge about the disease and treatment uptake, Section 3.5.2. Thirdly, we
exploit data from the Red Cross on weekly radio emissions, social mobilization campaigns,
safe burials and refused burials to study whether radio emissions are followed by a change
in burial practices. Finally, we discuss the role of local information in affecting beliefs
and behavior change in Section 3.5.2.
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3.5.1 Local radios and the spread of Ebola
The aim of this paper is to identify the impact of broadcast information on social unrest
or resistance behavior and on the spread of Ebola. The main empirical strategy follows
the same logic as a standard difference-in-difference strategy with continuous treatment.
We compare areas with varying access to distinct media outlets that pre-date the start of
the epidemic, before and after a given information campaign starts several months after
the beginning of the Ebola outbreak. More precisely we study the effect of having access
to an information campaign aired in a local radio on the spread of Ebola and resistance
behavior. Identification relies on a parallel trends assumption, namely that areas with
greater access to a local radio would have behaved similarly to other areas in the absence
of the information campaign.
The design is similar to previous literature on media that uses features of the geographic
terrain and pre-existing exposure to radio signal reception to identify the effect of broad-
cast information on a relevant economic outcome (Olken, 2009; La Ferrara et al., 2012;
Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; DellaVigna et al., 2014; Adena et al., 2015), but it adds two
additional dimensions that strengthen the design. Firstly, we add a time dimension, since
we observe the Ebola outbreak for at least six months before the rural radio campaign
starts. Secondly, we add a control group, namely areas that have access to information
from other radio stations, or areas that have access to the same information campaign
from other rural radio stations.
First we conduct a simple difference-in-difference exercise summarized in equation (3.6).
Outcomed,t = β Radio
Local
d × PostCampaign t +
∑
k 6=Local
γk Radiokd × PostCampaign t
+ Xd,t Γ + αd + λt + εd,t (3.6)
The treatment of interest is the interaction between the radio signal reception for a local
rural radio station RadioLocald in sub-prefecture d and the post-treatment dummy speci-
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fying the start of the rural radio campaign PostCampaign t in month t. This interaction
corresponds to rd,t in the theoretical model above, Section 3.3. We control for access to
other radio stations interacted with the post-treatment dummy. In particular we control
for access to any radio station, to any rural radio station, to private and to national radio
stations47. Hence the coefficient of interest, β, measures the overall marginal impact of
the rural radio campaign aired by local radio stations on a given outcome, conditional on
the access to other radios and other controls.
The main outcome of interest is the spread of Ebola. In particular we use the log of Ebola
cases as dependent variable, motivated by equation (3.5) in the theoretical model48. To
avoid the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable we assume that past Ebola cases will be
largely captured by location fixed effects αd and time fixed effects λt. Given that we are
dealing with one single epidemic outbreak, the assumption seams reasonable. However
for robustness we also run an alternative specification with a lagged dependent variable
instead of the fixed effects, which gives us a lower bound estimate of the true effect
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Other outcomes studied are the number of weeks with
resistance events in a given month for a given sub-prefecture49 and the ratio of people
that die from Ebola in their community over the total deaths from Ebola50. We also run
the same regression equation for these outcomes adjusted by population in 100’00051.
Xd,t is a set of time-varying or time-invariant controls interacted with the post-treatment
dummy, Zd×PostCampaignt. This includes the distance to the closest radio transmitter




d , which serves as proxy for the free
space signal, i.e. the radio signal in absence of geographical accidents. This should address
47These are radios that pre-date the spread of Ebola and that are currently working (no broken trans-
mitters).
48Our preferred specification is log(Ebola + 0.01), as this allows us to interpret the coefficient βLocal
directly as the % change in the number of Ebola cases as a result of a 1 pp. increase in the access to a
local radio. Results are consistent when using alternative specifications, such as log(Ebola+ 1).
49We first record whether there was any such event in a given week (to reduce possible measurement
error in the number of events reported in the daily/weekly Situation reports) and then we aggregate such
events per month.
50We use the ratio (Ebola deaths in community / 1+ Total Ebola deaths) × 100
51Where log(ebola+ 1) stands for log(Ebola/population× 100′000 + 1)
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the potential concern that areas with a local radio signal are fundamentally different from
other areas due to their proximity to the radio tower. We also control for population,
population density, geographic area, distance to the epicenter or first Ebola case, as well as
proxies for wealth and education, interacted with the post-treatment dummy. We include
the shortest distance to an Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU), laboratory and community care
center (CCCs) at each point in time. Standard errors are clustered at prefecture × year
to account for spatial and serial dependence.
The main empirical strategy is a fully flexible difference-in-difference strategy allowing for
the effect to change over time, summarized in equation (3.7).










+ Xd,t Γ + αd + λt + εd,t (3.7)
Everything is identical to the standard difference-in-difference equation (3.6) but instead
of the post-treatment dummy PostCampaign t we use time dummies 1t(j)
Rural, for j
periods before/after the start of the rural radio campaign52. The coefficients of interest
are {βj}j≥0, which measure the marginal impact of the rural radio campaign aired by
local radio stations on the spread of Ebola, after j periods, conditional on covariates and
on the access to other radios. This specification allows us to plot each of the coefficients
βj and test the parallel trends assumption, i.e. βj = 0 for all j < 0. Finally if information
takes time before it is absorbed and translates into preventive behavior, which eventually
lowers the spread of Ebola, we expect βj = 0 for some j ≥ 0 and βj < 0 only after several
periods.
52The omitted category is j = −1, the period immediately following the start of the campaign. We
start at −5, which is our first observed month, January 2014.
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Results on the effect of Local radios on the spread of Ebola
The main result of this paper is summarized in Figure 3.2. It plots the average log-
Ebola cases for sub-prefectures with above and below median access to a local rural
radio station, conditioning on sub-prefectures with above mean access to some rural radio
station. It shows that areas with access to rural radios of their own community had a
similar evolution in the spread of Ebola, compared to areas with other rural radios, during
the first six months of the outbreak prior to the start of the rural radio campaign, a rise
thereafter, and an abrupt drop in cases approximately three months earlier than other
areas. The Figure also motivates the validity of the design. Not only do we have parallel
trends but also the same level of log-Ebola prior to the start of the rural radio campaign53.
Figure 3.2: Log-Ebola in areas with above/below median access to













Jan14 Jul14 Jan15 Jul15 Jan16 Jul16
Month-Year
Control: Other Rural R. Treated : Own Community R. 
Notes: The outcome is log(Ebola+ 1), where Ebola is the number of Ebola cases.
We show a similar plot for log(Ebola+ 0.01) in Figure C.4.
The Figure plots the average log-Ebola for sub-prefectures with above and below median
access to a local rural radio station, conditioning on sub-prefectures with above mean access to
some rural radio station.
The results to our main specification are shown graphically in Figure 3.3. First, we see
53Figure C.4 shows that the pattern is similar if we define log-Ebola as log(Ebola + 0.01) instead of
log(Ebola+ 1).
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that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied in our regression framework. There is no
difference in the spread of Ebola for areas with varying levels of access to an own rural
radio, controlling for access to other radios, prior to the start of the campaign, i.e. β̂j = 0
for all j < 0. This holds also conditional on a number of other controls correlated with
the spread of disease. Secondly, it shows that the impacts of the campaign were not
immediate, that is, the transmission rate of Ebola cases dropped in areas with access to
local radios seven months after the first time rural radios started a sustained campaign
encouraging protective measures, addressing Ebola rumors and new burial practices, and
that increasingly incorporated local, traditional or religious leaders and Ebola survivors
into its programming. This pattern is also evident in the evolution of resistance behavior,
measured as violence or resistance against authorities, medical teams, social workers,
refusal of safe burials or treatment uptake. We also see a gradual drop in the ratio of
Ebola deaths in community compared to total Ebola deaths, including those who died in
an ETU. This gives us a measure of treatment uptake.
The regression output is shown in Tables C.2-C.4. A 10 percentage point (pp) increase in
access to a local radio54 lowers the number of Ebola cases by 13− 18% each month after
the seventh month following the start of the campaign55. This holds conditional access to
other radios, distances to the closest radio transmitter for each media outlet, demographic
controls, population, population density and distance to the epicenter, interacted with the
time dummies, as well as the time-varying distance to the closest ETU/laboratory/CCC
at each point in time.
There is a contemporaneous drop in resistance in the same month as the drop in the
transmission rate of Ebola, Table C.3, possibly suggesting that some of this resistance
behavior is a response to Ebola, rather than a mechanism. However, we also see weak
evidence of a much more gradual and earlier drop in resistance behavior, compared to
54This interpretation makes more sense since our treatment variable, radio signal, is a share in [0, 1].
55The coefficients in Table C.2 can be read directly as the percentage change in the number of Ebola
cases due to a 1 pp increase access to a local radio, or the coefficients ×10 as the approximate effect of a
10 pp increase in access to a local radio.
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the transmission rate, going from a suggestive drop by 10% in the fourth month, to
a statistically significant drop by 34% in the seventh month, which stabilizes at 13%
thereafter, for a 10 pp increase in access to a local radio56. Similarly, there is a gradual
decrease in the relative number of Ebola deaths in community57, by a suggestive 25%
in the seventh month and a statistically significant drop by 41% in the eighth month as
access to a local radio increases by 10 pp, Table C.458.
The results of the difference-in-difference strategy specified in equation (3.6) are smaller
and less precisely estimated, but they show a similar pattern. As access to local radios
increases by 10 pp, the number of Ebola cases drops by approximately 4 − 5% and the
number of Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita drops by 3− 5% over the following months,
Table C.559. For consistency we also test that there is no linear trend in log-Ebola, prior
to the start of the campaign60.
Together this evidence suggests that while broadcast information by local radios took
time to be absorbed, it eventually led to a drop in social resistance behavior, an increase
in treatment uptake and eventually helped halt the Ebola epidemic.
We can do back-of-the-envelope calculations to understand how many Ebola cases would
have been spared with greater access to local radios. For instance comparing areas above
and below median access to local radios, conditional on above median access to rural
radios, we are comparing areas that have on average 76% access to a rural radio but no
access to one from their own prefecture, vs. areas that have 74% access to any rural
radio and 65% access to one from their own community. The total number of Ebola cases
56We see weak evidence of a rise in resistance in the fourth month after the start of the campaign, but
the effect is only a 8% rise in resistance and it is no longer there when we look at resistance in 100’000
per capita, Table E.8. In this case resistance in 100’000 per capita drops by 51% in the seventh month
for a 10 pp increase in access to a local radio.
57Percentage of Ebola deaths in community over total deaths + 1, where total deaths include Ebola
deaths in community and deaths in a ETU.
58We are excluding Gueckedou, first prefecture to be hit by Ebola, in order to study a sample with
similar ratios of deaths in community vs ETU prior to the start of the rural information campaign. See
Supplementary Appendix Figure E.3 for results with the full sample.
59The results are more precisely estimated when we exclude Gueckedou, the prefecture first hit by
Ebola, but they are similar in magnitude when we include it, Supplementary Appendix Table E.11.
60Supplementary Appendix Table E.9
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in those areas without an own community radio is 1560 over the entire epidemic and
1446 in the post-rural campaign period61. Our difference-in-difference results mean that
an increase by 65 pp in access to a local radio would have meant 21% less Ebola cases.
This means that 303 Ebola cases occurring in the post-July 2014 period would have been
spared, that is 8% of the total number of Ebola cases.
61That is, after July 2014. See Supplementary Appendix Table E.2
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Figure 3.3: Event studies
Pre/Post Rural campaign by access to Own Community Rural Radio signals
Log-ebola
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90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t-1. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
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Months to/since campaign start
90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t-1. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year. Excl. Gueckedou.
Notes: 90% confidence intervals. Robust Standard Errors clustered by Prefecture × Year. Last
Figures exclude Gueckedou Prefecture. For alternative specifications see Figures E.2-E.3.
Controls: wealth level, education, rural, population, population2, population-density; log-
distance to epicenter, to the closest radio transmitter from any radio, national, private, rural,
own rural radio (working and pre-existing), to the closest ETU, CCC and laboratory at each
time × time-dummies.
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3.5.2 Mechanisms
In this Section we give a number of strategies that are intended as suggestive evidence of
mechanisms underlying the main empirical findings described above. Firstly, we provide
evidence that our measure of radio signal reception is correlated with ownership of radio
devices and radio listening patterns, Section 3.5.2. Secondly, we use survey data on post-
Ebola beliefs and stated behavior to assess whether listening to an Ebola program on the
media is related to greater knowledge about the disease and treatment uptake, Section
3.5.2. We also use our radio signal measure as instrument for hearing about Ebola on
the media. Thirdly, we exploit data from the Red Cross on weekly radio emissions,
social mobilization campaigns, safe burials and refused burials to study whether radio
emissions are followed by a change in burial practices. Finally, we discuss the role of
local information in affecting beliefs and behavior change in Section 3.5.2. In particular
we rule out a supply-side channel of political accountability and we discuss the role of
language, ethnic belonging and trust in local institutions in explaining the importance of
local radios.
Information uptake
The first exercise is to asses whether the radio signal measure constructed predicts ra-
dio listening patterns. We present here evidence using survey data from three sources,
Afrobarometers Rounds 5 (2013) and 6 (2015), of 1,310 and 1,200 individuals, respec-
tively; a post-Ebola survey by the Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS) of 2,466
people and a phone-survey of 1,000 individuals conducted by Internews, an international
organization that created the last widely-aired Ebola program, “Ebola Chrono”.
In a simple OLS design, we explore whether people who have access to any radio signal,
according to our constructed measure, own more radio devices or listen more to news on
the radio and whether there is a difference for a given media outlet d, equation (3.8).
We also study whether people with higher access to a particular radio signal k are more
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likely to listen to that media outlet k, either to the general program, or to a program
about Ebola on that radio, equation (3.9). Using self-reported measures we assess whether
individuals who report listening to a given radio k, are more likely to listen to an Ebola
program aired on the radio (3.10). We then conduct this last exercise using access to a
particular radio signal k, instead of self-reported listening patterns (3.11).
OwnRadioDevicei = α0 + α1 AnyRadioSignald + α2 RadioSignal
k
d + εd (3.8)
ListenRadioki = β0 + β1 RadioSignal
k
d + Xi Γ
β + εd (3.9)
ListenEbolaProgrami = γ0 + γ1 ListenRadio
k
i + Xi Γ
γ + εd (3.10)
ListenEbolaProgrami = δ0 + δ1 RadioSignal
k
d + Xi Γ
δ + εd (3.11)
Standard errors are clustered at the level of sub-prefecture, since this is the level of ob-
servation of our radio signal measure. We add individual-level controls, namely a wealth
index and an education variable, as well as population and population density.
Results to Information uptake
Individuals in areas with higher access to any radio signal own more radio devices and
listen more to news on the radio, Table 3.6. An increase by 10 percentage points in access
to any radio signal is associated with a 2− 5% increase in the ownership of radio devices
and a 2, 5− 6% increase in the number of times they listen to news on the radio. There
is also weak evidence that these areas are more urban. When split across different media
outlets, there are weak differences - people in areas with higher access to an own rural
radio or to private radio stations have higher ownership of radios62.
We also find evidence from the GeoPoll survey conducted by Internews that our mea-
sure of radio signal is predictive of people listening to that particular media outlet63.
62Supplementary Appendix Table E.15
63Supplementary Appendix Tables E.16-E.18
Chapter 3 125
Essays in Development Economics
Table 3.6: In areas with higher access to a radio signal (from any radio),
more people own radio devices and listen to news on the radio
Owns Radio News-Radio Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R5 R6 R5 R6 R5 R6
Any Radio 0.126∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 1.662∗∗∗ 0.010 0.184∗
(0.072) (0.092) (0.264) (0.338) (0.067) (0.074)
N 1296 1176 1294 1176 1296 1176
Mean 0.599 0.568 2.827 2.665 0.844 0.785
F 3.05 9.07 7.67 24.20 0.02 6.20
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-Prefecture
∗ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Afrobarometer Rounds 5 (2013) and 6 (2015)
Notes: Any Radio is the share of a Sub-prefecture with access to radio signal above
43 dBµV/m and takes values in [0, 1]. Owns radio takes values 1 if an individual does own a
radio device and 0 otherwise. News radio takes values 0-4 depending on the frequency with
which they listen to news on the radio (0 never, 1 once a month, 2 few times a month, 3 few
times a week, 4 every day). Urban takes value 1 if the home town is urban and 0 if it is rural.
This evidence is interpreted as suggestive, given the small sample size and that most
individuals are surveyed in the main sub-prefecture within each prefecture, a total of 35
sub-prefectures64. An increase in the access to an own rural radio station by 10% is asso-
ciated with a 14, 6% increase in the likelihood that surveyed individuals listen to a rural
radio station. There is also some evidence that people with higher access to a particular
radio station are more likely to listen to “Ebola Chrono” on that media outlet, but the
evidence is weak except for national radio stations. We attach this to the fact that rural
stations already had a full program on Ebola when this program started in January 2015
across media outlets.
Finally, we see that people who listen to rural radios are more likely to say that they have
heard about Ebola on the Radio, Table 3.7, and this is driven by people who have access
to a rural radio from their own community, Table 3.8.
64We include only surveyed individuals for which we know the sub-prefecture, leaving us with a sample
size of 979 including the capital or of 507 excluding the capital.
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Table 3.7: Did you learn about Ebola on the Radio?
Depending on preferred Media outlet reported.
Outcome: Yes, I learned about Ebola on the Radio.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Listen Any Radio 0.0523 0.0489 0.0485
(0.0510) (0.0521) (0.0522)
Listen Rural Radio 0.247∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.251∗∗
(0.0998) (0.112) (0.112)
Listen National Radio -0.0288 -0.0204 -0.0198
(0.109) (0.115) (0.118)
Listen Private 0.0771 0.0734 0.0637
(0.0900) (0.0857) (0.0870)
Listen Int. Radio -0.148 -0.155 -0.164
(0.190) (0.187) (0.186)
N 506 506 506 353 353 353
Mean 0.616 0.616 0.616 0.616 0.616 0.616
Cond. listen Radio Y Y Y
Controls N Pop All N Pop All
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-Prefecture. Sample: 34 Sub-prefectures. Excluding capital.
Controls: N, pop, popdens, wealth index, educ, urban.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Internews Survey (2015)
Beliefs, prevention and treatment uptake
We now show suggestive evidence that broadcast information affected beliefs or knowl-
edge about Ebola, fear of treatment and stated treatment uptake. Using cross-sectional
household survey data collected at the end of the outbreak, we explore whether people
who own a radio receiver, listen to the radio, report having heard about Ebola on the
radio, or have better access to a given radio signal, are more likely to believe in Ebola,
have greater knowledge about its symptoms and are more likely to seek treatment or abide
by protective measures.
We first run a simple OLS regression to study whether individuals who have heard about
Ebola on the media are more likely to know more about Ebola, seek more treatment and
wash their hands with chlorine, which helps combat the disease, conditional on receiving
information through other means, equation (3.12). Other means of information include
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Table 3.8: Did you learn about Ebola on the Radio?
For a given Radio signal.
Outcome: Yes, I learned about Ebola on the Radio.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Radio 0.113 0.0544
(0.142) (0.137)
Any Rural Radio -0.00637 -0.0959 -0.00637 -0.0959
(0.0953) (0.0891) (0.0953) (0.0891)
Own Rural Radio 0.179∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0287) (0.0285) (0.0287) (0.0285)
National 0.0204 0.0354 0.0204 0.0354
(0.0356) (0.0421) (0.0356) (0.0421)
Private -0.0612 -0.0299 -0.0612 -0.0299
(0.0493) (0.0586) (0.0493) (0.0586)
International 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0866∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0866∗
(0.0302) (0.0439) (0.0302) (0.0439)
N 353 353 348 348 348 348
Mean 0.616 0.616 0.616 0.616 0.616 0.616
Controls Pop All Pop All Pop All
Cond. Any Radio signal. Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-Prefecture. Sample: 34 Sub-prefectures. Excluding capital.
Controls: N, pop, popdens, wealth index, educ, urban. Cond. on listening to any Radio.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Internews Survey (2015)
door-to-door campaigns, NGOs or being informed by a doctor. The omitted category is
people that have not heard about Ebola or who have heard about it from their family.
Behaviori = β0 + β1 EbolaInfoi + β2 EbolaInfo
OnMedia
i + Xi,d Γ + αr + εi,d (3.12)
The coefficients of interest are β1 + β2, the effect of hearing about Ebola on the media,
or β2, the additional effect of hearing about Ebola on the media, compared to other
information sources. In Xi,d we control for individual-level characteristics, including age,
education, wealth, gender, as well as whether the location is an urban area, covariates at
the sub-prefecture level, such as population, population density, access to electricity and
health facilities. We also add distance to the epicenter as control in some specifications,
which is a proxy for exposure to the epidemic. We also add region fixed effects αr, for 8
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big regions of Guinea. Standard errors are clustered at the level of a sub-prefecture d.
In addition, given that the OLS estimates are plausibly inflated due to omitted variable
bias, since people who seek more information are also more likely to know more about
Ebola or have behaviors that help avoid the spread of disease, we instrument having heard
about Ebola on the media with the radio signal reception to an own rural radio for the
sub-sample of areas with above median access to any rural radio. We study equation
(3.13). The omitted category are individuals that have not heard about Ebola or have
heard about it through other means, such as family members or from a doctor.
Behaviori = β0 + β1 EbolaInfo
OnMedia
i + β2 EbolaInfo
Door
i + Xi,d Γ + αr + εi,d (3.13)
The coefficient of interest is β1, the effect of hearing about Ebola on the media, control-
ling or not for door-to-door campaigns, EbolaInfoDoori . The exclusion restriction is that
the radio signal reception to an own rural radio does not drive the observed behavior
other than through its impact on information on Ebola received through the media. In
Section 3.5.3 we provide evidence that covariates are balanced around access to an own
rural radio, conditional on access to other rural radios. In addition we can control for the
distance to the closest transmitter to a rural radio, which is a proxy for the free space
signal, and would capture potential endogeneity to the access to a rural radio. Finally, we
interpret the results of this exercise as suggestive, given that we lack the time dimension
that strengthens our identification in Section 3.5.1.
Results on beliefs, prevention and treatment uptake
The results of our OLS specification show that receiving information about Ebola is
predictive of greater Ebola knowledge, belief in its existence and less fear to seek health
treatment. However, not every type of information matters for seeking health treatment
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or using chlorine, Tables C.7-C.965.
Those that have heard about Ebola on the media are 50% more likely more likely than
those that have received information through other means to say that someone, just like
them66, seeks more health treatment compared to before the epidemic. The question on
health treatment is not necessarily related to Ebola. Other measures of neighbors seeking
health behavior suggest that overall people that received more information about Ebola
are less scared of seeking health treatment but they are more likely to believe that their
neighbors have decreased health treatment compared to before, except for people that
have received information through the media, who believe that others are more likely to
seek health treatment compared to before67. The results hold conditional on individual
level controls, as well as controlling for distance to the epicenter, which serves a proxy for
the potential severity of the epidemic but is not affected by the information treatment of
interest.
On the other hand hearing about Ebola on the media is not the best means of information
to ensure a greater use of chlorine68. Family networks or experiencing close cases of Ebola
are positive correlates of the use of chlorine. Chlorine use is a private action that is not
observed by others in contrast to seeking treatment or changing burial practices. The
common knowledge aspect of having listened to the information on the media, should
have little additional benefit on this action69.
To give further evidence of the hypothesis that the common knowledge aspect of receiving
information on the media affects actions that are observed by others but not private
actions we test whether the effect varies by greater exposure to media for the former but
65We condition on above median access to any rural radio, and control for distance to the closest
own rural transmitter for consistency with the reduced form and instrumental variable results. Detailed
results on the full sample are available upon request.
66In surveys answers are more likely to reflect the true behavior if you ask them about someone just
like them.
67They are intended as robustness checks of our main measure, presented in Supplementary Appendix
Table E.23.
68The coefficient is small and negative.
69Violating the social norm has no cost in this case, since it is not observed, α = 0 in the theoretical
model, Section 3.3.
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not for the latter. Figures 3.4-3.5 show exactly this pattern, where the treatment is the
share of people in the own sub-prefecture, except oneself, that report having heard about
Ebola on the media.
These results are suggestive only, due to the obvious selection problem, that people lis-
tening to Ebola on the radio are different from people who know about Ebola otherwise.
However we find reassuring that although having heard about Ebola on the media is re-
lated to ownership of radio devices70, ownership of radio devices does not predict knowing
more about Ebola, nor having greater knowledge about Ebola71, i.e. some people own
radio devices but do not listen to Ebola on the media, because they did not have access
to the radio program72.
Figure 3.4: OLS Access to broadcast information
OLS: Having heard about Ebola on the media



































Media 1-50% 50-70% >70%
90% conf. intervals
% of people in own Sub-Prefecture that have heard about Ebola on the Media
(except yourself)
Notes: Conditional on above median access to an own rural radio signal.
Media: individual has heard about Ebola on the Media
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS)
We then instrument having heard about Ebola on the radio with the radio signal reception
to an own community rural radio. The first stage is strong when we condition on the
sub-sample of areas with access to above median access to any rural radio, controlling
70Those owning a radio device are 14− 17% more likely to have heard about Ebola on the media.
71Supplementary Appendix Table E.19
72Note that the instrument is having heard about Ebola on the media, not ownership of radio devices.
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Figure 3.5: Reduced form effects of access to broadcast information
Reduced form: Own Rural radio signal

































Own Rural R. >0 1-50% 50-70% 70-90% >90%
90% conf. intervals
% of Sub-Prefecture with access to an Own Rural Radio signal
Notes: Conditional on above median access to an own rural radio signal.
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS)
for demographic covariates, distance to the epicenter and on the distance to the closest
transmitter to a rural radio from the own community, once we control for door-to-door
campaigns, with an F − Stat = 15 in column (4) in Table C.673. The effect is similar
in all cases: an increase by 10 pp in access to the signal from a radio station in the own
community is associated with a 4− 9% greater likelihood of having heard about Ebola on
the media. The instrument is also significantly related to ownership of radio devices74.
The reduced form results using radio signal reception to a rural radio from the own
community, conditional on above median access to any rural radio, are roughly consistent
with the OLS results, Tables C.7-C.975. Greater access to a local radio is positively and
significantly associated with greater knowledge and beliefs about Ebola, except when we
condition on distance to an own rural radio transmitter. This is consistent with a model in
which the benefit of broadcast information compared to other types of information is due
to its effect on actions that have social norms attached, rather than its pure information
effect. It is also positively associated with neighbors seeking greater health treatment of
73The significance test on the instrument has an F − Stat = 22 unconditionally, F − Stat = 84
conditional on controls, F −Stat = 82 including distance to the closest transmitter from any rural radio.
When control for the distance to the closest transmitter to a rural radio from the own community we
have an F − Stat = 6. When in addition we control for door-to-door campaigns we have F − Stat = 15,
Supplementary Appendix Table E.22.
74Supplementary Appendix Table E.20
75Detailed results with and without controls are available upon request.
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other health behaviors, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. Door-to-
door campaigns, however, which lack the common knowledge aspect, are either not or
negatively associated with greater health seeking behavior. Fear of seeking treatment is
negative and statistically significant when conditioning on the distance to transmitter to
a local radio. We also study how the effect varies by percentage of access to an own rural
radio, conditional on demographic covariates and distance to the epicenter. The results
suggest that sub-prefectures with 70−90% access to an own rural radio are twice as likely
to state that their neighbors have not decreased their health seeking behavior, Figure 3.4.
On the other hand the effect on chlorine use is zero or negative.
The second stage results are very close in magnitude to the OLS results, and statistically
significant, with the same caveats found in the reduced form results, i.e. the effect on
beliefs and knowledge about Ebola disappears when conditioning on distance to own
radio transmitter, and fear of seeking treatment is negative and statistically significant
only when conditioning on this distance. The coefficient on neighbors seeking treatment
is larger in this case, but smaller and less precisely estimated than the OLS estimate. The
coefficient of chlorine use is negative or zero, Tables C.7-C.9.
We interpret these results as suggestive. They are consistent with a model in which broad-
cast information affects knowledge and beliefs, but there is an advantage in comparison to
other sources of information only when actions have a social cost and they are observable
by others. It has no additional benefit on changing private actions, compared to other
types of information. Given externalities in health behavior some actions are strategic
substitutes and the common knowledge aspect of radio can discourage them, if people
expect others to increase their preventive behavior. This can explain the null or negative
effects found on chlorine use and the ambiguous effects on seeking health treatment.
This explanation is also consistent with survey evidence from Internews on the program
“Ebola Chrono”, which was conducted by this organization and then aired across radio
stations after January 2015. This program was a synergy and therefore similar across
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the country. Most people express that what they most liked about the program were
the citizen interviews (20%) and the expert interviews (19%), just after the information
provided (44%), rather than the presenters themselves (11%), who are not known in the
community76. Knowing what other citizens believe gives information about changes in
what constitutes acceptable behaviors. Individuals also say they learned mostly about
preventive measures in these shows (54%), followed by cures (30%). The vast majority is
also likely to say that they found the information on preventive measures useful (92%).
These preventive behaviors range from washing your hands with chlorine, to laboratory
testing and conducting safe burials for family members.
Change in cultural practices
The evolution of cultural practices is studied by looking at the change in burial practices
over time as information arrives. Burial practices are a central aspect of culture, they
were difficult to change in such a fast pace and a major source of distress during the
Ebola epidemic. The outcome studied are refusals by a given community to abide by safe
burials77 conducted by the Red Cross78.
In Section 3.5.1 we showed in a difference-in-difference design that treatment uptake, mea-
sured as the ratio of Ebola deaths in community to Ebola deaths in an Ebola Treatment
Unit (ETU), changed over time as a consequence of information transmitted through local
radios. We would like to do the same exercise to study burial practices but the data is
available only for a short time period after the peak of the epidemic, namely from April
to December 2015. We therefore seek a different strategy. In particular we study whether
cultural practices change as a consequence of radio emissions or social mobilization cam-
paigns conducted by the Guinean Red Cross over several months. These radio emissions
76Supplementary Appendix Table E.24
77Once the safe burials, i.e. conducted with personal protective equipment (PPE), were accommodated
to the local customs, which included a religious ceremony, they became known as safe and dignified burials
(SDB).
78National Red Cross and Red Crescent Society
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were emitted by Rural radios, as well as by mobile radio transmitters. We have weekly
data at prefecture level from April to December 2015 on the number of safe and dignified
burials conducted by the Red Cross and the number of burials refused by a given commu-
nity, as well as the number of radio emissions aired, the number of volunteers conducting
social mobilization campaigns, whether these were preventive or in response to resistance
behavior, as well as the number of people transported, cholera kits, surveillance efforts
and other activities conducted by the Red Cross.
We study in a panel estimation framework with location and time fixed effects whether
burial practices changed over time following radio emissions from the Red Cross. Radio
shows and social mobilization campaigns are endogenous to the spread of Ebola and to
the change in behavior over time. In particular, communities that were more likely to
refuse safe burials or treatment, show other form of resistance behavior or were more
affected by the epidemic, are exactly the places that were targeted by the Red Cross to
receive more information and assistance. We will take this selection effect into account
by studying the effect of radio emissions this month on burial refusals in the following
month, conditional on radio emissions one month before, as well as conditioning on social
mobilization campaigns that were realized in response to resistance behavior, and other

















d,t−j × SocialMob.Prev.RedCrossd,t−j + Xd,t Γ + αd + λt + εd,t
for all m ∈ [0, 4] (3.14)
The effect of interest is βm0 , for different time horizons m ∈ [0, 4], which is the effect of
radio emissions this month on burials m months later, conditioning on observables that
should capture the selection effect, i.e. the fact that the Red Cross emits radio shows
in areas where they expect to find resistance. While radio shows were not randomly
assigned, the selection effect means that β̂m0 is likely a lower bound of the effect of these
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radio emissions on burial practices m periods ahead. In addition we also see whether social
mobilization campaigns that were realized for prevention of resistance behavior affected
refused burials, γm0 and whether there are complementarities, δ
m
0 .
The outcome variable Refusald,t+m are the refusals of safe burials conducted by the Red
Cross in 100’000 per capita m months ahead. In this case d denotes prefecture (34).
Standard errors are clustered at prefecture × semester to allow for some level of serial
dependence across time.
The controls in Xd,t include the total number of burials or Ebola deaths in period t, trends
by population, population density and distance to the epicenter, which should capture
the likelihood that Ebola spreads, as well as the number of other activities the Red Cross
conducts in period t, such as transport of patients, disease surveillance or the provision of
cholera kits. We also exploit the fact that the Red Cross classifies some of the social mobi-
lization campaigns as responsive to resistance behavior, which we use as control to capture




d,t−j in the set of controls.
Results to the evolution of cultural practices
The results indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in the number of radio emis-
sions this month is followed by a drop in refused burials in 100’000 per capita by 0.16−0.33
the next month and 0.92 after three months, Figure 3.6 and Table C.10. This is equiva-
lent to a 40 − 85% of a standard deviation change in the number of refused burials this
month or 3 standard deviations after three months. In terms of number of radio emissions
per prefecture, one additional radio show emitted by the Red Cross in a given month is
followed by a drop in refused burials in the following month, by 0.05 or 48% of the av-
erage number of refusals in a given month79. This means that 20 additional radio shows
are required to ensure one less burial refusal in the next month. In the long term these
79Supplementary Appendix Table E.26.
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radio emissions would be followed by 4 less refused burials three months ahead80. The
effect of social mobilization campaigns or their interaction with radio emissions is small,
ambiguous and not robust to different specifications81. We take these results as sugges-
tive. They are consistent with a model in which radio emissions have a greater impact
on cultural practices than social mobilization campaigns due to their common knowledge
aspect. People know that everybody knows that the social norm is shifting and that they
would incur little social cost by abiding to safe burials.

















t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3
Red Cross Radio Emissions
90% conf. intervals
Data source: International Federation of the Red Cross in Guinea, April-December, 2015
The outcome variables are total refused burials, an average of 0.33 per month, and refused
burials in 100’000 per capita, with monthly mean (std. dev.) 0.11 (0.39). Red Cross Radio
are the number of radio emissions aired and here we standardized the original variable
which had mean (std. dev.) 0.85 (3.29). Plotted coefficients are separate regressions, con-
ditional on social mobilization campaigns, as well as conditional on demographic controls,
social mobilization and other efforts by the Red Cross. We also control for the potential
interaction effects between social mobilization and radio emissions. See Table C.10 and
Supplementary Appendix Table E.25.
80The effect is not statistically significant for month 3 when using the non-standardized variables but
it is otherwise, Table C.10
81Radio emissions and social mobilization campaigns designed for prevention appear to be complements
in the short run, i.e. at t+ 1, but substitutes in the long run, i.e. at t+ 3.
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Local information
This Section further examines the channels through which local information matters for
the spread of a disease. First we study the possibility of a political accountability channel
explored in other settings (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007),
namely that higher access to local information leads institutions to provide more public
goods because citizens are more able to hold them accountable. Secondly, we discuss the
differences in language, ethnic groups and trust as potential mechanisms underlying the
persuasiveness of information provided via local rather than another rural radio.
I. Political accountability
In theory, broadcast information could have affected social unrest and the spread of Ebola
through its impact on the provision of public goods, due to a government accountability
channel (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007). That is, areas with
higher access to local information would make the government more accountable for its
policies and hence the latter would make a greater effort to provide public goods, such as
treatment, to these areas. This is unlikely to be the main channel in this setting, for a
number of reasons. Firstly, while private motives, corruption or other motives are possi-
ble, it is plausible to think that in the case of a deadly and contagious disease that spreads
rapidly throughout the country, the government authorities will eventually have as their
objective to stop its rapid spread. Secondly, the whole apparatus set in place to halt the
spread of Ebola included NGOs, such as Doctors without Borders (MSF), the Red Cross
and was then coordinated under the auspices of the WHO. In fact, the intervention was
criticized for taking little account of social unrest and local populations, as illustrated
by the imposition of quarantines and cremations in Liberia (Moon, 2015) and the civil
violence that arised, Chapter 2. To explore this possibility, however, we study whether
the presence of Ebola treatment units (ETUs), laboratories and Community care centers
(CCCs) is predictive of radio signal exposure, controlling for the distance to the epicenter,
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population and population density, which are predictors of the spread of the disease. We
find that while general access to any radio is positively related with availability of public
goods, this is not the case for local radios, conditional on access to other radios or other
rural radios, Table 3.9. We look both at the shortest distance to an ETU, laboratory
or CCC ever available, as well as their total number or the number of them in a given
sub-prefecture in 100’000 per capita82. There is evidence that access to any rural radio
is related to greater availability of CCCs, but these are hospitals that pre-date the Ebola
epidemic. This is consistent with a political accountability channel occurring prior to the
epidemic outbreak (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007). There is
no difference in any of the public goods across areas with different exposure to a local
radio, however. Moreover, we are conditioning on the availability of these public goods in
all our specifications. Finally, in Section 3.5.3 we show that the establishment of ETUs
and laboratories does not change significantly over time in areas with varying exposure
to a local radio.
II. Language, ethnic groups and trust
The Ebola information campaigns were similar across rural radio stations and conditional
on a given rural radio, they were exactly the same for people listening to it from within the
prefecture in which the radio is located compared to people listening to it from another
prefecture. Why would it matter then whether the information is received from a rural
radio station from the own community?
The source of information may be important in determining how persuasive the infor-
mation can be. The rural radios produced an information campaign on Ebola that was
sustained, contrary to the private radio stations, and the contents were persuasive, rather
than factual or normative, compared to the national radio stations, as they invited Ebola
survivors to their talks, as well as local, traditional or religious leaders. In addition those
82Supplementary Appendix Tables E.27-E.28
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Table 3.9: Public Good provision by access to Radio
Shortest distance to a public good
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Distance to ETU -0.008∗ 0.009 0.004 -0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.000
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Distance to Lab -0.014∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.009∗ -0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Distance to CCC -0.000 0.002∗ 0.002 0.003 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Any Radio 0.484∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.043) (0.052) (0.051) (0.029) (0.052) (0.097)
Any Rural Radio 0.639∗∗∗
(0.109)
N 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (ETU,Lab,CCC) 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.39 0.00 0.65 0.99
p-val (sum ETU,Lab,CCC) 0.00 0.07 0.70 0.89 0.57 0.91 0.94
(Robust SE). With region fixed effects (8 regions).
Excl. capital. Controls: population, population density, geographic area, distance to epicenter and their square.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Distance to ETU, Distance to Lab and Distance to CCC, are the smallest log-
distances to an Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU), laboratory (Lab) and community care
center (CCC) ever available, with mean (std. dev.) 10.5 (4.02), 10.5 (4.4) and 6.5 (7.9),
respectively. ETUs and laboratories are created ad-hoc during the Ebola outbreak. CCCs
are hospitals that exist prior to the epidemic outbreak. We control for variables correlated
with the spread of the disease.
with access to their own community radio station were more likely to know the speaker,
know someone who knows the speaker, or have someone from their own community as
presenter, compared to those with access to a rural radio station from another community.
Trust is likely to be important in transmitting information that is sensitive and opposed
to prior beliefs.
In Section 3.5.2 we showed that radio signal reception to any radio station is correlated
with ownership of a radio device and listening to news on the radio. However, when we
look at who learned about Ebola on the radio, only those that report listening to a rural
radio station are more likely to say that they have learned about Ebola on the radio and
when we look at reduced form results using our radio signal measure, we see that this is
driven by sub-prefectures with higher access to an own rural radio station. Section 3.5.2
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moreover suggests that the extra that they learned on the radio was related to treatment
uptake or other people’s actions, rather than about the disease per se, in comparison to
people who learned from other information sources.
We next study the possibility that ethnic groups or language and trust plays a role in
explaining the difference between own community and any rural radio station. This chan-
nel was proposed by the director of rural radios in Guinea, and a reason for creating new
rural radios later in the epidemic, so that every prefecture would have their own rural
radio83. Guinea is a very diverse country, with about 24 ethnic groups with different
customs and languages. In our sample the average sub-prefecture has an ethnic fraction-
alization index of 24%, which means that the probability that two individuals belong to
different groups is about 1/4 on average84. Rural radio stations take this into account
and emit radio programs in a number of languages. They report using an average of 3
languages and a maximum of 6, apart from French, according to surveys conducted by
the author85. Guineans are often fluent in several languages. However, language is still a
potential barrier to communication and moreover languages and ethnic groups coincide,
and people might trust more people of their own ethnic group. Survey data reveals that
the average Guinean rarely thinks that their ethnic group is treated unfairly and they
more likely to state a stronger national identity rather than ethnic belonging86. However,
on average only 28% of individuals state that most people can be trusted, and the other
72% state that one has to be very careful in trusting most people. There is also low trust
in institutions, such as the president or the local council.
We conduct a series of balance tests across radio signal reception to see whether language,
ethnic groups and trust levels predict access to a local radio87. This exercise tells us
83These were launched after our effects take place, namely after February 2015.
84Fractionalization measures the probability that two individuals belong to different groups. It’s a
Herfindahl index that goes from 0 (all belong to the same group), to 1 (total diversity). It is defined as
F =
∑m
i=1 ni(1− ni), where m is the number of groups and ni is the relative size of each group.
85The Rural radio of Boke reported using Susu, Fulla, Landuma, Diakanke, Nalou, Mikhifore and
French.
86Supplementary Appendix Table E.29
87Supplementary Appendix Tables E.30-E.35
Chapter 3 141
Essays in Development Economics
whether ethnic composition or languages spoken varies across areas with or without access
to a local radio station. The results show that there is a different composition in terms
of language or ethnic groups, but the differences are not statistically significant when
controlling for trust in institutions and urban infrastructure. On the other hand, areas
with higher access to a rural radio from their own community have higher levels of trust in
their local council across different specifications. To test the hypothesis that higher trust
in the local council is an outcome of having access to a radio from the own community,
rather than something that differentiates areas with or without a local radio per se, we
run the exact same balance test but using trust in the local council measured after the
peak of the epidemic instead of pre-epidemic levels of trust. This post-epidemic measure
of trust in local councils is not predictive of access to local radios, conditional on the same
set of covariates88. After the peak of the epidemic new rural radios were created so that
everybody would have an own rural radio station. This is consistent with the demand-side
effects required for a political accountability channel to occur, namely that citizens trust
more their local politicians when they have higher access to local information. Finally, to
rule out that the results of this paper are entirely driven by trust in local councils and that
having a local radio is a proxy for it, we control for trust in our main empirical strategy,
Section 3.5.1. While the effects are somewhat smaller, they are not entirely driven by it89.
The results give suggestive evidence of the role of trust in local institutions in explaining
why local information matters more than information from other communities, conditional
on receiving the same information.
3.5.3 Robustness and validity checks
In this Section we provide robustness and validity checks of our main empirical strategy.
We first study deeper the identifying assumptions and then provide alternative specifica-
tions.
88The coefficient is negative and not statistically significant, Supplementary Appendix Table E.35
89See for instance Table C.2.
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I. Parallel trends assumption
The key identifying assumption in a difference-in-difference strategy is that the trends in
the spread of Ebola would be the same in places with varying levels of radio exposure
in the absence of treatment. There are three main validity checks we conduct. First
we have shown in Section 3.5.1 that the spread of Ebola is similar in areas with varying
levels of access to an own rural radio, conditional on other radios, prior to the start of the
rural radio campaign. Secondly we study whether the Ebola response changes over time
differentially for areas with distinct access to their own community radio station, condi-
tional on controls. Thirdly we assess that areas with access to an own community radio
station are not fundamentally different from other areas. While this is not necessary in
a difference-in-difference design, it strengthens the empirical set-up, given the potentially
unexpected dynamics of the spread of a disease. Finally we study the spread of other
diseases, using data available at the level of a prefecture.
Time-varying confounders : The second validity check requires studying other poten-
tial confounders changing over time differentially for areas with distinct levels of exposure
to local radios. The main suspect are national and international efforts to contain the epi-
demic. The best measure we have is the establishment of health facilities, such as Ebola
treatment units (ETUs) and laboratories. Given that international aid arrives much later
than the start of the rural radio campaign, namely after August 2014, when the WHO
declares the Ebola epidemic an ‘international public health emergency’, there is not much
variation in health facilities before that. Instead we study whether there is something that
changes differentially in areas with distinct exposure to local radios around the seventh
month after the start of the rural radio campaign, given that we observe the effect at
that time. We find that this is not the case, when looking at the time-varying distance to
the closest ETU or the number of ETUs or the number of ETUs adjusted by population,
with or without controls, Figure C.5. The patterns are less impressive when we look at
the establishment of laboratories, but we still see no statistically significant change in the
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distance to the closest laboratory or the number of laboratories per capita, conditional
on controls, Figure C.6.
Baseline characteristics correlated with the spread of disease : We also assess
whether baseline covariates, correlated with the spread of disease, are balanced around
access to an own community radio station, conditional on access to other radios. If areas
with distinct access to an own community are fundamentally different from each other,
one would think that in absence of information treatment the disease might not have
continued the parallel trends observed prior to the start of the information campaign.
Since our treatment variable is continuous we run a regression with each radio signal
measure as dependent variable on a number of covariates (Pei et al., 2018). We exclude
the capital to understand what differentiates the rest of the country.
We first assess whether areas with higher access to radio are more densely populated or
closer to the epicenter or first Ebola case. We find that areas with higher access to some
radio station are more densely populated, but not different in terms of distance to the
epicenter90. On the other hand, sub-prefectures with access to an own rural radio station
are somewhat larger and therefore less densely populated compared to areas with access
to rural radio stations from other communities. Since population density is an important
correlate of disease spread we will control for population and population density in all our
specifications.
Secondly, other important covariates, such as wealth, education, religious beliefs, infras-
tructure, are more predictive of having access to any radio, or conditioning on any radio,
they are predictive of having a national or a private radio, but not a rural radio91. These
covariates are not predictive of having access to an own community radio, once we control
for having access to any rural radio.
90Supplementary Appendix Table E.12.
91Supplementary Appendix Table E.13.
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Other diseases : Finally, we study the spread of other diseases during the year prior
to the Ebola outbreak, aggregated by prefecture. Having access to any radio station,
compared to not having access to it, is correlated with the likelihood of the spread of
some diseases92. When looking at distinct media outlets, conditional on having access to
any radio, there are important differences in the spread of disease for areas with varying
access to the national or private radio93. However, areas that have access a rural radio in
their own prefecture are similar to other areas with some access to radios94.
II. Alternative specifications
Lagged dependent variable specification : The theoretical model summarized in
equation (3.5) suggests a specification with a lagged dependent variable. Since we are
running a short panel with 16 periods in the event study with j ∈ [−5, 10], the inclusion
of both fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable is problematic (Nickell, 1981). We
can run however an alternative regression to equation (3.7), replacing αd with the lagged
dependent variable log(Ebola+ 0.01)d,t−1, namely:








Campaign + Xd,t Γ + λt + εd,t (3.15)
The coefficients {βj}j≥0 are a lower bound estimate of the true effect of local radios on
the spread of Ebola (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
The results from this specification are similar to the fixed effects specification95. The
coefficient is identical in the seventh month but somewhat lower coefficients thereafter,
although only the coefficient in the tenth month is significantly smaller.
92Supplementary Appendix Table E.14
93columns (2)-(5)
94column (6)-(7)
95Supplementary Appendix Table E.7 and Figure E.3.
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Different measures of Ebola : Our preferred specification uses log(Ebola+ 0.01) as
outcome variable. The reason is that this is the closest model to the epidemiological the-
ory, Section 3.3. However, we also do the same empirical analysis with log(Ebola+ 1) as
outcome variable, as well as the number of Ebola cases, or alternatively we adjust by pop-
ulation, taking log(ebola+ 1) and ebola as outcome variables, where ebola is the number
of Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita96. We find identical results in terms of the timing of
the drop in Ebola cases and also effects of similar magnitude. When the outcome variable
is log(Ebola + 1) we find an effect of 8.5 − 13% drop in the number of Ebola cases due
to a 10 pp increase local radios, seven months after the campaign97. When the outcome
is the number of Ebola cases the effect is a 20% drop. Finally, when ebola is measured in
100’000 per capita, the effect in the linear model is a 35% drop in this outcome. In the
log-linear model with log(ebola+ 1) as outcome, the implied effect is a 10% drop.
3.6 Conclusion
The Ebola epidemic in Western Africa in 2014-15 was a human tragedy, as well as a major
shock that generated a great influx of state capacity in the form development assistance
and required the adoption of new medical technologies and a change in cultural practices
to halt the outbreak, which led to social unrest and the spread of rumors, countering
containment efforts.
This paper shows that sustained access to a local radio program informing about protective
measures, encouraging treatment, addressing Ebola rumors and new burial practices,
lowered social resistance behavior, increased treatment uptake and led to a drop in infected
cases seven months after the start of the campaign, compared to having access to other
96Results are presented in Tables E.3-E.6
97In the log-linear model with log(Ebola + 1) the coefficients require a greater adjustment than the
standard case, given by the following formula: (eβ̂×0.10−1)× y0+1y0 ×100%, where y0 is the average Ebola
in the absence of local radios.
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campaigns or the same campaign from other radios. A back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that around 303 Ebola infections could have been spared if all areas with access
to a rural radio station had their own local radio from the beginning of the outbreak,
that is 8% of the total number of Ebola cases. This is consistent with evidence showing
that local newspapers are more likely to increase salience of public goods, compared to
national or international news (Besley and Burgess, 2002), and the role of community
radio stations in providing information to voters, in neighboring Sierra Leone (Casey,
2015). We find suggestive evidence that broadcast information affected cultural norms,
such as burial practices, and facilitated technological adoption, but there is no evidence
of impacts on private actions. This differs from other sources of information, such as
social mobilization strategies, which do not seem to impact burial practices. On the other
hand, knowing an Ebola victim or receiving information from family members is more
predictive of private actions, such as chlorine use. The findings suggest that the common
knowledge of radios serves as a coordination device and is key in changing health habits
that are attached to cultural practices. This is consistent with evidence in other contexts
showing that radios can affect social norms (Paluck, 2009; Paluck and Green, 2009).
Our results support the hypothesis often repeated by local actors and anthropologists that
local knowledge is key in affecting significant development outcomes. This work suggests
that cultural practices can change, rumors can subside, in matter of months, if information
is convincing and trustworthy. This paper is a step forward in our understanding of
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Adj. R2 = 0.66
Slope = 20
p−value = 0.051
Notes: Conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD).
Definitions: Conflicts: average number of yearly Conflicts (ACLED). Disease outbreak alerts (excluding
updates) (WHO). Observations: 67 countries over 1997-2016 in Africa, South and South East Asia,
Central America, the Caribean and Mexico (excluding the outliers Pakistan and Somalia).
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Table A.1: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Conflict
Heterogeneous effects by Institutions / Health Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
disesase(t) -8.485 53.09 52.28 41.06 178.6∗∗ 139.6∗∗∗ 48.33 59.96
(28.92) (34.73) (34.48) (36.79) (83.49) (45.62) (61.23) (35.90)
disesase(t) × Polity IVHigh 37.86
(111.00)
disesase(t) × Political RightsHigh -343.1∗∗
(151.93)
disesase(t) × Civil LibertiesHigh -149.0∗∗
(58.03)
disesase(t) × Freedom of ExpressionHigh -17.98
(83.31)
disesase(t) × Health Expenditure (t-1) -8.965
(26.93)
Observations 648 577 577 577 577 577 577 577
R-squared 0.814 0.880 0.881 0.881 0.896 0.882 0.882 0.881
Mean 555.5
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year × Continent FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population(t-1),GDP(t-1) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
disease(t-1) Y Y Y Y Y Y
(1, disease(t-1)) × Institutions(t-1) Y Y Y Y
(1, disease(t-1)) × Health Expenditure(t-1) Y
(Robust SE) clustered by country
Where Institutions are demeaned variables.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD)
at (t − 1), and disease outbreaks one year before and also at (t − 1). Weighted by average population
over the sample period. For full specification equation (1.3). Definitions: Conflicts: disease-motivated
conflicts according to the description of the event (ACLED). Disease outbreak alerts (excluding updates)
(WHO). Civil Liberties: civil liberties, aggregating freedom of expression and belief, associational rights,
rule of law, individual rights; Political Rights: electoral process, political pluralism and participation,
functioning government, with higher values indicating more liberties or rights (Freedom House Index);
Polity IV (2): captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (autocracy)
to +10 (consolidated democracy) (Center for Systemic Peace). Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016
in Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico (excluding Somalia,
Pakistan (outliers) and South Sudan (incomplete data on civil liberties)).
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Table A.2: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Health or Disease-related Conflict
Heterogeneous effects by Institutions / Health Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
disesase(t) 0.227 2.488∗∗ 2.438∗∗ 1.938 8.370∗∗ 5.782∗∗∗ 2.352 2.801∗∗
(1.01) (1.14) (1.15) (1.33) (3.51) (1.77) (2.36) (1.17)
disesase(t) × Polity IVHigh 1.700
(4.59)
disesase(t) × Political RightsHigh -16.65∗∗
(6.97)
disesase(t) × Civil LibertiesHigh -5.747∗∗
(2.72)
disesase(t) × Freedom of ExpressionHigh -0.656
(3.27)
disesase(t) × Health Expenditure (t-1) -0.320
(1.11)
Observations 648 577 577 577 577 577 577 577
R-squared 0.811 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.892 0.876 0.876 0.876
Mean 20.76
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year × Continent FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Population(t-1),GDP(t-1) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
disease(t-1) Y Y Y Y Y Y
(1, disease(t-1)) × Institutions(t-1) Y Y Y Y
(1, disease(t-1)) × Health Expenditure(t-1) Y
(Robust SE) clustered by country
Where Institutions are demeaned variables.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD)
at (t − 1), and disease outbreaks one year before and also at (t − 1). Weighted by average population
over the sample period. For full specification equation (1.3). Definitions: Conflicts: disease-motivated
conflicts according to the description of the event (ACLED). Disease outbreak alerts (excluding updates)
(WHO). Civil Liberties: civil liberties, aggregating freedom of expression and belief, associational rights,
rule of law, individual rights; Political Rights: electoral process, political pluralism and participation,
functioning government, with higher values indicating more liberties or rights (Freedom House Index);
Polity IV (2): captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (autocracy)
to +10 (consolidated democracy) (Center for Systemic Peace). Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016
in Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico (excluding Somalia,
Pakistan (outliers) and South Sudan (incomplete data on civil liberties)).
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Table A.3: Event study on Riots by Polity IV (2) (above mean)
Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disesase(t) 8.141 -33.40∗∗ 0.0211 -14.37 -64.59 57.06∗ 175.0 208.0∗∗ 77.96
(9.98) (14.67) (23.73) (10.28) (64.33) (31.12) (110.63) (100.84) (78.76)
disesase(t) × Polity IVHigh 2.443 47.04∗∗∗ 37.25 48.29 209.2 28.28 -158.2∗ 26.12 -56.47
(12.94) (12.00) (38.49) (40.22) (127.48) (90.63) (86.20) (240.19) (75.06)
Polity IVHigh -49.32 -102.6 -114.9 -72.68 -242.9 31.92 754.5 113.9 106.0
(31.50) (76.35) (93.62) (63.86) (159.62) (188.74) (547.47) (120.27) (172.72)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.584 0.522 0.583 0.554 0.898 0.886 0.879 0.876 0.896
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), disease(t+j-1), disease(t+j-1) × Covariate (t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.4: Event study on Riots by Polity IV (2) (demeaned)
Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disesase(t) 6.445 -18.13 10.53 0.0182 8.899 80.76∗ 143.6 234.5∗ 54.37
(7.76) (15.40) (13.24) (11.63) (42.53) (44.09) (91.45) (136.38) (63.66)
disesase(t) × Polity IV(t-1) -1.370 1.479 -0.404 2.833 22.21 10.39 23.89∗ 29.08 44.64∗
(2.81) (2.65) (4.53) (4.54) (14.61) (7.80) (13.72) (25.11) (24.97)
Polity IV(t-1) -1.902 -6.469 -1.742 -3.263 6.259 50.24 13.23 -22.26 -46.00∗∗
(3.69) (9.10) (7.16) (4.01) (30.63) (37.60) (16.39) (15.28) (21.03)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.566 0.487 0.548 0.545 0.898 0.888 0.876 0.879 0.897
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), disease(t+j-1), disease(t+j-1) × Covariate (t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Event study on Riots by Political Rights (above mean)
Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disesase(t) 10.66 -4.420 9.019 -8.873 52.90 177.9∗∗ 133.0 222.3∗∗ 82.29
(12.06) (7.16) (22.95) (11.66) (34.23) (74.78) (91.62) (104.27) (77.34)
disesase(t) × Political RightsHigh -9.280 -35.35 7.564 29.11 -135.2 -308.6∗∗ -30.91 -18.00 -127.7∗∗
(19.74) (48.12) (35.16) (22.37) (84.93) (133.63) (71.92) (206.64) (59.46)
Political RightsHigh -20.53 29.06 3.963 -27.22 199.0∗ 844.7∗ -130.1 120.5 236.3
(21.12) (55.70) (31.23) (57.18) (114.95) (441.17) (237.77) (122.15) (252.40)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.571 0.494 0.549 0.548 0.898 0.901 0.874 0.876 0.895
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), disease(t+j-1), disease(t+j-1) × Covariate (t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.6: Event study on Riots by Political Rights (demeaned)
Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disesase(t) 4.312 -19.84 5.063 -1.246 18.27 83.00∗∗ 162.1∗ 257.7∗ 67.68
(7.44) (16.13) (12.56) (15.40) (47.69) (33.28) (84.64) (132.34) (56.16)
disesase(t) × Political Rights(t-1) -1.103 -0.183 -2.283 -0.810 5.769 6.245∗ 12.23∗∗ 15.40 23.67∗∗
(1.08) (1.64) (1.69) (1.41) (5.81) (3.15) (5.42) (11.44) (10.10)
Political Rights(t-1) 0.803 3.100 4.177 5.062 31.20 11.59 9.353 -0.640 0.578
(1.31) (2.66) (3.46) (7.95) (39.00) (35.22) (22.88) (17.83) (23.32)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.565 0.485 0.555 0.546 0.898 0.888 0.877 0.881 0.898
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), disease(t+j-1), disease(t+j-1) × Covariate (t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.7: Event study on Riots by Civil Liberties (above mean)
Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disesase(t) 10.29 -17.10 35.00 26.50 -55.15 139.9∗∗∗ 355.7∗∗∗ 356.8∗∗ 274.0∗
(11.71) (32.06) (26.97) (29.78) (75.39) (35.59) (118.41) (157.26) (154.59)
disesase(t) × Civil LibertiesHigh -5.244 -0.497 -38.55 -50.13 140.1 -127.1∗∗∗ -399.2∗∗∗ -207.3 -365.7∗∗
(9.57) (28.14) (26.44) (32.28) (112.68) (44.17) (113.58) (251.86) (153.09)
Civil LibertiesHigh -2.865 -0.198 -2.152 42.43 -601.3∗∗ 187.3∗ 825.9∗∗ -361.1 1089.4∗∗
(13.20) (12.52) (16.27) (43.83) (239.29) (99.96) (410.92) (255.19) (477.94)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.562 0.485 0.557 0.554 0.905 0.887 0.888 0.880 0.909
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), disease(t+j-1), disease(t+j-1) × Covariate (t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A.2: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Conflict incidence
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Time since disease outbreak
90% conf. intervals
Conditional on political rights (demeaned) × (1, disease outbreaks)
Notes: Conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD)
at (t − 1), and disease outbreaks one year before and also at (t − 1). Weighted by average population
over the sample period. For full specification equation (1.2). Definitions: Conflicts: average number of
yearly Conflicts (ACLED). Disease-motivated conflicts according to the description of the event. Disease
outbreak alerts (excluding updates) (WHO). Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016 in Africa, South
and South East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.
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Figure A.3: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Health or Disease-related Conflict
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Time since disease outbreak
90% conf. intervals
Conditional on political rights (demeaned) × (1, disease outbreaks)
Notes: Conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD)
at (t − 1), and disease outbreaks one year before and also at (t − 1). Weighted by average population
over the sample period. For full specification equation (1.2). Definitions: Conflicts: average number of
yearly Conflicts (ACLED). Disease-motivated conflicts according to the description of the event. Disease
outbreak alerts (excluding updates) (WHO). Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016 in Africa, South
and South East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.
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Figure A.4: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Conflict incidence
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Time since disease outbreak
90% conf. intervals
Conditional on political rights (above mean) × (1, disease outbreaks)
Notes: Conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD)
at (t − 1), and disease outbreaks one year before and also at (t − 1). Weighted by average population
over the sample period. For full specification equation (1.2). Definitions: Conflicts: average number of
yearly Conflicts (ACLED). Disease-motivated conflicts according to the description of the event. Disease
outbreak alerts (excluding updates) (WHO). Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016 in Africa, South
and South East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.
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Figure A.5: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Riots





















-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4




















-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
Time since disease outbreak
90% conf. intervals
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Time since disease outbreak
90% conf. intervals
Conditional on political rights (above mean) × (1, disease outbreaks)
Notes: Conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD)
at (t − 1), and disease outbreaks one year before and also at (t − 1). Weighted by average population
over the sample period. For full specification equation (1.2). Definitions: Conflicts: average number of
yearly Conflicts (ACLED). Disease-motivated conflicts according to the description of the event. Disease
outbreak alerts (excluding updates) (WHO). Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016 in Africa, South
and South East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.
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Figure A.6: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Health or Disease-related Conflict
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Time since disease outbreak
90% conf. intervals
Conditional on political rights (above mean) × (1, disease outbreaks)
Notes: Conditional on average population and GDP in 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank/OECD)
at (t − 1), and disease outbreaks one year before and also at (t − 1). Weighted by average population
over the sample period. For full specification equation (1.2). Definitions: Conflicts: average number of
yearly Conflicts (ACLED). Disease-motivated conflicts according to the description of the event. Disease
outbreak alerts (excluding updates) (WHO). Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016 in Africa, South
and South East Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.
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Table A.8: Event study on Riots by Civil Liberties (demeaned)
Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disesase(t) 3.738 -20.11 3.464 -5.104 13.57 69.72∗∗ 146.1∗ 231.2∗ 77.47
(6.73) (16.92) (10.62) (13.12) (42.12) (27.84) (80.31) (129.17) (67.77)
disesase(t) × Civil Liberties(t-1) -0.988 -0.577 -2.528∗ -1.304 4.180 4.387∗ 7.483∗ 7.440 14.53∗
(0.87) (1.79) (1.26) (1.01) (3.55) (2.40) (4.18) (7.83) (7.40)
Civil Liberties(t-1) 2.590 1.165 6.355 6.564 -11.56 9.778 -12.31 0.778 -56.14
(2.43) (3.28) (7.44) (8.99) (25.37) (41.32) (23.96) (30.62) (52.53)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.567 0.484 0.560 0.548 0.897 0.887 0.875 0.878 0.896
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), disease(t+j-1), disease(t+j-1) × Covariate (t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.9: Event study on Riots by Freedom of Expression (above mean)
Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disesase(t) 10.59 -25.53 24.83 16.41 -38.57 63.65 158.6∗ 270.2∗ -28.01
(10.63) (29.01) (22.57) (25.44) (92.51) (49.89) (82.31) (140.37) (101.34)
disesase(t) × Freedom of ExpressionHigh -10.57 11.88 -28.07 -34.53 86.53 -16.13 -114.9 -114.5 81.94
(10.10) (25.32) (24.51) (29.70) (115.01) (65.35) (71.93) (223.00) (77.93)
Freedom of ExpressionHigh 5.677 -12.77 31.34 37.92 -122.5 296.0 793.9∗ 436.9∗ 675.4
(16.94) (30.90) (24.06) (28.42) (150.39) (178.54) (456.10) (222.53) (455.26)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.562 0.484 0.551 0.546 0.897 0.888 0.882 0.878 0.899
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), disease(t+j-1), disease(t+j-1) × Covariate (t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.10: Event study on Riots by Freedom of Expression (demeaned)
Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disesase(t) 4.311 -19.48 5.603 -8.586 33.77 57.59 57.76 160.0 -90.40
(6.91) (17.28) (11.37) (13.48) (46.51) (56.90) (81.80) (137.41) (103.44)
disesase(t) × Freedom of Expression(t-1) -4.873 0.389 -8.891∗∗ -7.798∗ 22.96 -12.70 -6.104 -33.36 48.84
(3.85) (7.74) (4.23) (4.48) (32.29) (24.20) (12.74) (20.21) (43.23)
Freedom of Expression(t-1) 7.204∗ 3.365 16.41 25.72 -17.97 68.29 87.59 171.9 165.1
(4.13) (7.94) (11.43) (19.41) (93.69) (137.62) (90.50) (202.88) (219.97)
Observations 416 469 522 522 522 471 420 369 318
R-squared 0.571 0.484 0.560 0.573 0.903 0.893 0.881 0.889 0.908
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), disease(t+j-1), disease(t+j-1) × Covariate (t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.11: Event study on Riots by Health Expenditure (above mean)
Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disesase(t) 0.739 -15.84 -0.179 9.309 -51.09 -0.829 179.6∗ 167.5∗ 228.3∗∗
(9.20) (13.01) (16.41) (11.03) (47.63) (22.62) (103.57) (84.44) (91.87)
disesase(t) × Health ExpenditureHigh 6.675 -6.408 17.20 -16.09 124.5 184.3 -116.9 68.80 -482.2∗∗∗
(11.39) (34.49) (14.51) (24.18) (102.31) (121.76) (110.28) (156.33) (177.63)
Health ExpenditureHigh 4.356 17.81 12.20 47.75 -169.7 -303.9 367.1 349.1∗ 1026.8∗∗
(8.29) (27.73) (15.64) (28.58) (138.67) (198.55) (279.62) (184.98) (427.05)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.561 0.485 0.551 0.549 0.897 0.889 0.878 0.879 0.911
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), disease(t+j-1), disease(t+j-1) × Covariate (t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.12: Event study on Riots by Health Expenditure (demeaned)
Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disesase(t) 6.385 -13.62∗∗ 8.265 -10.63∗ -2.401 74.04∗∗ 144.5 197.4 65.10
(7.31) (6.49) (18.19) (6.13) (8.86) (32.31) (87.19) (125.25) (52.69)
disesase(t) × Health Exp.(t-1) -1.602 5.880 -1.261 -3.129 0.844 -14.88 -51.80 73.47 -70.95
(5.32) (5.26) (9.43) (6.95) (4.95) (21.01) (34.27) (100.74) (68.67)
Health Exp.(t-1) 7.995 6.297 13.17 5.863 -11.36 53.75 41.43 43.55 141.6
(7.84) (5.94) (10.80) (11.54) (14.61) (67.14) (101.56) (72.10) (99.78)
Observations 365 418 471 524 577 577 526 475 424
R-squared 0.498 0.571 0.483 0.555 0.536 0.887 0.875 0.877 0.894
Mean 18.92 27.57 34.33 45.36 395.4 427.6 465.3 511.3 567.2
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE, Year*Continent FE,
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), disease(t+j-1), disease(t+j-1) × Covariate (t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.13: Event study of Disease outbreaks on Conflict - Count Data Model
Conflicts
t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
disease(t) 0.0270 -17.56 18.24 -16.39 -57.39 -36.22 150.7∗ 259.7 106.4
(6.05) (19.18) (15.50) (20.41) (92.42) (54.49) (79.21) (175.84) (150.00)
Observations 416 469 522 575 628 577 526 475 424
(Robust SE), Time-FE, Country-FE
Controls: Population (t-1), GDP (t-1), Disease(t+j-1), Disease(t-1)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This table shows marginal effects at the average level of disease outbreaks in a Poisson regression
model estimated by Maximum Likelihood.
Observations: 66 countries over 2004-2016 in Africa, South and South East Asia, Central America, the
Caribbean and Mexico (excluding Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan).
12
Essays in Development Economics
B Appendix to Chapter 2
Figure B.1: Presence of the epidemic and conflict incidence month per month
Notes: Presence of the epidemic ∈ {0, 1} (blue shade) and number of conflicts in a given
location month per month (red dots).
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Figure B.2: Total Ebola and Conflict incidence in West Africa, pre and post-Epidemic
Notes: Cumulative Ebola infections per district (more if darker shade) and Conflict events (red
dots) weighted by number of conflicts in the same location. We see more conflict events in Sierra
Leone in the post-Epidemic compared to pre-Epidemic period. We see some displacement of
conflict in Guinea towards locations with more cumulative number of Ebola infections. For
Liberia the effects are not evident from the raw data at cross-sectional level.
























Essays in Development Economics






0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15











0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20







All Africa since 2010
15
Essays in Development Economics
Table B.1: Descriptives in Yearly quarters from Jan 2012 to May 2016
Pre-Epidemic Post-Epidemic Total Difference Total
2012-2013 2014-2016/Q2 Post-Pre Epid
[t-test]
Conflict 0.0383 0.0534 0.0467 0.0151
(0.393) (0.539) (0.479) [1.61]
conflict 0.763 0.856 0.815 0.0929





Observations 4,672 5,840 10512 584
Notes: The epidemic starts at the end of December 2013 in Guinea, but we do not
observe the first few cases. Conflict is the number of conflicts in a given yearly quarter
(riots, protests and violence against civilians) for each observational unit. conflict is
the number of conflict events in one million per capita in a yearly quarter. Difference
in means post-Epidemic-pre-Epidemic are followed by t-test statistics in square brackets.
EbolaTotal are the total cumulative number of Ebola cases counted at the end of the
epidemic. ebolaTotal are these measured in 100’000 per capita.




ebola ∈ {0, 1} 0 0.071 0.039
(0) (0.257) (0.19)
confirmed 0 0.815 0.447
(0) (9.631) (7.140)
probable 0 0.245 0.134
(0) (3.897) (2.887)
ebola (c+p) 0 1.061 0.581
(0) (12.88) (9.55)
ebolapc (c+p) 0 0.855 0.468
(0) (7.49) (5.56)
suspect 0 1.662 0.911
(0) (15.26) (11.33)
total 0 2.723 1.492
(0) (22.59) (16.78)
ebolapc total 0 1.553 0.851
(0) (10.06) (7.485)
N 30,368 36,792 67160
chiefdom (SLE ) / sub-pref (GIN) / county (LBR)
2-week windows
Conflict
Pre-Epid. Epidemic Total Difference
2012-13 2014-16/5 2012-16 Epid.-Pre-Epid.
conflict ∈ {0, 1} 0.00491 0.00679 0.00594 0.00189**
(0.0699) (0.0822) (0.0768) [3.17]
Conflicts 0.00589 0.00848 0.00731 0.00259**
(0.0914) (0.116) (0.106) [3.16]
Conflictspc 0.117 0.136 0.128 0.0185
(0.279) (2.85) (2.82) [0.84]
N 30,368 36,792 67160
chiefdom (SLE) / sub-pref (GIN) / district(LBR)
2-week windows, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, (SE), [t-stat]
Notes: The main variables used in the regressions are Conflictspc, namely the number
of conflicts in one million per capita and ebolapc (c+p), the number of confirmed and
probable Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita.
16
Essays in Development Economics
Table B.3: Descriptives - State Response - provision by country (population-weighted)
GIN LBR SLE Total
EverETU 0.135 0.512 0.224 0.238
(0.342) (0.503) (0.418) (0.426)
EverLab 0.126 0.451 0.293 0.242
(0.333) (0.500) (0.457) (0.429)
EverCCC 0.133 0.190 0.620 0.294
(0.340) (0.394) (0.487) (0.456)
EverQuar 0.0290 0.825 0.762 0.412
(0.168) (0.382) (0.428) (0.493)
NearETUend 0.133 0.500 0.186 0.223
(0.338) (0.490) (0.385) (0.411)
NearLabend 0.123 0.445 0.256 0.228
(0.323) (0.494) (0.435) (0.415)
Observations 584
Notes: Ebola treatment Units (ETU), Laboratories, Community care centers (CCCs),
Military district-Quarantines. Ever are dummy variables indicating whether a location
had access to it or not. Nearend is the smallest inverse distance to an ETU/Lab measured
at the end of the outbreak for locations that do not have one on their own, or 0 if they
do.
Table B.4: Descriptives - State Response - average population size
ETUs Labs CCCs Quarantines
Without 31,512 31,205 35,642 33,503
(51656.8) (51016.4) (97315.7) (62999.3)
With 175,189 190,972 51,227 51,487
(349568.5) (358544.7) (105232.8) (150396.6)
Total 39,138 39,138 39,138 39,138
(99267.3) (99267.3) (99267.3) (99267.3)
Observations 584 584 584 584
Notes: Ebola treatment Units (ETU), Laboratories, Community care centers (CCCs),
Military district-Quarantines or area blockades.
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Yearly quarters since first Ebola case, 2013:q4 (26 Dec, 2013)
95% conf. intervals
Difference-in-Difference : GIN
Notes: Coefficients on the total end-number of Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita in a
given location (sub-prefecture) × dummy for a yearly quarter. Calendar time since first
case in Guinea. Omitted category: 2012:q1.
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95% conf. intervals
High frequency Difference-in-Difference : Guinea
Notes: Coefficients on the total end-number of Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita in a
given location (sub-prefecture) × dummy for a six-week period. Time relative to first
case in region (prefecture). Omitted category: period -1.
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95% conf. intervals
High frequency Difference-in-Difference : Sierra Leone
Notes: Coefficients on the total end-number of Ebola cases in one location (chiefdom)
× dummy for a six-week period. Time relative to first case in region (district). Omitted
category: period -1.
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Yearly quarters since first Ebola case, 2014:q1 (March 30, 2014)
95% conf. intervals
Difference-in-Difference : LBR
Notes: Coefficients on the total end-number of Ebola cases in one location (county) ×
dummy for a yearly quarter. Calendar time since first case in Liberia. Omitted category:
2012:q1.
19
Essays in Development Economics
Table B.5: Difference in Differences relative to the first index case in West Africa - First Stage
First Stage Reduced Form
(1) (2)
ebolaTot × PostEbola conflict(quarter)
DistEpic × PostEbola -.00101∗∗∗ -1.11e-06
(.000369) (3.40e-06)
DistEpic × I(Guinea) × PostEbola .000388 -6.00e-08
(.000283) (2.46e-06)
DistEpic × I(Liberia) × PostEbola .0014∗∗∗ .000013
(.000427) (7.90e-06)
DistEpic2 × PostEbola 3.77e-09∗∗∗ 6.92e-12
(1.07e-09) (9.44e-12)
DistEpic2 × I(Guinea) × PostEbola -2.92e-09∗∗∗ -7.93e-12
(9.70e-10) (8.72e-12)




Time FE Y Y
Chiefd FE Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Dist; Controls Restr.: sample restricted to locations with household survey data.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: conflict is the number of conflicts in each yearly quarter in 1 million per capita.
ebolaTotal is the total cumulative number of Ebola cases measured at the end of the
outbreak for each location in 100’000 per capita. PostEbola is a post-treatment dummy
taking value 1 from 2014 on, after the first Ebola case is observed. DistEpic is the
geographic linear distance to the first index case, DistEpic2 is the square distance. I(.)
is an indicator variable for each country.
First stage F-Statistic: 10.24.
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Figure B.9: Impulse response for local projections for the impacts of ebola infections in



























0 2 4 6 8 10
Time since new Ebola case (2-week periods)
1
Notes: The coefficients of ebolat−1 in equation (2.5) are plotted, with 90% and 95%
confidence intervals. We condition on 9 lags in ebola and conflict (two-week frequency).
22













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Essays in Development Economics
Figure B.10: Predicted Ebola vs Ebola cases in Sierra Leone following Fang et al. (2016)
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(Clustered SE) by Dist; Time FE, Chiefd. FE; Reg. × Month FE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of Ebola infections over time.
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(Leads t+1, t+2)=0 0.320
SumLeads t+1, t+2=0 0.489
(LeadsAll)=0 0.271
SumLeadsAll=0 0.165
Stand. coef.; (Clustered SE) by Dist; Time FE, Chiefd. FE; Reg. × Month FE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: F-test in a regression including new Ebola cases at three leads and lags and
controlling for cumulative Ebola, Table B.12. t are two-week periods. conflict are the
number of conflicts in one million per capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola
cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum is the cumulative number of Ebola infections over
time.
Table B.14: Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation in Panel data
Linear model: conflict on ebola, ebolaCum
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
F( 1, 583) 0.056
p-value 0.8130
Notes: The specification is in two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in
one million per capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per
capita. ebolaCum is the cumulative number of cases over time in 100’000 per capita.
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Table B.15: Feedback effects?
conflict(t) ebola(t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ebola(t-1) 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0948) (0.1076)
ebolaCum(t-1) 0.000684∗∗∗ 0.000645∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002)
conflict(t-1) 0.0534 0.0532 0.0545 0.00738
(0.0410) (0.0410) (0.0409) (0.0103)
conflict(t-1) × ebola(t-1) 0.00127
(0.0039)
N 66576 66576 66576 66576 66576 66576 66576
R2 0.142 0.142 0.144 0.144 0.143 0.605 0.605
(Clustered SE) by Dist; cond. Time, Chiefd, Reg × Month FE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of cases over time in 100’000 per capita.
Table B.16: Robustness: different Conflict and Ebola measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Mean 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01
N 66576 66576 66576 66576
R2 0.12 0.55 0.12 0.55
(Clustered SE) by Chiefd/County; Time FE, Chiefd FE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. conflict ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether there has been any conflict
or not in a given period. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebola +
suspect is the number Ebola cases including suspect cases in 100’000 per capita.
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t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
ebola
90% conf. intervals
Notes: Coefficients on ebola at different time periods in a regression including new Ebola
cases at three leads and lags and controlling for cumulative Ebola, Table B.12. t are
two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per capita in the
own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum is the
cumulative number of Ebola infections over time.
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Table B.17: Robustness: Linear Probability Model vs Count Data Model (Marginal effects)
Outcome: conflict ∈ {0, 1} Linear Prob. Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ebola(t-1) 0.00476∗ 0.00241∗ 0.00212∗∗ 0.000773 0.000818∗∗∗





N 66576 66576 65992 66576 65992
Chiefd FE Y
Population Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Chiefd/County.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether there has been any
conflict or not in a given period. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita.
ebolaCum is the cumulative number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. Population is
the population. Columns (1)-(3) show coefficients of a linear probability model estimated
by OLS. Columns (4)-(5) show marginal effects at the average level of ebola(t − 1) of a
Poisson regression model estimated by Maximum Likelihood.
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-5 -4 -3 -2 0 1 2 3 4 5
Six-week Periods since July2014 (first Quarantine)
90% conf. intervals - excl. capital - omitted cat.: period -1 - Reg*Month FE
High frequency difference-in-difference : all countries
Notes: The figure shows the change in conflict incidence over time due to an additional
quarantine in 100’000 per capita. Regression of conflict in 1mn per capita on 6-week time
dummies interacted with an ever/never quarantine dummy divided by population per
100’000. Time 0 is in July 2014, which is the first time a quarantine was ever established.
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Table B.19: Margins of response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t)
ebola(t-1) 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗







Ebola(t-1) ∈ {0, 1} 0.209∗∗
(0.0872)
ebola(t-1) × PostPeak -0.000467
(0.0070)
ebola(t-1) × Trend -0.00132∗
(0.0007)
N 66574 65990 66574 65990 66574 66574 66574
R2 0.143 0.144 0.143 0.143 0.142 0.143 0.143
(Clustered SE) by Dist, Time, Chiefd, Reg × Month FE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. ebola are Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita, Ebola are the
raw number of Ebola cases, Ebola ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy variable indicating whether there are
Ebola cases or not in a given period. Cum refers to the cumulative. PostPeak is a dummy
variable indicating whether the peak of the epidemic has been reached for a given region.
Table B.20: Non-linearities?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t)
ebola(t-1) 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0039) (0.0057) (0.0041) (0.0058)
ebola2(t-1) -0.0000282∗∗ -0.0000265∗ -0.0000271∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ebolaCum(t-1) 0.000464∗ 0.000424 -0.000153 -0.000215
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005)
ebolaCum2(t-1) 0.000000472∗ 0.000000488∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 66574 66574 65990 65990 65990 65990
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.109 0.110
(Clustered SE) by Dist, Time, Chiefd, Reg × Month FE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of cases over time in 100’000 per capita.
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Table B.21: Countries (standardized coefficients)
Outcome: conflict(t) All Liberia Sierra Leone Guinea
ebola(t-1) 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.00341
(0.00388) (0.00698) (0.00478) (0.00271)
ebolaCum(t-2) 0.000464∗ -0.000782 0.000748∗∗∗ 0.000386
(0.000272) (0.000593) (0.000106) (0.000905)
N 65990 10396 17061 38533
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Chiefd FE Y Y Y Y
Reg × Month FE Y Y Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Dist
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of cases over time in 100’000 per capita.


















-5 -4 -3 -2 0 1 2 3 4 5
Six-week Periods since first Quarantine
90% conf. intervals - excl. capital  - cumEb>5 
High frequency Difference-in-difference : all countries
Notes: Change in conflict incidence after the imposition of a quarantine (population-
weighted). Regression of conflict in 1mn per capita on 6-week time dummies divided by
population per 100’000, only for ever quarantined locations. Time 0 is the date of the
establishment of a quarantine.
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Table B.22: State response Predictors: Infrastructure and Correlates of disease spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quarantine ETU Lab CCC None
log(ProxEpic) 0.162∗∗∗ 0.009 0.103∗∗ 0.009 -0.156∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.048) (0.046) (0.056) (0.051)
log(ProxEpic)2 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 0.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
log(Population) -0.045 -0.118∗∗ 0.035 0.026 0.016
(0.058) (0.055) (0.062) (0.065) (0.072)
log(Popdens) 0.039 0.179∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.029 -0.034
(0.065) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064)
Hospitals -0.017 -0.056 0.071 0.289∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.133) (0.106) (0.091) (0.089) (0.102)
Electricity 0.007 0.150 0.221 0.342∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.128) (0.210) (0.151) (0.144)
Water 0.124 0.197∗ 0.080 0.015 0.044
(0.159) (0.106) (0.153) (0.145) (0.125)
Army 0.008 0.104 0.208 0.094 -0.136
(0.260) (0.103) (0.147) (0.172) (0.217)
Police -0.197 -0.193∗ -0.073 -0.095 0.287
(0.257) (0.109) (0.100) (0.199) (0.225)
Paved Roads 0.307∗ 0.794∗∗∗ -0.203∗ -0.418∗∗ -0.012
(0.181) (0.083) (0.107) (0.159) (0.098)
Blocked Local Roads -2.993∗∗∗ -1.165∗∗∗ -0.851∗∗ -1.663∗∗∗ 3.944∗∗∗
(0.473) (0.291) (0.341) (0.570) (0.305)
Mean 0.36 0.11 0.10 0.31 0.47
N 219 219 219 219 219
R2 0.52 0.28 0.22 0.27 0.43
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Dist
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: All variables are pre-determined, measured before the start of the outbreak. Out-
comes: military district-quarantine, Ebola treatment units (ETUs), Laboratories, Com-
munity care centers (CCCs) ∈ {0, 1}. ProxEpic is the normalized inverse distance to the
epicenter, or first index case.
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Table B.23: State response: Political motives?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quarantine ETU Lab CCC None
Ethn Polariz. -0.214 -0.253 -0.283 -0.158 0.031
(0.223) (0.218) (0.242) (0.264) (0.218)
Ethn Fractionaliz. 0.532 0.744∗∗ 0.425 0.550 -0.397
(0.334) (0.303) (0.327) (0.345) (0.271)
Ethnic Salience 0.092∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.047 0.008 -0.083∗
(0.040) (0.033) (0.036) (0.054) (0.046)
Strongly Relig. 0.019 0.010 0.006 -0.004 -0.006
(0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.021)
Traditional Relig. 0.002∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Trust People 0.001 0.011 -0.027∗∗ -0.024∗ 0.009
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
Trust President 0.319∗∗∗ -0.014 0.101∗ 0.105 -0.155∗
(0.078) (0.041) (0.057) (0.098) (0.089)
Trust Opposition 0.208∗∗∗ -0.087 0.092 0.073 -0.119
(0.073) (0.084) (0.069) (0.088) (0.079)
Trust Local Instit. -0.329∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.155∗∗ -0.066 0.223∗∗
(0.083) (0.059) (0.062) (0.105) (0.092)
Trust Army -0.178∗ -0.034 0.016 0.002 0.050
(0.104) (0.070) (0.071) (0.078) (0.091)
Trust Leaders -0.246∗∗∗ -0.131 -0.006 -0.164 0.287∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.082) (0.073) (0.122) (0.092)
Mean 0.36 0.11 0.10 0.31 0.47
N 219 219 219 219 219
R2 0.63 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.50
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Dist; cond. on Infrastructure, Epicenter proximity, Population.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: All variables are pre-determined, measured before the start of the outbreak. Out-
comes: military district-quarantine, Ebola treatment units (ETUs), Laboratories, Com-
munity care centers (CCCs) ∈ {0, 1}.
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-3 -2 0 1 2 3 4 5
Six-week Periods since first Quarantine
90% conf. intervals - excl. capital - omitted cat.: period -1  - cumEb>10
High frequency difference-in-difference : all countries
Notes: Change in conflict incidence after the imposition of a quarantine (population-
weighted). Regression of conflict in 1mn per capita on 6-week time dummies divided by
population per 100’000, only for ever quarantined locations. Time 0 is the date of the
establishment of a quarantine.
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Time since quarantine six-week periods
Before Quarantine After Quarantine
Scatter plot and linear predictions
Notes: Conflict incidence for ever-quarantined locations, before and after the Quarantine.
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Table B.24: Military district-quarantines - OLS results (restricted to ever quarantined
locations)
Outcome: conflict(t) Pre-Quar Pre/Post-Quar





PreQuar × Trend -0.00560 -0.00696∗
(0.0038) (0.0035)
ebola(t-1) 0.00938∗∗∗ 0.00897∗∗ 0.00937∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0033)
ebolaCum(t-2) -0.00150∗∗ -0.00174∗∗ -0.00151∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
N 1348 1233 1348 1233 1348 1233
R2 0.193 0.209 0.190 0.205 0.192 0.209
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Chiefd FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
cumEbola>20 Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Chiefd
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of cases in 100’000 per capita. WithinQuar is a dummy variable
taking value 1 if the location is currently under a military quarantine and 0 otherwise.
PostQuar takes value 1 if the location has already been quarantined once and 0 otherwise.
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Table B.25: Public Goods: Heterogeneous effects with Health Centers - cond. on cumulative Ebola
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t)
ebola(t-1) 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.00225 0.0196∗∗ 0.0302 0.0139
(0.0071) (0.0039) (0.0079) (0.0192) (0.0098)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg -0.0200∗∗∗ -0.00460 -0.0181∗∗∗ -0.0317 -0.0176∗
(0.0066) (0.0039) (0.0066) (0.0194) (0.0102)
ebola(t-1) × NearETUend 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0093)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg × NearETUend -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0241∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0090)
ebola(t-1) × NearLabend 0.0270 0.00152
(0.0360) (0.0369)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg × NearLabend -0.0184 0.00786
(0.0377) (0.0387)
ebola(t-1) × NearCCCend -0.0101 -0.0153
(0.0211) (0.0099)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg × NearCCCend 0.0157 0.0163
(0.0213) (0.0102)
N 36160 33222 33222 36160 33222
R2 0.010 0.014 0.012 0.010 0.014
(Clustered SE) by Dist; Excl. capital; only Epidemic period; Time FE, Chiefd FE
Cond. on cumEbola. Omitted: ETU*PostEmerg, Lab*PostEmerg, CCC*PostEmerg
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of cases in 100’000 per capita. PostEmerg is a post-treatment
dummy taking value 1 after September 2014, when a great amount of emergency assistance
is released. NearETU endi is the normalized inverse distance to the closest Ebola treatment
unit (ETU) ever available to a given location. NearLabendi is the normalized inverse
distance to the closest Laboratory for rapid testing of the Virus ever available to a given
location. NearCCCendi is the normalized inverse distance to the closest Community Care
Center (CCC) ever available to a given location.
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Table B.26: Public Goods: Heterogeneous effects with Health Centers - interaction with High Ebola
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t)
ebola(t-1) 0.114 0.102 0.118 0.118 0.107
(0.1146) (0.1184) (0.1205) (0.1143) (0.1175)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg -0.126 -0.120 -0.131 -0.132 -0.127
(0.1126) (0.1168) (0.1183) (0.1122) (0.1157)
ebola(t-1) × I(HighEbola) -0.0923 -0.100 -0.0988 -0.0882 -0.0939
(0.1144) (0.1187) (0.1205) (0.1135) (0.1169)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg × I(HighEbola) 0.108 0.117 0.115 0.102 0.110
(0.1125) (0.1171) (0.1182) (0.1115) (0.1150)
ebola(t-1) × NearETUend 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0093)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg × NearETUend -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0203∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0091)
ebola(t-1) × NearLabend 0.0272 0.00228
(0.0360) (0.0368)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg × NearLabend -0.0186 0.00635
(0.0374) (0.0382)
ebola(t-1) × NearCCCend -0.00986 -0.0146
(0.0209) (0.0095)
ebola(t-1) × PostEmerg × NearCCCend 0.0180 0.0171∗
(0.0202) (0.0095)
N 36480 33516 33516 36480 33516
R2 0.010 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.013
(Clustered SE) by Dist; Excl. capital; only Epidemic period; Time FE, Chiefd FE
Omitted: ETU*PostEmerg, Lab*PostEmerg, CCC*PostEmerg High*PostEmerg
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of cases in 100’000 per capita. PostEmerg is a post-treatment
dummy taking value 1 after September 2014, when a great amount of emergency assistance
is released. NearETU endi is the normalized inverse distance to the closest Ebola treatment
unit (ETU) ever available to a given location. NearLabendi is the normalized inverse
distance to the closest Laboratory for rapid testing of the Virus ever available to a given
location. NearCCCendi is the normalized inverse distance to the closest Community Care
Center (CCC) ever available to a given location.
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Table B.27: Is Total Conflict predictive of the amount of Public Goods? (correlations)
CCC ETU Lab
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nr.CCCs NearCCC Nr.ETUs NearETU Nr.Labs NearLab
ConflEpidemic 23.8∗ 23.8∗ -1.8 -6.12 4.15 1.76
(12.4) (12.4) (9.44) (8.54) (7.19) (7.73)
Mean 0.31 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08
N 572 572 572 540 572 540
R2 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.14 0.14
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Dist; Controls: Ebola Total, popdens, NearEpic
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Outcomes: number or inverse distance to Ebola treatment units (ETUs), Labo-
ratories, Community care centers (CCCs).
Table B.28: Economic mechanism?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t) conflict(t)
ebola(t-1) 0.0186∗ 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0191∗ 0.0218∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0054) (0.0096) (0.0053)
PricePalmOil(t-1) 0.0000159 0.0000153 0.00000581
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
PriceImpRice(t-1) -0.000143∗ -0.000132∗ -0.000113
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 7714 7272 7309 7272 7272
R2 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068
(Clustered SE) by Dist, with Time FE, Chiefd FE
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita in the own region. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. ebolaCum
is the cumulative number of Ebola infections over time. Price of palm oil and price of
imported rice is are prices measured at monthly level and collected by (Glennerster et al.,
2013) during the epidemic.
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Table B.29: Baseline correlates of civil violence
Outcome: conflict(quarter) Pre-Epidemic Epidemic
(1) (2)
ebola Total per cap. 0.000 0.006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
Strongly Relig -0.280 -0.046
(0.270) (0.176)
Trad Relig -0.007 0.003
(0.012) (0.010)
Ethnic Salience -0.136 0.107
(0.233) (0.196)
Ethnic Fractionaliz. 1.586 -2.291
(2.096) (1.594)
Ethnic Polariz. -1.342 1.546
(1.695) (1.291)
Trust Leaders 0.466 0.157
(0.509) (0.481)
Trust People 0.060 0.022
(0.060) (0.042)
Trust Local Instit. -0.691∗ -0.173
(0.359) (0.304)





Country FE Y Y
Time FE Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Dist; Controls: ProxEpic, ProxEpic2, Population, Population Density
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per capita over a quarter of
a year in the pre-epidemic and in the post-epidemic period. ebolaTotalpercap. is the
total cumulative number of Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita measured post epidemic.
The covariates are Afrobarometer data measured pre-epidemic and aggregated at our
unit of observation (other variables), i.e. chiefdom, district and sub-prefecture for Sierra
Leone, Liberia and Guinea, respectively. Trust in people is a summary index statistic
grouping trust in neighbors, in other citizens, family members. Incumbent and opposition
are summary index statistics grouping trust and votes for the either (including them
separately leads to similar results).
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Table B.30: Correlates of civil violence - Political preferences, War and Infrastructure
Outcome: conflict(t) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ebola(t) 0.0145∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0169∗
(0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0086)
ebola(t-1) × Incumbent -0.0000177
(0.0019)
ebola(t-1) × Opposition -0.000663
(0.0026)
ebola(t-1) × Civil War -0.145
(0.3363)
ebola(t-1) × InfrastructureSumIndex 0.000189
(0.0003)
ebola(t-1) × Electricity 0.0383∗∗∗
(0.0129)
ebola(t-1) × Piped Water -0.00641
(0.0088)
ebola(t-1) × Health Centers -0.0187
(0.0284)
ebola(t-1) × Markets -0.0221∗
(0.0118)
ebola(t-1) × Paved Roads 0.826∗∗∗
(0.0237)
Mean 0.0968 0.0968 0.0968 0.0968
N 23370 65208 24852 24852
R2 0.0530 0.0392 0.0503 0.0529
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Chiefd FE Y Y Y Y
(Clustered SE) by Dist; Time, Chiefd; Control: ebola × DistEpic, ebola × DistEpic2; Excl. capital
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: t are two-week periods. conflict are the number of conflicts in one million per
capita. ebola is the number Ebola cases in 100’000 per capita. The covariates are Afro-
barometer data measured pre-epidemic and aggregated at our unit of observation (other
variables), i.e. chiefdom, district and sub-prefecture for Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea,
respectively. Infrastructure is a summary index statistic grouping access to roads, wa-
ter, electricity, hospitals. CivilWar is the sum of conflict events in each location during
the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, starting with the first available newspaper reports
from the ACLED dataset (1997-2003).
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Table B.31: Correlates of civil violence - Table of p-values and q-values
p-values and q-values
Outcome: conflict(t) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ebola(t) .015 .018 .001 5.18e-08 .541
ebola(t-1) × Strongly Relig. .059 .049 .048
.164 .149 .149
.142 .132 .132
ebola(t-1) × Tradit. Relig .235 .381
.433 .599
.355 .519
ebola(t-1) × Ethnic Fractional. .028 .155
.117 .342
.101 .261
ebola(t-1) × Ethnic Polariz. .037 .004
.137 .029
.121 .028
ebola(t-1) × Ethnic Salience .364 .335
.599 .582
.519 .504
ebola(t-1) × Trust Leaders .010 .003
.050 .029
.042 .028
ebola(t-1) × Trust Local Instit. .001 .117
.012 .277
.011 .202
ebola(t-1) × Trust President .408 .229
.613 .433
.519 .355
ebola(t-1) × Trust Opposition .802 .559
.828 .703
.761 .621
ebola(t-1) × Trust Army .006 .745
.037 .828
.033 .761
ebola(t-1) × Trust People .784 .212
.828 .433
.761 .355
First row: standard p-values.
Second row: q-values introduced by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).
Third row: sharpened two-stage q-values introduced by Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli (2006).
Notes: This is a table of p-values and q-values corresponding to Table 2.10. q-values are p-
values that are adjusted for the number of multiple hypoheses being tested. We adjust them
considering all hypotheses tested in Tables 2.10 and B.30, following Anderson (2008).
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Table B.32: Correlates of civil violence - Political preferences, War and Infrastructure - Table of p-values
and q-values
p-values and q-values
Outcome: conflict(t) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ebola(t) .010 .008 .004 .053
ebola(t-1) × Incumbent .992
.993
.823
ebola(t-1) × Opposition .797
.828
.761
ebola(t-1) × Civil War .666
.787
.751
ebola(t-1) × InfrastructureSumIndex .574
.703
.621
ebola(t-1) × Electricity .004
.029
.028
ebola(t-1) × Piped Water .469
.674
.582
ebola(t-1) × Health Centers .511
.703
.621
ebola(t-1) × Markets .065
.167
.145
ebola(t-1) × Paved Roads 4.16e-41
.001
.001
First row: standard p-values.
Second row: q-values introduced by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).
Third row: sharpened two-stage q-values introduced by Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli (2006).
Notes: This is a table of p-values and q-values corresponding to Table B.30. q-values are p-
values that are adjusted for the number of multiple hypoheses being tested. We adjust them
considering all hypotheses tested in Tables 2.10 and B.30, following Anderson (2008).
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C Appendix to Chapter 3
Figure C.1: Ebola radio campaigns - Summary
Ebola Campaign 1st Starting Where
campaigns Date
Synergie Nationale reporting April 2014 National, Rural
Synergie Rurale incr. inclusive July 2014 Rural
Fondation Hirondelle inclusive September 2014 Rural
Synergie inclusive April, July 2014 Private
URTELGUI February 2015* URTELGUI
Ebola inclusive January 2015 National, Rural
Chrono subset of Private
Spots on Ebola February 2015* the above
Figure C.2: Creating coverage zones by sub-prefecture
This illustrates the coverage area for one particular radio transmitter for a given signal strength.
Black: 0% percent of the area is covered by that radio with at least 43 dBµV/m. Grey: lighter
shades denote higher access to the radio signal. White: 100% of the area is covered with at least
that signal strength.
Table C.1: Descriptives - Ebola cases
Dataset WHO World Bank
Ebola cases Confirmed Probable Suspect TOTAL Deaths Population
Guinea 3,358 456 0 3,814 2,544 12.3 mn
Liberia 3,342 1,702 8,422 13,416 4,810 4.4 mn
Sierra Leone 8,358 0 3,545 11,903 3,956 6.3 mn
TOTAL 15,058 2,108 11,967 29,133 11,310 23 mn
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Figure C.3: Scraping Resistance Data
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Figure C.4: Ebola in areas with above/below median access to
Own Community Rural Radio signal
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Table C.2: Event study - Outcome : log(Ebola+0, 01)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Rural × (t-5) -0.007 0.048 -0.254 -0.144 0.126 -0.275
(0.382) (0.385) (0.397) (0.379) (0.348) (0.426)
Own Rural × (t-4) 0.101 0.111 -0.035 -0.015 0.169 -0.061
(0.358) (0.389) (0.415) (0.369) (0.329) (0.444)
Own Rural × (t-3) 0.208 0.334 0.559 0.137 0.222 0.533
(0.421) (0.387) (0.489) (0.458) (0.381) (0.526)
Own Rural × (t-2) 0.191 0.201 0.311 0.115 0.103 0.266
(0.328) (0.301) (0.390) (0.358) (0.293) (0.368)
Own Rural × (t) -0.263 -0.228 -0.302 -0.249 -0.327 -0.163
(0.331) (0.385) (0.406) (0.368) (0.289) (0.559)
Own Rural × (t+1) 0.150 0.126 0.319 0.071 0.089 0.100
(0.390) (0.398) (0.453) (0.474) (0.347) (0.546)
Own Rural × (t+2) 0.341 0.310 0.539 0.155 0.079 0.249
(0.659) (0.538) (0.792) (0.673) (0.524) (0.567)
Own Rural × (t+3) 0.561 0.370 1.010 0.364 0.195 0.782
(0.942) (0.730) (1.061) (0.980) (0.705) (0.652)
Own Rural × (t+4) 1.070 0.660 0.990 1.121 0.463 0.785
(1.002) (0.794) (1.125) (1.063) (0.743) (0.921)
Own Rural × (t+5) 0.286 -0.184 0.008 0.317 -0.234 -0.282
(0.976) (0.879) (1.157) (1.054) (0.832) (0.967)
Own Rural × (t+6) 0.266 0.151 0.435 0.135 0.235 0.279
(0.678) (0.754) (0.842) (0.659) (0.712) (0.890)
Own Rural × (t+7) -1.409∗ -1.185 -1.073 -1.607∗∗ -1.113 -1.338∗
(0.760) (0.759) (0.890) (0.676) (0.721) (0.758)
Own Rural × (t+8) -2.054∗∗ -1.589∗ -1.974∗∗ -2.107∗∗ -1.659∗∗ -1.960∗∗∗
(0.865) (0.816) (0.902) (0.855) (0.810) (0.658)
Own Rural × (t+9) -2.805∗∗∗ -2.202∗∗ -2.416∗ -2.981∗∗∗ -2.416∗∗ -2.090∗∗
(0.988) (0.906) (1.218) (0.977) (0.935) (0.861)
Own Rural × (t+10) -2.366∗∗∗ -1.860∗∗ -1.737∗∗ -2.558∗∗∗ -1.892∗∗ -1.629∗∗∗
(0.824) (0.739) (0.853) (0.803) (0.735) (0.577)
N 5376 5376 5376 4352 5376 4352
Mean (no Own Rural R.) -3.878 -3.878 -3.878 -3.878 -3.878 -3.878
R-squared 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.54
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y






(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.3: Event study - Outcome : Social resistance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resistance Resistance Resistance Resistance Resistance Resistance
Own Rural × (t-5) -0.026 -0.044 -0.022 -0.030 -0.026 0.019
(0.083) (0.079) (0.102) (0.090) (0.088) (0.098)
Own Rural × (t-4) -0.007 -0.007 -0.013∗ 0.000 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (.) (0.005) (0.023)
Own Rural × (t-3) -0.007 -0.007 -0.013∗ 0.000 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (.) (0.005) (0.023)
Own Rural × (t-2) -0.007 -0.007 -0.013∗ 0.000 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (.) (0.005) (0.023)
Own Rural × (t) -0.007 -0.007 -0.013∗ 0.000 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (.) (0.005) (0.023)
Own Rural × (t+1) -0.028 -0.026 -0.037 0.000 -0.025 -0.011
(0.024) (0.020) (0.027) (.) (0.020) (0.026)
Own Rural × (t+2) 0.029 0.022 0.037 0.043 0.019 0.047
(0.025) (0.021) (0.039) (0.032) (0.018) (0.053)
Own Rural × (t+3) -0.153 -0.211 -0.010 -0.178 -0.245 -0.049
(0.147) (0.144) (0.129) (0.187) (0.164) (0.146)
Own Rural × (t+4) 0.021 0.010 0.075 0.053 -0.038 0.142∗
(0.071) (0.068) (0.064) (0.075) (0.063) (0.074)
Own Rural × (t+5) -0.074 -0.224 -0.066 -0.064 -0.148 -0.178
(0.297) (0.289) (0.308) (0.343) (0.312) (0.335)
Own Rural × (t+6) -0.050 -0.239 -0.067 -0.079 -0.029 -0.040
(0.304) (0.280) (0.344) (0.353) (0.320) (0.316)
Own Rural × (t+7) -0.817∗∗ -0.901∗∗∗ -0.540∗ -0.887∗∗ -0.756∗∗ -0.600∗∗
(0.310) (0.282) (0.295) (0.361) (0.302) (0.296)
Own Rural × (t+8) -0.418∗ -0.463∗∗ -0.231 -0.405 -0.366 -0.246
(0.229) (0.226) (0.194) (0.253) (0.223) (0.173)
Own Rural × (t+9) -0.510∗∗ -0.456∗∗ -0.229∗ -0.581∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗ -0.223
(0.193) (0.177) (0.134) (0.204) (0.190) (0.155)
Own Rural × (t+10) -0.406∗∗ -0.366∗∗ -0.107 -0.437∗∗ -0.328∗ -0.128
(0.181) (0.156) (0.159) (0.205) (0.174) (0.163)
N 5376 5376 5376 4352 5376 4352
Mean (no Own Rural R.) 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179
R-squared 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.52
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y






(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.4: Event study - Outcome : % Ebola deaths in community over total Ebola deaths
+1
Excluding Gueckedou (first Prefecture hit by Ebola).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Rural × (t-5) 3.195 2.795 0.826 2.286 2.894 -1.792
(2.599) (2.462) (2.148) (2.532) (2.414) (2.370)
Own Rural × (t-4) 2.220 2.789 0.686 1.184 1.973 -1.641
(1.988) (2.467) (2.141) (1.892) (1.820) (2.455)
Own Rural × (t-3) 5.846∗∗ 5.250∗∗ 5.476∗ 5.504∗ 5.390∗∗ 2.473
(2.646) (2.616) (2.917) (2.825) (2.465) (3.245)
Own Rural × (t-2) 4.118∗ 4.428∗ 3.447 3.484 3.801∗ 1.455
(2.272) (2.565) (2.730) (2.333) (2.120) (3.052)
Own Rural × (t) -1.592 0.679 -2.377 -1.648 -1.553 -3.998
(2.661) (3.692) (3.199) (2.851) (2.399) (4.573)
Own Rural × (t+1) 3.975 3.248 1.781 3.377 3.717 -1.212
(2.806) (2.868) (2.958) (3.423) (2.625) (4.529)
Own Rural × (t+2) 0.608 1.532 -0.614 -0.566 0.306 -3.192
(2.241) (2.254) (2.754) (2.179) (2.029) (2.317)
Own Rural × (t+3) 7.062 6.105 4.663 6.784 5.230 3.175
(5.257) (4.393) (4.814) (5.600) (4.232) (5.172)
Own Rural × (t+4) 4.936 5.273 0.888 5.399 1.965 2.777
(5.291) (4.400) (4.985) (6.010) (4.033) (5.385)
Own Rural × (t+5) 2.233 1.120 2.488 3.265 0.344 7.717
(4.061) (3.869) (5.787) (4.434) (3.804) (5.246)
Own Rural × (t+6) 0.263 -0.671 3.847 -2.343 0.572 1.243
(4.800) (4.291) (4.861) (4.434) (4.660) (4.698)
Own Rural × (t+7) -5.803 -6.592 -10.118 -5.787 -6.348 -8.748
(6.698) (7.075) (6.818) (6.784) (6.665) (6.107)
Own Rural × (t+8) -10.110∗∗ -9.162∗ -13.506∗∗ -10.327∗∗ -9.736∗∗ -14.083∗∗∗
(4.977) (5.018) (5.372) (4.865) (4.744) (4.645)
Own Rural × (t+9) -11.226∗∗ -10.689∗∗ -8.930∗ -13.166∗∗∗ -10.590∗∗ -6.393
(4.570) (4.160) (5.106) (4.854) (4.244) (4.872)
Own Rural × (t+10) -8.275∗ -6.557 -4.564 -9.191∗∗ -7.587∗ -0.885
(4.269) (4.377) (4.464) (4.327) (4.019) (4.492)
N 4768 4768 4768 3888 4768 3888
Mean (no Own Rural R.) 3.388 3.388 3.388 3.388 3.388 3.388
R-squared 0.33 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.48
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y






(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year. Excl. Gueckedou.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.5: Difference-in-Differences - Dependent variable : log(Ebola+0.01)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Rural × Post Rural -0.27 -0.44 -0.27 -0.29 -0.54∗∗ -0.37
(0.31) (0.26) (0.31) (0.31) (0.24) (0.32)
N 9454 9454 9454 7598 7598 7598
Mean (no Own Rural R.) -4.33 -4.33 -4.33 -4.33 -4.33 -4.33
R-squared 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.32
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop/Dens/Dist.Epic. Y Y Y
Dist.Tower Y Y
Demographic Y Y Y
ETU/Labs/CCC Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year. Excluding first Prefecture hit by Ebola.
Omitted: Other Radios × Post
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Average number of Ebola cases for the sub-sample (with no access to rural ra-
dios): 0.36. The coefficients can be interpreted as the approximate percentage change
in the number of Ebola cases due to a 1 pp increase in access to a local radio. This is
approximately (eβ̂ × 0.01− 1)× 0.37
0.36
× 100%.
Table C.6: First Stage - Dep. Var: Heard about Ebola on the Media
Controlling for door to door campaigns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Rural Radio φ 0.0782 0.605∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.157
(0.0775) (0.147) (0.0421) (0.107) (0.0446) (0.148)
Ebola Door-to-door -0.807∗∗∗ -0.804∗∗∗ -0.820∗∗∗ -0.819∗∗∗ -0.821∗∗∗ -0.830∗∗∗
(0.0329) (0.0369) (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0276) (0.0294)
N 2447 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
Mean 0.71 0.68
R-squared 0.41 0.46 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57
F-test φ 1.02 17.01 106.76 15.18 93.64 1.14
Controls Y Y Y Y
Distance to Transmitter φ Y Y
Distance to Rural Radio Transmitter Y Y
Other Radio Signals Y
Cond. Rural Radio > median Y Y Y Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-prefecture. With Region FE.
Controls: pop, dist. epic., wealth, educ, gender, elect, water, health fac., urban
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS).
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Figure C.5: Event studies - Placebo exercise
Pre/Post Rural campaign by access to Own Community Rural Radio
Log-Distance to closest Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU)
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90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t+10. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Number of Ebola Treatment Units (ETU) in Sub-Prefecture
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Months to/since campaign start
90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t+10. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Number of Ebola Treatment Units (ETU) in Sub-Prefecture per capita in 100’000
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+4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9
Months to/since campaign start
90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t+10. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Notes: 90% confidence intervals. Robust Standard Errors clustered by Prefecture × Year.
Controls: wealth level, education, rural, population, population2, population-density; log-
distance to epicenter, to the closest radio transmitter from any radio, national, private,
rural, own rural radio (working and pre-existing) × time-dummies.
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Figure C.6: Event studies - Placebo exercise
Pre/Post Rural campaign by access to Own Community Rural Radio
Log-Distance to closest Laboratory
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90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t+10. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Number of Laboratories in Sub-Prefecture
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Months to/since campaign start
90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t+10. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Number of Laboratories in Sub-Prefecture per capita in 100’000
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+4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9
Months to/since campaign start
90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t+10. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Notes: 90% confidence intervals. Robust Standard Errors clustered by Prefecture × Year.
Controls: wealth level, education, rural, population, population2, population-density; log-
distance to epicenter, to the closest radio transmitter from any radio, national, private,
rural, own rural radio (working and pre-existing) × time-dummies.
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Table C.7: Having heard about Ebola on the Media (1)
Conditional on above median access to any rural radio.
Ebola Knowledge Ebola exists
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS Reduced F. 2SLS OLS OLS Reduced F. 2SLS
Ebola Any Info 0.251∗∗ 0.0722∗∗
(0.109) (0.0339)
Ebola Info on Radio/TV 0.00364 0.190∗∗∗ -0.310 -0.0103 0.0406∗ -0.0716
(0.0248) (0.0592) (0.262) (0.00854) (0.0203) (0.0659)
Own Rural -0.130 -0.0299
(0.111) (0.0273)
Ebola Door-to-door 0.204∗∗∗ 0.0525∗∗ -0.202 0.0533∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ -0.0376
(0.0626) (0.0229) (0.206) (0.0191) (0.00673) (0.0534)
N 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
Mean 2.93 0.98
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Distance Transmitter Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
> median Rural R. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-prefecture. With Region FE. Conditional on above median access to any Rural radio
Controls: pop, dist. epic., wealth, educ, gender, elect, water, health fac., urban
Instrument: Mean access to a Rural Radio from Own Community.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS).
Table C.8: Having heard about Ebola on the Media (2)
Conditional on above median access to any rural radio.
Fear of Treatment Neighbours seek more Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS Reduced F. 2SLS OLS OLS Reduced F. 2SLS
Ebola Any Info -0.175∗∗∗ -0.0203
(0.0644) (0.0860)
Ebola Info on Radio/TV 0.0124 -0.0953∗∗ -0.629∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.332
(0.0163) (0.0434) (0.276) (0.0327) (0.0583) (0.347)
Own Rural -0.280∗ 0.139
(0.147) (0.127)
Ebola Door-to-door -0.0994∗ -0.0161 -0.532∗∗ 0.0323 -0.0917∗∗ 0.181
(0.0524) (0.0195) (0.233) (0.0644) (0.0355) (0.293)
N 1232 1232 1232 1232 1234 1234 1234 1234
Mean 0.07 0.28
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Distance Transmitter Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
> median Rural R. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-prefecture. With Region FE. Conditional on above median access to any Rural radio
Controls: pop, dist. epic., wealth, educ, gender, elect, water, health fac., urban
Instrument: Mean access to a Rural Radio from Own Community.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS).
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Table C.9: Having heard about Ebola on the Media (3)
Conditional on above median access to any rural radio.
Chlorine Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS Reduced F. Reduced F. 2SLS
Ebola Any Info 0.00942 0.185
(0.0212) (0.119)
Ebola Info on Radio/TV -0.00552 -0.00148 -0.00468 -0.0628 0.0803
(0.00768) (0.0105) (0.00756) (0.0824) (0.213)
Own Rural -0.0262 -0.0146
(0.0352) (0.0360)
Ebola Door-to-door 0.00189 0.00364 -0.0478
(0.0137) (0.00888) (0.0689)
Info from Family 0.188 0.00913 0.0714
(0.121) (0.0190) (0.161)
Knows Ebola Victim 0.0194∗ 0.0191∗ 0.0203∗
(0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0111)
N 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
Mean 0.97
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Distance Transmitter Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
> Median Rural R. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-prefecture. With Region FE.
Controls: pop, dist. epic., wealth, educ, gender, elect, water, health fac., urban
Conditional on above median access to any Rural radio
Instrument: Mean access to a Rural Radio from Own Community.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS).
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Table C.10: Refused Burials over time for each prefecture
Outcome: Refused burials in 100’000 per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t t+1 t+2 t+3
Red Cross Radio -0.041 -0.326∗∗∗ -0.166 -0.918∗∗
(0.067) (0.108) (0.185) (0.418)
Red Cross Radio × Social Mobilis. Preventive -0.053 -0.010 0.021 0.177∗∗
(0.041) (0.034) (0.034) (0.085)
Social Mobilis. Preventive 0.189∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.034 -0.074
(0.092) (0.085) (0.070) (0.059)
Social Mobilis. Response -0.088 -0.270∗ -0.342∗ -0.354
(0.145) (0.162) (0.203) (0.288)
N 238 204 170 136
Mean 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10
R-squared 0.73 0.86 0.92 0.96
Radio Emis.(t-1, t-2) Y Y Y Y
Soc.Mob.Rep.(t-1, t-2) Y Y Y Y
Soc.Mob.Prev.(t-1, t-2) Y Y Y Y
Red Cross activity Y Y Y Y
Pop/Dens/Dist Epic × Trend Y Y Y Y
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses clustered by Prefecture × Semester
Controlling for Pref. FE, Time FE.
Red Cross activity: surveillance, transport, cholera kits
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: International Federation of the Red Cross in Guinea, April-December, 2015
The outcome variable is refused burials in 100’000 per capita, with mean (std. dev.) 0.11
(0.39). Red Cross Radio are the number of radio emissions aired and here we standardized
the original variable which had mean (std. dev.) 0.85 (3.29). Social Mobilis. Preven-
tive and Social Mobilis. Response are a standardized variable measuring the number of
volunteers conducting door-to-door campaigns either for prevention or as a response to
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Supplementary Appendices
D Supplementary Appendix to Chapter 2
Table D.1: Conflict events reported in Newspapers (1)
Ebola-related violence during the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa
– “At least 21 members of a government outreach team were in-
jured when residents of Wome near Nzerekore attacked them
with sticks and stones, thinking they were coming to bring Ebola
to the village. 8 of them were killed.” 8 reported fatalities,
Womey, Guinea, Agence France Presse, September 2017.
– “An ambulance carrying suspected Ebola patients crashed into
a ditch in the northwestern district of Port Loko after a mob
pelted it with stones. No injuries reported.” Port Loko, Sierra
Leone, Oct 2014, Agence France Presse
– “Hundreds of youth violently prevented the installation of an
Ebola treatment center, setting fires and breaking furniture.”
Kissidougou, Guinea, Agence France Presse, Dec 2014
– “Residents attacked a group of three police officers and their
driver who stopped on their way to a funeral, claiming the vic-
tims were spreading Ebola and had killed a local resident whom
one of the victims had given a sedative. The mob used machetes.”
Kindia, Guinea, Agence France Presse, Jan 2015
– “Thousands of protesters marched on the main Ebola hospital in
Kenema and threatened to burn it down and remove the patients
after a rumour spread about “cannabalistic rituals” occurring
there; police fired tear gas to disperse the crowd.” Kenema, Sierra
Leone, Reuters, July 2014
– “Heavy rioting took place in the West Point neighbourhood
between residents and police in response to the imposition of a
curfew and quarantine.” Montserrado, Liberia, FrontPageAfrica August
2014
– “Protesters barricaded one of the main entrances of the ELWA
hospital to protest against the establishment of an Ebola Cen-
ter in the hospitals compound.” Montserrado, Liberia, The Inquirer,
July 2014
– “An angry crowd confronted Red Cross workers regarding the
burial of an Ebola victim. The police tried unsuccessfully to
calm the situation as the rioters burned a Red Cross vehicle.”,
Conakry, Guinea, Xinhua News, December 2014
1
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Table D.2: Conflict events reported in Newspapers (2)
Non-Ebola-related violence during the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa
– “Security forces in Labe killed a protester and wounded
four others, witnesses said Thursday, as opposition supporters
clashed with police at anti-government rallies in its largest
towns and cities.” 1 reported fatality, Labe, Guinea, Agence France
Presse, April 2015
– “Twenty people were arrested and two police officers injured
during a riot at the Plam Oil Production project in Mattru
Jong, after stakeholders incited people against a government
takeover of the project.” Bonthe, Sierra Leone, Concord Times May
2014
– “A motorcyclist was killed by a soldier of the Armed Forces
of Liberia following a scuffle on Tuesday in Thinker Village
Community in Paynesville. Meanwhile, police have arrested the
soldier and are investigating the event.” 1 reported fatality.
Montserrado, Liberia, Front Page Africa, April 2015
– “An unknown number of people are feared injured or dead
following alleged clashes between members of the traditional
Poro or Sande Societies in Grand Bassa County, mainly in
Kpokon. Several houses were burnt down in the clashes.” 10
fatalities reported.” Grand Bassa, Liberia, Front Page Africa, April 2016
2
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Table D.3: Conflict events reported in Newspapers (3)
Civil violence in other epidemic outbreaks throughout Africa
– “A man was shot dead and several others injured on Wednesday
in fresh rioting in northern Haiti, as protesters clashed with UN
peacekeepers blamed for the cholera outbreak, a police source
said. ”, Port-au-Prince, The Telegraph, November 2010.
– “In Toamasina, it is reported that health workers and volun-
teers working in the fight against the plague epidemic have been
hunted by furious residents. The people used sticks and knives
to frighten the health workers.”, Tomasina, Madagascar, Outbreak
News Today, L’Express de Madagascar, October 2017.
– “Cholera treatment centre attacked due to misinformation and
suspicion among locals that it was spreading the disease”, An-
cuabe, Mozambique, All Africa, 2009.
– “A Frelimo branch secretary was seized by an angry mob and
killed, over accusations that party leaders were spreading
cholera”, Maputo, Mozambique, Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique,
2013.
– “A Frelimo official and community leader in Mecufi, was buried
alive, up to his neck, and then killed by an angry mob over accu-
sations that party leaders were spreading cholera in Macomia
district”, Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, 2013.
– “Dodoth warriors kill UPDF soldier who had been suffering
from malaria”, Kalapata, Uganda, All Africa, 2009.
– “Two men where allegedly killed by their sons after the sons
accused their fathers of being ‘witches’, following the deaths
of a sister and brother due to childbirth and malaria respec-
tively”, Buba, DRC, Radio Okapi, 2016.
– “500 AIDS activists marched by a police station to protest police
brutality”, Johannesburg, South Africa, Reuters News, 2003.
3
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Table D.4: Newspapers pre and post Epidemic - Guinea
Newspapers reporting on conflict in Guinea Number of Articles
pre-Ebola post-Ebola Total
Agence France Presse 29 35 64
Aminata 24 23 47
Associated Press 12 6 18
Guineenews 3 7 10
Media Foundation for West Africa 2 1 3
Radio France Internationale 11 4 15
Reuters 2 1 3
Xinhua 10 17 27
Africa News 1 0 1
Afrik.com 12 0 12
AfriquInfos 1 0 1
All Africa 5 0 5
AngolaPress 9 0 9
Committee to Protect Journalists 1 0 1
Daily Record 1 0 1
Guinee 7 2 0 2
Human Rights Watch (Washington, DC) 1 0 1
IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis 1 0 1
Jeune Afrique 4 0 4
Kankan Radio 1 0 1
Le Point 2 0 2
Lejourguinee.com 3 0 3
Relief Web 2 0 2
Reuters Africa 1 0 1
Slate Afrique 1 0 1
Sunday Mail 1 0 1
Xinau General News 3 0 3
Mali Actu 1 0 1
AlertNet (London) 0 1 1
Amnesty International 0 1 1
Daily Independent (Lagos) 0 1 1
Deutsche Welle 0 2 2
France 24 0 2 2
International Freedom of Expression Exchange Clearing House 0 1 1
PBS News Hour 0 1 1
Syndigate Media 0 1 1
Video News 0 1 1
Voice of America (Washington, DC) 0 1 1
Total 146 106 252
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Table D.5: Newspapers pre and post Epidemic - Sierra Leone
Newspapers reporting on conflict in Sierra Leone Number of Articles
pre-Ebola post-Ebola Total
Associated Press International 1 1 2
Awareness Times 5 2 7
Concord Times 6 14 20
APANEWS 1 0 1
Agence de Presse Africaine 1 0 1
Cocoricko 2 0 2
Public Agenda 1 0 1
Think Africa Press 2 0 2
Agence France Presse 0 6 6
Al Jazeera - English 0 1 1
Aminata 0 1 1
Awoko.org 0 12 12
BBC News 0 1 1
CBC News 0 1 1
Media Foundation for West Africa 0 2 2
Pan African News Agency 0 4 4
Reuters 0 4 4
Star Africa 0 1 1
The Mercury (South Africa) 0 1 1
Vice News 0 1 1
Voice of America (Washington, DC) 0 1 1
Total 19 53 72
5
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Table D.6: Newspapers pre and post Epidemic - Liberia
Newspapers reporting on conflict in Liberia Number of Articles
pre-Ebola post-Ebola Total
Agence France Presse 4 5 9
Associated Press 1 2 3
Front Page Africa 6 2 8
Heritage 5 18 23
New Dawn Liberia 5 1 6
New Democrat 14 1 15
The Analyst 7 2 9
The Inquirer 4 21 25
The NEWS 6 13 19
The New Dawn 15 55 70
The New Republic Liberia 5 14 19
All Africa 2 0 2
Liberian News 2 0 2
Liberian Times 3 0 3
Reuters 1 0 1
The Front Page Africa 1 0 1
The Informer 4 0 4
The Liberian Times 4 0 4
The New Zealand Herald 2 0 2
Voice of America 1 0 1
Associated Press International 0 1 1
Daily Observer 0 1 1
Foreign Policy 0 1 1
FrontPageAfrica 0 49 49
GNN Liberia 0 1 1
International Business Times 0 2 2
International Freedom of Expression Exchange Clearing House 0 2 2
Leadership (Abuja) 0 1 1
Liberia News Agency 0 6 6
Liberian Observer 0 18 18
PBS News Hour 0 1 1
Radio France Internationale 0 2 2
Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF) 0 1 1
Syndigate Media 0 4 4
The Mercury (South Africa) 0 1 1
Total 92 225 317
6
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E Supplementary Appendix to Chapter 3
Figure E.1: Ebola program schedules for two Rural Radios
Ebola program on Gaoual Rural Radio
Program Schedule Length
Micro-programs 7.40pm 3min














Schedule: Monday-Sunday; 8-10am and 18-23am
11
Essays in Development Economics
Table E.1: Summary Statistics - Outcomes by median access to Own Rural Radio
Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
Low Local R. High Local R. Total Low L.R. High L.R. Total
Ebola cases 0.912 0.557 0.678
(3.786) (4.457) (4.243)
Ebola cases per capita in 100k 2.083 1.893 1.958
(11.20) (16.16) (14.65)
Log Ebola+0,01 -3.887 -4.239 -4.119
(2.003) (1.462) (1.675)
Log Ebola+1 0.211 0.104 0.140
(0.649) (0.475) (0.543)
Log Ebola cases in 100k per cap. +1 0.251 0.159 0.190
(0.807) (0.694) (0.736)
Resistance behavior 0.186 0.0820 0.117
(0.695) (0.424) (0.534)
Ebola total deaths 0.549 0.393 0.446
(2.274) (3.194) (2.914)
Ebola deaths in community 0.250 0.152 0.185
(1.115) (1.427) (1.330)
Ebola deaths in ETU 0.299 0.241 0.261
(1.353) (2.049) (1.841)
Community over ETU deaths ×100 3.720 1.618 2.335
(13.33) (9.046) (10.75)
Refused burials 0.192 0.131 0.160
(0.819) (0.787) (0.802)
Refused burials in 100k per cap. 0.0877 0.0310 0.0579
(0.374) (0.184) (0.291)
Observations 5017 551
1st block: Sub-prefecture × Month (January 2014 - May 2016). 2nd: Prefecture × Month (April-December 2015).
Low Local R. (High Local R.): below (above) median access to Own Rural Radio.
For 173 Sub-Pref with above median access to any Rural Radio.
Notes: These are means by access to local radios, conditional on access to rural radios,
are shown in Table E.1. To see descriptives on the full sample studied see Table 3.4. For
aggregate statistics on Ebola see Table C.1.
Table E.2: Summary Statistics
Total Outcomes by date & median access to Own Rural Radio
Sum (Count) Sum (Count) Sum (Count)
Low R. High R. Total Low R. High R. Total Low R. High R. Total
Ebola cases 1560 1842 3402 1446 1558 3004 849 90 939
(1711) (3306) (5017) (1298) (2508) (3806) (1003) (1938) (2941)
Ebola cases per capita in 100k 3563.6 6259.5 9823.1 3391.7 5259.0 8650.7 2303.5 239.2 2542.8
(1711) (3306) (5017) (1298) (2508) (3806) (1003) (1938) (2941)
Observations 5017 3806 2941
Cond. period Post 7/2014 12/2015
Sub-prefecture (January 2014 - May 2016)
Low R. (High R.): below (above) median access to Own Rural Radio.
For 173 Sub-Pref with above median access to any Rural Radio. After July 2014
12
Essays in Development Economics
Figure E.2: Event studies - Pre/Post Rural campaign by access to Own Community
Rural Radio
Log ebola cases in 100’000 per capita +1
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Months to/since campaign start
90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t-1. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Ebola cases
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Months to/since campaign start
90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t-1. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
ebola cases in 100’000 per capita



























-5 -4 -3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10
Months to/since campaign start























-5 -4 -3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10
Months to/since campaign start
90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t-1. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Notes: 90% confidence intervals. Robust Standard Errors clustered by Prefecture × Year.
Controls: wealth level, education, rural, population, population2, population-density; log-
distance to epicenter, to the closest radio transmitter from any radio, national, private,
rural, own rural radio (working and pre-existing), to the closest ETU, CCC and laboratory
at each time × time-dummies.
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Figure E.3: Event studies - Pre/Post Rural campaign by access to Own Community
Rural Radio
Lagged Dependent Variable Model - Log Ebola cases +0.01
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90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t-1. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Social resistance in 100’000 per capita
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90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t-1. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Treatment uptake (full sample)
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-5 -4 -3 -2 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10
Months to/since campaign start
90% conf. intervals; Omitted cat. t-1. Robust SE clustered by Prefecture x Year.
Notes: 90% confidence intervals. Robust Standard Errors clustered by Prefecture × Year.
Controls: wealth level, education, rural, population, population2, population-density; log-
distance to epicenter, to the closest radio transmitter from any radio, national, private,
rural, own rural radio (working and pre-existing), to the closest ETU, CCC and laboratory
at each time × time-dummies.
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Table E.3: Event study - Outcome : Nr. of Ebola cases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ebola ebola ebola ebola ebola ebola
Own Rural × (t-5) -0.243 -0.065 -0.237 -0.305 0.023 -0.259
(0.358) (0.443) (0.454) (0.389) (0.347) (0.774)
Own Rural × (t-4) -0.119 0.054 0.018 -0.162 0.139 0.120
(0.357) (0.498) (0.559) (0.401) (0.395) (0.954)
Own Rural × (t-3) -0.048 0.007 0.366 -0.057 0.020 0.580
(0.429) (0.439) (0.638) (0.479) (0.386) (0.967)
Own Rural × (t-2) -0.360 -0.285 0.026 -0.404 -0.427 0.197
(0.543) (0.363) (0.513) (0.590) (0.463) (0.757)
Own Rural × (t) -0.413 -0.489 -0.011 -0.184 -0.442 0.770
(0.607) (0.467) (0.935) (0.628) (0.463) (1.397)
Own Rural × (t+1) -0.274 -0.317 -0.093 -0.308 -0.299 -0.768
(0.445) (0.411) (0.467) (0.507) (0.407) (0.564)
Own Rural × (t+2) 0.359 -0.214 1.249 0.445 0.057 1.431
(1.207) (0.801) (1.563) (1.509) (0.985) (1.398)
Own Rural × (t+3) 2.076 1.706 3.972 2.279 1.319 4.079∗∗
(2.453) (1.463) (3.057) (2.723) (1.933) (1.809)
Own Rural × (t+4) 2.819 1.474 3.565 3.243 1.876 3.174
(2.766) (1.881) (3.400) (3.189) (2.324) (2.802)
Own Rural × (t+5) 3.070 1.764 3.354 3.715 2.644 2.885
(1.960) (1.674) (2.474) (2.334) (1.905) (2.639)
Own Rural × (t+6) -0.117 -0.102 1.949 0.009 -0.336 2.373
(2.322) (1.998) (2.199) (2.776) (2.095) (3.056)
Own Rural × (t+7) -2.747∗∗∗ -1.994∗∗ -2.016∗ -2.638∗∗∗ -2.313∗∗∗ -1.713∗
(0.967) (0.874) (1.156) (0.965) (0.865) (0.964)
Own Rural × (t+8) -3.431∗∗ -2.586∗ -2.941∗ -3.592∗∗ -2.983∗∗ -3.115∗∗
(1.384) (1.358) (1.606) (1.438) (1.328) (1.487)
Own Rural × (t+9) -4.732∗∗ -3.829∗∗ -4.081∗ -4.980∗∗ -4.317∗∗ -3.916∗
(1.859) (1.856) (2.357) (1.879) (1.796) (2.046)
Own Rural × (t+10) -2.558∗∗ -1.805∗ -1.885 -2.708∗∗ -2.082∗ -1.797
(1.182) (1.008) (1.283) (1.238) (1.080) (1.086)
N 5376 5376 5376 4352 5376 4352
Mean (no Own Rural R.) 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839
R-squared 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.48
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y






(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.4: Event study - Outcome : ebola cases in 100’000 per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Rural × (t-5) -2.645 -1.773 -2.443 -2.422 -1.197 -1.987
(2.124) (2.384) (2.644) (2.153) (1.828) (3.068)
Own Rural × (t-4) -2.353 -1.439 -1.865 -2.094 -0.880 -1.139
(2.122) (2.466) (2.799) (2.175) (1.908) (3.447)
Own Rural × (t-3) -1.893 -1.710 -1.249 -1.503 -0.942 -0.444
(2.204) (2.355) (2.833) (2.248) (1.825) (3.397)
Own Rural × (t-2) -2.041 -2.523 -2.140 -1.644 -1.520 -1.685
(2.088) (2.181) (2.444) (2.091) (1.687) (2.795)
Own Rural × (t) -3.494 -3.616 -3.113 -1.355 -2.736 0.119
(2.408) (2.213) (3.192) (2.134) (1.805) (3.760)
Own Rural × (t+1) -2.310 -2.673 -2.262 -1.952 -1.830 -2.611
(2.213) (2.346) (2.583) (2.279) (1.836) (2.936)
Own Rural × (t+2) -0.324 -1.503 0.774 0.130 -0.492 1.541
(2.690) (2.475) (3.674) (3.703) (2.361) (3.783)
Own Rural × (t+3) 8.436 5.732 12.526 8.927 5.831 12.822∗
(8.723) (6.670) (11.961) (9.623) (6.550) (7.372)
Own Rural × (t+4) 6.099 2.975 6.252 6.250 3.515 7.130
(6.746) (5.338) (8.236) (7.351) (5.121) (6.364)
Own Rural × (t+5) 4.595 2.324 3.668 5.558 2.882 7.070
(4.804) (4.564) (5.259) (5.675) (4.072) (5.782)
Own Rural × (t+6) 3.819 2.193 5.686 5.964 2.262 11.859
(9.455) (7.827) (9.933) (11.318) (8.327) (14.284)
Own Rural × (t+7) -11.945∗∗ -10.497∗∗ -11.348∗∗ -9.376∗∗ -10.071∗∗ -7.333∗∗
(4.516) (4.034) (4.757) (3.951) (4.157) (3.411)
Own Rural × (t+8) -12.034∗∗ -10.532∗ -12.287∗ -10.727∗ -10.230∗ -10.388∗
(5.792) (5.693) (6.722) (5.527) (5.681) (5.830)
Own Rural × (t+9) -14.997∗∗ -13.433∗ -16.330∗ -13.648∗∗ -13.087∗ -13.033∗
(7.407) (7.084) (8.927) (6.667) (7.211) (6.861)
Own Rural × (t+10) -9.638∗∗ -7.716∗ -8.516∗ -8.957∗∗ -7.511∗ -6.046
(4.377) (3.973) (4.717) (4.237) (3.970) (3.714)
N 5376 5376 5376 4352 5376 4352
Mean (no Own Rural R.) 2.048 2.048 2.048 2.048 2.048 2.048
R-squared 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.29
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y






(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.5: Event study - Outcome : Log ebola cases in 100’000 per capita +1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Rural × (t-5) -0.092 -0.053 -0.140 -0.159 -0.025 -0.192
(0.149) (0.158) (0.176) (0.148) (0.129) (0.180)
Own Rural × (t-4) -0.031 -0.017 -0.038 -0.088 0.016 -0.066
(0.147) (0.163) (0.185) (0.149) (0.134) (0.204)
Own Rural × (t-3) 0.043 0.032 0.135 0.007 0.058 0.112
(0.161) (0.162) (0.201) (0.168) (0.143) (0.223)
Own Rural × (t-2) 0.019 -0.032 0.039 -0.021 -0.005 0.005
(0.133) (0.126) (0.156) (0.135) (0.117) (0.153)
Own Rural × (t) -0.142 -0.171 -0.138 -0.120 -0.158 -0.064
(0.127) (0.129) (0.164) (0.133) (0.106) (0.211)
Own Rural × (t+1) -0.005 -0.042 0.034 -0.049 -0.012 -0.084
(0.155) (0.155) (0.183) (0.174) (0.136) (0.204)
Own Rural × (t+2) 0.077 0.014 0.171 -0.001 -0.012 0.053
(0.267) (0.223) (0.326) (0.276) (0.216) (0.246)
Own Rural × (t+3) 0.235 0.143 0.447 0.145 0.092 0.366
(0.413) (0.314) (0.483) (0.427) (0.309) (0.297)
Own Rural × (t+4) 0.373 0.195 0.339 0.361 0.126 0.290
(0.451) (0.351) (0.512) (0.476) (0.334) (0.423)
Own Rural × (t+5) 0.175 -0.032 0.099 0.191 -0.007 0.044
(0.389) (0.345) (0.460) (0.427) (0.325) (0.399)
Own Rural × (t+6) -0.063 -0.086 0.038 -0.123 -0.069 0.044
(0.301) (0.321) (0.358) (0.288) (0.302) (0.368)
Own Rural × (t+7) -0.726∗∗ -0.623∗∗ -0.642∗ -0.785∗∗∗ -0.601∗∗ -0.682∗∗
(0.317) (0.299) (0.355) (0.276) (0.295) (0.279)
Own Rural × (t+8) -0.955∗∗ -0.769∗∗ -0.955∗∗ -0.975∗∗∗ -0.799∗∗ -0.919∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.362) (0.417) (0.365) (0.364) (0.307)
Own Rural × (t+9) -1.225∗∗∗ -1.017∗∗ -1.119∗∗ -1.291∗∗∗ -1.073∗∗ -0.987∗∗
(0.443) (0.413) (0.551) (0.427) (0.424) (0.397)
Own Rural × (t+10) -0.958∗∗∗ -0.770∗∗ -0.767∗∗ -1.029∗∗∗ -0.781∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.323) (0.369) (0.330) (0.324) (0.242)
N 5376 5376 5376 4352 5376 4352
Mean (no Own Rural R.) 0.248 0.248 0.248 0.248 0.248 0.248
R-squared 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.50
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y






(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.6: Event study - Outcome : Log ebola cases +1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(ebola) log(ebola) log(ebola) log(ebola) log(ebola) log(ebola)
Own Rural × (t-5) -0.018 -0.014 -0.073 -0.048 0.021 -0.087
(0.098) (0.096) (0.103) (0.100) (0.087) (0.112)
Own Rural × (t-4) 0.016 0.016 0.002 -0.009 0.045 0.010
(0.092) (0.102) (0.114) (0.098) (0.087) (0.136)
Own Rural × (t-3) 0.020 0.040 0.114 0.003 0.023 0.126
(0.109) (0.099) (0.128) (0.119) (0.099) (0.151)
Own Rural × (t-2) -0.017 -0.012 0.036 -0.040 -0.039 0.038
(0.104) (0.082) (0.103) (0.112) (0.092) (0.115)
Own Rural × (t) -0.114 -0.108 -0.087 -0.095 -0.123 -0.012
(0.098) (0.093) (0.123) (0.103) (0.081) (0.165)
Own Rural × (t+1) 0.004 -0.001 0.049 -0.015 -0.005 -0.048
(0.111) (0.099) (0.119) (0.127) (0.100) (0.123)
Own Rural × (t+2) -0.022 -0.028 0.088 -0.058 -0.069 0.037
(0.170) (0.136) (0.196) (0.186) (0.146) (0.162)
Own Rural × (t+3) 0.136 0.119 0.366 0.104 0.048 0.323
(0.290) (0.194) (0.328) (0.311) (0.231) (0.204)
Own Rural × (t+4) 0.276 0.183 0.347 0.294 0.137 0.299
(0.320) (0.237) (0.360) (0.348) (0.254) (0.318)
Own Rural × (t+5) 0.244 0.096 0.272 0.286 0.143 0.208
(0.258) (0.223) (0.310) (0.299) (0.225) (0.292)
Own Rural × (t+6) -0.034 -0.060 0.148 -0.058 -0.040 0.086
(0.223) (0.233) (0.243) (0.236) (0.226) (0.270)
Own Rural × (t+7) -0.492∗∗ -0.411∗∗ -0.373∗ -0.524∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗ -0.401∗∗
(0.187) (0.184) (0.210) (0.173) (0.172) (0.182)
Own Rural × (t+8) -0.648∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗ -0.586∗∗ -0.679∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗ -0.600∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.229) (0.261) (0.230) (0.221) (0.206)
Own Rural × (t+9) -0.854∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗ -0.712∗∗ -0.915∗∗∗ -0.759∗∗∗ -0.649∗∗
(0.283) (0.269) (0.355) (0.280) (0.269) (0.258)
Own Rural × (t+10) -0.640∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗ -0.465∗ -0.690∗∗∗ -0.527∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.203) (0.233) (0.219) (0.204) (0.159)
N 5376 5376 5376 4352 5376 4352
Mean (no Own Rural R.) 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195
R-squared 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.59
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y






(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.7: Event study - Lagged Dependent Variable Model - Outcome : log(Ebola+0, 01)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Rural × (t-4) 0.131 -0.020 0.215 0.162 -0.001 0.224
(0.121) (0.084) (0.135) (0.131) (0.083) (0.208)
Own Rural × (t-3) 0.178 0.171 0.692∗∗∗ 0.244 0.028 0.720∗∗
(0.398) (0.188) (0.254) (0.417) (0.382) (0.314)
Own Rural × (t-2) 0.102 -0.073 0.127 0.141 -0.118 0.180
(0.172) (0.260) (0.189) (0.201) (0.203) (0.298)
Own Rural × (t) -0.237 -0.336 -0.188 -0.150 -0.430 -0.055
(0.421) (0.462) (0.486) (0.394) (0.382) (0.500)
Own Rural × (t+1) 0.321 0.132 0.594∗ 0.304 0.162 0.428
(0.338) (0.244) (0.347) (0.328) (0.308) (0.336)
Own Rural × (t+2) 0.284 0.140 0.483 0.216 -0.072 0.385
(0.497) (0.371) (0.549) (0.485) (0.390) (0.372)
Own Rural × (t+3) 0.399 0.108 0.837 0.380 0.050 0.850∗
(0.576) (0.411) (0.610) (0.598) (0.449) (0.447)
Own Rural × (t+4) 0.787 0.368 0.565 1.025∗ 0.256 0.609
(0.510) (0.396) (0.661) (0.565) (0.453) (0.678)
Own Rural × (t+5) -0.279 -0.620 -0.406 -0.186 -0.585 -0.459
(0.458) (0.436) (0.581) (0.503) (0.471) (0.550)
Own Rural × (t+6) 0.135 0.135 0.544 0.064 0.258 0.472
(0.575) (0.600) (0.651) (0.564) (0.581) (0.691)
Own Rural × (t+7) -1.530∗∗ -1.368∗∗ -1.191∗ -1.579∗∗∗ -1.341∗∗ -1.383∗∗
(0.578) (0.598) (0.687) (0.498) (0.578) (0.660)
Own Rural × (t+8) -1.251∗∗ -1.108∗ -1.287∗∗ -1.145∗ -1.166∗ -1.248∗∗
(0.615) (0.614) (0.639) (0.644) (0.585) (0.531)
Own Rural × (t+9) -1.645∗∗∗ -1.521∗∗ -1.248 -1.751∗∗∗ -1.630∗∗∗ -1.103
(0.596) (0.617) (0.782) (0.608) (0.596) (0.667)
Own Rural × (t+10) -0.793∗∗ -0.873∗∗ -0.334 -0.859∗∗∗ -0.701∗∗ -0.515∗
(0.338) (0.350) (0.251) (0.315) (0.298) (0.300)
N 5040 5040 5040 4080 5040 4080
Mean (no Own Rural R.) -3.829 -3.829 -3.829 -3.829 -3.829 -3.829
R-squared 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.55
Lagged Dep.Var. Y Y Y Y Y Y






(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.8: Event study - Outcome : Social resistance in 100’000 per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resistance Resistance Resistance Resistance Resistance Resistance
Own Rural × (t-5) -0.277 -0.201 -0.372 -0.327 -0.275 -0.333
(0.428) (0.381) (0.629) (0.424) (0.444) (0.478)
Own Rural × (t-4) -0.082 -0.081 -0.127∗ 0.000 -0.065 -0.145
(0.063) (0.060) (0.071) (0.000) (0.052) (0.163)
Own Rural × (t-3) -0.082 -0.081 -0.127∗ 0.000 -0.065 -0.145
(0.063) (0.060) (0.071) (.) (0.052) (0.163)
Own Rural × (t-2) -0.082 -0.081 -0.127∗ 0.000 -0.065 -0.145
(0.063) (0.060) (0.071) (.) (0.052) (0.163)
Own Rural × (t) -0.082 -0.081 -0.127∗ 0.000 -0.065 -0.145
(0.063) (0.060) (0.071) (.) (0.052) (0.163)
Own Rural × (t+1) -0.233 -0.210 -0.296 0.000 -0.193 -0.133
(0.173) (0.146) (0.193) (.) (0.144) (0.145)
Own Rural × (t+2) 0.171 0.130 0.228 0.304 0.112 0.276
(0.151) (0.132) (0.255) (0.229) (0.119) (0.281)
Own Rural × (t+3) -0.516 -0.492 -0.260 -0.651 -1.124 -0.480
(0.677) (0.591) (0.700) (0.881) (0.718) (0.701)
Own Rural × (t+4) 0.223 0.091 0.133 0.446 -0.152 0.387
(0.316) (0.274) (0.356) (0.408) (0.234) (0.373)
Own Rural × (t+5) -0.766 -0.741 -1.073 -0.765 -1.113 -0.696
(1.369) (1.335) (1.702) (1.530) (1.462) (1.780)
Own Rural × (t+6) -1.164 -0.992 -1.703 -1.748 -1.055 -1.803
(1.418) (1.370) (2.133) (1.541) (1.540) (1.482)
Own Rural × (t+7) -4.601∗∗∗ -4.271∗∗∗ -3.563∗∗ -5.007∗∗∗ -4.401∗∗∗ -3.619∗∗∗
(1.511) (1.274) (1.730) (1.709) (1.545) (1.216)
Own Rural × (t+8) -1.663∗ -1.544∗ -1.371 -1.467 -1.558 -0.657
(0.988) (0.871) (0.907) (1.014) (0.935) (0.760)
Own Rural × (t+9) -1.308∗∗ -1.279∗∗ -0.915 -1.423∗∗ -1.189∗ -0.703
(0.623) (0.577) (0.571) (0.712) (0.633) (0.560)
Own Rural × (t+10) -1.503∗∗ -1.323∗∗ -0.930 -1.564∗∗ -1.227∗ -0.756
(0.629) (0.558) (0.706) (0.744) (0.616) (0.696)
N 5376 5376 5376 4352 5376 4352
Mean (no Own Rural R.) 0.698 0.698 0.698 0.698 0.698 0.698
R-squared 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.42
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y






(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.9: Pre-Trends (pre-Rural Radio campaign) - Dependent variable :
log(Ebola+0.01)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Rural × Trend -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
N 1956 1956 1956 1572 1956 1572
Mean (no Own Rural R.) -4.43 -4.43 -4.43 -4.43 -4.43 -4.43
R-squared 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.51
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop/Dens/Dist.Epic. Y Y Y
Dist.Tower Y Y
Demographic Y Y Y
ETU/Labs/CCC Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year. Excluding first Prefecture hit by Ebola.
Omitted: Other Radios × Trend
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table E.10: Pre-Trends (pre-Rural Radio campaign) - Full sample
Dependent variable : log(Ebola+0.01)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Radio × Trend -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05∗ -0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
National × Trend 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Private-Urtelgui × Trend 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Any Rural × Trend 0.06∗ 0.03 0.06∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Own Rural × Trend -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
N 1956 1956 1956 1572 1956 1572
Mean (no Own Rural R.) -4.43 -4.43 -4.43 -4.43 -4.43 -4.43
R-squared 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.51
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop/Dens/Dist.Epic. Y Y Y
Dist.Tower Y Y
Demographic Y Y Y
ETU/Labs/CCC Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year. Excluding first Prefecture hit by Ebola.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.11: Difference-in-Differences - Full sample
Dependent variable : log(Ebola+0.01)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Radio × Post Rural -0.24 -0.09 -0.24 -0.02 0.31 0.26
(0.46) (0.44) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48)
National × Post Rural 0.01 -0.29 0.01 -0.05 -0.56 -0.42
(0.45) (0.38) (0.45) (0.48) (0.34) (0.36)
Private-Urtelgui × Post Rural 0.75∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.41) (0.28) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35)
Any Rural × Post Rural 0.51 0.35 0.51 0.30 0.04 -0.06
(0.44) (0.42) (0.44) (0.44) (0.40) (0.43)
Own Rural × Post Rural -0.38 -0.24 -0.38 -0.42 -0.43 -0.25
(0.34) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.27) (0.37)
N 9744 9744 9744 7888 7888 7888
Mean (no Own Rural R.) -4.31 -4.31 -4.31 -4.31 -4.31 -4.31
R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.33
Subpref FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pop/Dens/Dist.Epic. Y Y Y
Dist.Tower Y Y
Demographic Y Y Y
ETU/Labs/CCC Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Prefecture × Year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Average number of Ebola cases for the sub-sample (with no access to rural ra-
dios): 0.36. The coefficients can be interpreted as the approximate percentage change
in the number of Ebola cases due to a 1 pp increase in access to a local radio. This is
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Table E.12: Balancing Test for population, area and distance to epicenter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Population 0.064∗∗∗ 0.052∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.029
(0.022) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.025) (0.033) (0.029)
Geographic Area -0.147∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011)
Distance to Epicenter -0.002 0.040∗∗ 0.004 0.001 -0.008 -0.027∗ -0.022
(0.005) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015)
Any Radio 0.073
(0.094)
Any Rural Radio 0.551∗∗∗
(0.108)
N 331 331 331 331 331 332 331
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (all) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
(Robust SE)
Excl. capital
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Geographic area is a standardized variable measuring the area of a sub-prefecture. Popula-
tion is log-population. Distance to epicenter is the log-distance to the start of the Ebola outbreak.
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Table E.13: Balancing Test for covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Income group -0.021 -0.045 -0.110∗ -0.048 0.009 -0.075 -0.081
(0.091) (0.073) (0.060) (0.063) (0.047) (0.088) (0.081)
Education 0.037 -0.095 0.010 -0.006 0.017 0.040 0.029
(0.081) (0.063) (0.050) (0.051) (0.040) (0.067) (0.064)
Rural Area -0.346∗∗∗ -0.094 -0.282∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗ 0.027 -0.001 -0.018
(0.107) (0.107) (0.105) (0.099) (0.058) (0.112) (0.098)
Religion -0.003 -0.022∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.028∗∗ 0.001 -0.010 -0.011
(0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011)
Strong Religious beliefs 0.086 0.283∗ 0.095 0.117 -0.036 -0.087 -0.065
(0.192) (0.142) (0.134) (0.126) (0.085) (0.150) (0.125)
Electricity 0.154 0.066 0.129 0.234 -0.037 -0.281 -0.258
(0.169) (0.195) (0.171) (0.178) (0.099) (0.231) (0.232)
Piped water -0.130 -0.211∗∗ -0.128 -0.080 0.087 0.196∗∗ 0.141
(0.117) (0.097) (0.084) (0.073) (0.055) (0.093) (0.090)
Health facility -0.155 -0.192 -0.029 -0.091 -0.050 -0.133 -0.102
(0.126) (0.151) (0.096) (0.104) (0.069) (0.140) (0.129)
Market 0.156 0.141 -0.045 -0.003 0.031 -0.020 -0.039
(0.105) (0.109) (0.079) (0.076) (0.058) (0.112) (0.095)
Police 0.022 -0.118 0.340∗∗ 0.332∗∗ 0.051 -0.232 -0.264
(0.186) (0.201) (0.136) (0.146) (0.086) (0.244) (0.248)
Any Radio 0.481∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.040
(0.090) (0.079) (0.074) (0.053) (0.103) (0.281)
Any Rural Radio 0.631∗∗
(0.290)
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (all cov.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.07 0.12
p-val (sum cov.) 0.57 0.42 0.87 0.43 0.62 0.14 0.07
(Robust SE)
Excl. capital
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.14: Balancing Test for disease prevalence in 2013 (cases per cap. in 1000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Flu 1.238∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗ -0.046 -0.115 0.490∗ -0.943 -1.261
(0.338) (0.293) (1.159) (1.150) (0.261) (1.025) (1.031)
Tetanus 3.826 -66.478∗∗ 30.499 15.589 10.706 39.837 32.910
(33.391) (31.903) (71.812) (70.364) (25.392) (81.592) (74.326)
Measels 24.827 -47.157∗ -17.176 -13.291 2.507 -3.878 -5.500
(26.016) (24.805) (29.854) (26.991) (16.456) (42.677) (38.229)
Polio 3.715 -72.735 -16.514 -35.766 -14.022 41.688 50.761
(57.371) (52.947) (69.723) (58.526) (38.108) (80.858) (65.694)
Malaria -0.004 0.004 -0.007 0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006
(0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013)
Meningitis -6.748 -2.745 -3.986 -2.784 0.227 8.379 8.232
(5.276) (4.445) (9.230) (9.333) (4.021) (7.640) (6.443)
Yellow Fever 12.528 63.333∗ -27.750 -20.959 -5.160 -15.848 -12.508
(27.699) (35.445) (30.003) (25.543) (21.442) (55.269) (47.104)
Diarrhea 0.221 1.054∗∗∗ -0.677 -0.597 -0.111 -0.337 -0.265
(0.509) (0.369) (0.566) (0.576) (0.280) (0.540) (0.447)
Cholera 3.679 -0.399 5.456 4.788 0.971 -9.454 -10.082
(6.197) (6.846) (4.896) (4.967) (2.582) (6.950) (7.371)
Any Radio 0.731∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.292 -0.273
(0.157) (0.245) (0.222) (0.131) (0.272) (0.467)
Any Rural Radio 0.647
(0.495)
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Mean 0.657 0.292 0.237 0.213 0.477 0.259 0.259
p-val (all diseases) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.30 0.44 0.31
p-val (sum diseases) 0.44 0.02 0.73 0.50 0.90 0.52 0.45
(Robust SE)
Excluding capital. Diseases in 2013.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.19: Ownership of radio-devices predicts having heard about Ebola on the Media
Ebola on Media Heard about Ebola Ebola Knowledge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Owns a Radio 0.123∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.00436 0.00368 0.00374 0.0176 0.0203 0.0205
(0.0317) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.00510) (0.00528) (0.00527) (0.0217) (0.0202) (0.0202)
Dist. Epic. -0.0106 0.00389 0.00851
(0.0121) (0.00255) (0.00878)
N 2447 2447 2447 2447 2447 2447 2447 2447 2447
Mean 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.99 0.99 0.99 2.90 2.90 2.90
R-squared 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cond mean
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-prefecture. With Region FE.
Controls: pop, dist. epic., wealth, educ, gender, elect, water, health fac., urban
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS).
Table E.20: Dep. Var: Owns Radio Device
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Rural Radio φ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.0966∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.166
(0.0329) (0.0440) (0.0343) (0.0754) (0.0302) (0.159)
N 2447 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
Mean 0.77 0.79
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
F-test φ 14.79 16.65 7.95 6.55 11.85 1.09
Controls Y Y Y Y
Distance to Transmitter φ Y Y
Distance to Rural Radio Transmitter Y Y
Other Radio Signals Y
Cond. Rural Radio > median Y Y Y Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-prefecture. With Region FE.
Controls: pop, dist. epic., wealth, educ, gender, elect, water, health fac., urban
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS).
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Table E.21: First Stage - Dep. Var: Heard about Ebola on the Media
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Rural Radio φ 0.117 0.594∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗
(0.0805) (0.127) (0.0431) (0.0982) (0.0438) (0.185)
N 2447 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
Mean 0.71 0.68
R-squared 0.05 0.11 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
F-test φ 2.10 21.97 83.62 6.10 81.96 6.53
Controls Y Y Y Y
Distance to Transmitter φ Y Y
Distance to Rural Radio Transmitter Y Y
Other Radio Signals Y
Cond. Rural Radio > median Y Y Y Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-prefecture. With Region FE.
Controls: pop, dist. epic., wealth, educ, gender, elect, water, health fac., urban
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS).
Table E.22: First Stage - Dep. Var: Heard about Ebola on the Media
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ebola Any Info 0.805∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗
(0.0273) (0.0388) (0.0425) (0.0434) (0.0449) (0.0424)
Own Rural Radio φ 0.0596 0.131 0.0600 -0.157 0.0662 0.320∗∗
(0.0499) (0.101) (0.0607) (0.143) (0.0678) (0.142)
N 2447 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234
Mean 0.71 0.68
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44
F-test φ 1.43 1.68 0.98 1.21 0.95 5.08
Controls Y Y Y Y
Distance to Transmitter φ Y Y
Distance to Rural Radio Transmitter Y Y
Other Radio Signals Y
Cond. Rural Radio > median Y Y Y Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-prefecture. With Region FE.
Controls: pop, dist. epic., wealth, educ, gender, elect, water, health fac., urban
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS).
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Table E.23: OLS : Having heard about Ebola on the Media
Outcome: Neighbors Seek Treatment...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
In 2013 In 2015 Fear to seek Like/More than 2013 Like/More/Less than 2013
Ebola Any Info 0.0741∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗ -0.0224 -0.210∗
(0.0275) (0.0814) (0.0606) (0.0465) (0.112)
Ebola Info on Radio/TV -0.0444 0.123∗∗∗ 0.00787 0.151∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.0279) (0.0300) (0.0121) (0.0341) (0.0516)
Dist. Epic. 0.00561∗∗∗ 0.0169 -0.00310 0.0225 0.0476
(0.00193) (0.0158) (0.0137) (0.0164) (0.0325)
N 2447 2247 2443 2447 2247
Mean 0.92 0.52 0.05 0.28 -0.25
R-squared 0.07 0.24 0.23 0.14 0.22
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
(Robust SE) clustered by Sub-prefecture. With Region FE.
Controls: pop, dist. epic., wealth, educ, gender, elect, water, health fac., urban
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: Post-Ebola survey (2015), Guinean National Institute of Statistics (INS).
In 2013 : neighbors sought treatment in 2013? yes (1), no (0). In 2015 : neighbors sought
treatment in 2015? yes (1), no (0). Fear to seek : are you scared of going to treatment
centers? Like/More than 2013 : neighbors sought treatment in 2013 but not in 2015 (0),
otherwise (1). Like/More/Less than 2013 : neighbors seek more (1) equal (0) less (-1)
treatment in 2015 than in 2013.
Table E.24: What do you like about the Ebola Radio show “Ebola Chrono”?
Mean (Std. Dev.) Observations
What did you like about the program? (Choose one)
Like Info 0.44 (0.50) 863
Like Presenters 0.11 (0.31) 863
Like Expert Interviews 0.19 (0.39) 863
Like Citizen Interviews 0.20 (0.40) 863
Like Music 0.06 (0.24) 863
What did you learn from the program? (Choose one)
Learned about Ebola 0.13 (0.33) 863
Learned about Prevention 0.54 (0.50) 863
Learned about Cures 0.33 (0.47) 863
Did the program influence...? (Yes/No)
Health outcomes 0.80 (0.40) 863
Ebola outcomes 0.78 (0.41) 863
Did you find this information useful? (Yes/No)
On other Diseases 0.86 (0.34) 1000
On Ebola victims 0.72 (0.45) 1000
On Preventing Ebola 0.92 (0.27) 1000
On Government 0.83 (0.38) 1000
Observations 1000
Data source: Internews Survey (2015)
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t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3
Red Cross Radio Emissions
90% conf. intervals
Data source: International Federation of the Red Cross in Guinea, April-December, 2015
The outcome variables are total refused burials, an average of 0.33 per month, and refused
burials in 100’000 per capita, with monthly mean (std. dev.) 0.11 (0.39). Red Cross Radio
are the number of radio emissions aired and here we standardized the original variable
which had mean (std. dev.) 0.85 (3.29). Plotted coefficients are separate regressions, con-
ditional on social mobilization campaigns, as well as conditional on demographic controls,
social mobilization and other efforts by the Red Cross. However, we do not include the
interaction term of radio emissions with preventive social mobilization campaigns. Table
available upon request.
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Figure E.5: % of Refused burials over Total Burials
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t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3
Red Cross Radio Emissions
90% conf. intervals
Data source: International Federation of the Red Cross in Guinea, April-December, 2015
The outcome variable is (refused burials / total safe and dignified burials+1) ×100, with
a monthly mean (std. dev.) 0.71 (4.40). The average number of total burials for a
prefecture in a given month is 71, which include Ebola-related and non-Ebola related
burials conducted by the Red Cross. Red Cross Radio are the number of radio emissions
aired and here we standardized the original variable which had mean (std. dev.) 0.85
(3.29). Plotted coefficients are from separate regressions, conditional on demographic
controls, social mobilization and other efforts by the Red Cross. The right graph includes
the interaction term Red Cross Radio×Social Mob. Preventive.
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Table E.25: Refused Burials t+ 1
Outcome: Refused burials in 100’000 per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1
Red Cross Radio -0.013 -0.080 -0.105∗ 0.012 -0.090 -0.155∗ -0.326∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.077) (0.080) (0.108)
Red Cross Radio × Social Mobilis. Preventive -0.010
(0.034)
Social Mobilis. Preventive -0.093∗∗ -0.066 -0.041 0.227∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.042) (0.036) (0.085)
Social Mobilis. Response 0.043 -0.095 -0.193 -0.270∗
(0.136) (0.187) (0.194) (0.162)
N 204 204 204 204 204 204 204
Mean 0.11
R-squared 0.49 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.74 0.78 0.86
Radio Emis.(t-1, t-2) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Soc.Mob.Rep.(t-1, t-2) Y Y Y Y
Soc.Mob.Prev.(t-1, t-2) Y Y Y Y
Red Cross activity Y Y Y Y Y
Pop/Dens/Dist Epic × Trend Y Y Y
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses clustered by Prefecture × Semester
Controlling for Pref. FE, Time FE.
Red Cross activity: surveillance, transport, cholera kits
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: International Federation of the Red Cross in Guinea, April-December, 2015
The outcome variable is refused burials in 100’000 per capita, with mean (std. dev.) 0.11
(0.39). Red Cross Radio are the number of radio emissions aired and here we standardized
the original variable which had mean (std. dev.) 0.85 (3.29). Social Mobilis. Preven-
tive and Social Mobilis. Response are a standardized variable measuring the number of
volunteers conducting door-to-door campaigns either for prevention or as a response to
resistance behavior. The original variables had mean (std. dev.) 548 (1786) and 2793
(6729), respectively.
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Table E.26: Refused Burials t+ 1
Non standardized coefficients
Outcome: Refused burials in 100’000 per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t t+1 t+2 t+3
Red Cross Radio 0.029∗ -0.053∗ -0.034 -0.215
(0.016) (0.027) (0.055) (0.130)
Red Cross Radio × Social Mobilis. Preventive -0.009 -0.002 0.004 0.030∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014)
Social Mobilis. Preventive 0.034 0.016 -0.035 -0.041
(0.041) (0.034) (0.029) (0.030)
Social Mobilis. Response -0.013 -0.040∗ -0.051∗ -0.053
(0.022) (0.024) (0.030) (0.043)
N 238 204 170 136
Mean 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10
R-squared 0.73 0.86 0.92 0.96
Radio Emis.(t-1, t-2) Y Y Y Y
Soc.Mob.Rep.(t-1, t-2) Y Y Y Y
Soc.Mob.Prev.(t-1, t-2) Y Y Y Y
Red Cross activity Y Y Y Y
Pop/Dens/Dist Epic × Trend Y Y Y Y
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses clustered by Prefecture × Semester
Controlling for Pref. FE, Time FE.
Red Cross activity: surveillance, transport, cholera kits
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Data source: International Federation of the Red Cross in Guinea, April-December, 2015
The outcome variable is refused burials in 100’000 per capita, with mean (std. dev.)
0.11 (0.39). Red Cross Radio are the number of radio emissions aired and with mean
(std. dev.) 0.85 (3.29). Social Mobilis. Preventive and Social Mobilis. Response are
the number of volunteers conducting door-to-door campaigns either for prevention or as
a response to resistance behavior with mean (std. dev.) 548 (1786) and 2793 (6729),
respectively.
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Table E.27: Public Good provision by access to Radio
Maximum number of public goods in 100’000 per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Number of ETUs in 100k per cap 0.091∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗ -0.090 0.037∗ 0.041 0.018
(0.032) (0.048) (0.055) (0.057) (0.022) (0.077) (0.067)
Number of Labs in 100k per cap 0.067∗∗∗ -0.007 0.042∗ 0.034 0.002 -0.016 -0.017
(0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.009) (0.040) (0.040)
Number of CCC in 100k per cap 0.003 -0.009∗∗ -0.008 -0.010∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.006
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
Any Radio 0.483∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.042) (0.051) (0.050) (0.028) (0.051) (0.100)
Any Rural Radio 0.625∗∗∗
(0.111)
N 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (ETU,Lab,CCC) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.71
p-val (sum ETU,Lab,CCC) 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.32 0.03 0.64 0.93
(Robust SE). With region fixed effects (8 regions).
Excl. capital. Controls: population, population density, geographic area, distance to epicenter and their square.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Number of ETUs in 100k per capita, Number of Labs in 100k per capita and
Number of CCCs in 100k per capita, are maximum number of Ebola Treatment Unit
(ETU), laboratories (Lab) and community care centers (CCC) in 100’000 per capita ever
available, with mean (std. dev.) 0.04 (0.28), 0.07 (0.50) and 0.9 (2.4), respectively. ETUs
and laboratories are created ad-hoc during the Ebola outbreak. CCCs are hospitals that
exist prior to the epidemic outbreak. We control for variables correlated with the spread
of the disease. The positive coefficient on Number of ETUs in 100k per capita in column
(5) disappears when controlling for the total cumulative number of Ebola cases, Table
E.28.
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Table E.28: Public Good provision by access to Radio
Maximum number of public goods in 100’000 per capita
Controlling for the total cumulative number of Ebola cases at the end of the epidemic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Number of ETUs in 100k per cap 0.054 -0.119∗∗ -0.110∗ -0.090 0.018 0.056 0.044
(0.046) (0.052) (0.061) (0.063) (0.024) (0.080) (0.069)
Number of Labs in 100k per cap 0.054∗∗ -0.004 0.044∗ 0.034 -0.004 -0.011 -0.008
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.027) (0.011) (0.041) (0.041)
Number of CCC in 100k per cap 0.001 -0.009∗∗ -0.008 -0.010∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.007
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
Any Radio 0.486∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.018
(0.043) (0.051) (0.050) (0.029) (0.051) (0.100)
Any Rural Radio 0.639∗∗∗
(0.112)
N 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (ETU,Lab,CCC) 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.61
p-val (sum ETU,Lab,CCC) 0.04 0.03 0.31 0.39 0.34 0.52 0.60
(Robust SE). With region fixed effects (8 regions).
Excl. capital. Controls: population, population density, geographic area, distance to epicenter and their square, total cumulative number of Ebola cases.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Number of ETUs in 100k per capita, Number of Labs in 100k per capita and
Number of CCCs in 100k per capita, are maximum number of Ebola Treatment Unit
(ETU), laboratories (Lab) and community care centers (CCC) in 100’000 per capita ever
available, with mean (std. dev.) 0.04 (0.28), 0.07 (0.50) and 0.9 (2.4), respectively. ETUs
and laboratories are created ad-hoc during the Ebola outbreak. CCCs are hospitals that
exist prior to the epidemic outbreak. We control for variables correlated with the spread
of the disease.
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Own group treated unfairly 1.635 1.315
(1.040) (1.008)














Trust Most 0.275 0.288
(0.181) (0.153)
Trust President 1.832 2.091
(0.855) (0.835)
Trust Local Council 1.922 1.976
(0.578) (0.571)
Observations 115 115
By Sub-prefecture - Afrobarometer Round 5, 2013. Excluding capital.
Notes: Fractionalization and Polarization are constructed based on reported ethnic group.
Fractionalization measures the probability that two individuals belong to different groups. It’s
a Herfindahl index that goes from 0 (all belong to the same group), to 1 (total diversity). It is
defined as F =
∑m
i=1 ni(1− ni), where m is the number of groups and ni is the relative size of
each group.




i (1−ni). In this case the group size matters beyond head
count. It reaches its maximum when 2 equally sized groups face each other. The correlation
between both measures is 0 at intermediate levels, negative at low levels of F , and positive at
high levels of F .
Own group treated unfairly is a categorical variable with values 0 (never treated unfairly),
1 (don’t know), 2 (sometimes treated unfairly), 3 (often treated unfairly), 4 (always treated
unfairly).
Ethnic belonging is a categorical variable with values higher numbers indicating stronger ethnic
belonging rather than a national identity. It takes values 0 (feel only national identity), 1 (feel
more national identity), 2 (feel equally national as ethnic identity), 3 (feel more ethnic identity),
4 (feel only ethnic identity).
Peul, Susu, Forest, Malinke, Mande, Mel are constructed by the author aggregating ethnic
groups by language group.
Trust Most is 1 if most people can be trusted and 0 if one must be very careful. Trust President
and Trust Local Council takes values 0 (no trust) 1 (little trust), 2 (some trust) and 3 (a lot).
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Table E.30: Ethnic groups / Languages by access to Radio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Peul -0.153 0.226 -0.154 -0.192 -0.024 -0.099 -0.083
(0.226) (0.173) (0.179) (0.172) (0.132) (0.233) (0.209)
Susu -0.027 -0.216 0.130 0.077 -0.052 -0.576∗∗ -0.540∗∗
(0.216) (0.189) (0.183) (0.185) (0.133) (0.255) (0.247)
Forest -0.025 0.415∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗ 0.200 -0.219∗∗ 0.284 0.438∗∗
(0.283) (0.145) (0.142) (0.160) (0.098) (0.190) (0.188)
Mande-Tan 0.066 1.885∗∗∗ 1.749∗∗∗ 1.876∗∗∗ -0.094 -0.153 -0.087
(0.631) (0.387) (0.520) (0.468) (0.403) (0.853) (0.694)
Malinke 0.047 -0.108 0.018 -0.129 -0.103 0.277 0.349
(0.216) (0.124) (0.137) (0.150) (0.105) (0.236) (0.225)
Mel -0.288 0.047 0.097 0.033 -0.184∗ 0.341∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.272) (0.125) (0.130) (0.130) (0.094) (0.178) (0.175)
Any Radio 0.386∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.060
(0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.044) (0.079) (0.235)
Any Rural Radio 0.701∗∗∗
(0.250)
N 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (all lang.) 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.01
p-val (sum lang.) 0.76 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.33 0.95 0.61
(Robust SE)
Excl. capital. Controls: population, geographic area, distance to epicenter, region fixed effects (8 regions).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Peul, Susu, Forest, Malinke, Mande, Mel are constructed by the author aggre-
gating ethnic groups by language group.
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Table E.31: Language Index by access to Radio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Fractionalization 0.408 0.439 0.345 0.326 -0.224 0.841∗∗ 0.845∗∗
(0.413) (0.351) (0.405) (0.374) (0.197) (0.331) (0.366)
Polarization -0.050 -0.348 -0.101 -0.123 0.151 -0.344 -0.194
(0.258) (0.210) (0.237) (0.216) (0.116) (0.213) (0.234)
Language-Index 0.007 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Any Radio 0.541∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ -0.038
(0.085) (0.079) (0.080) (0.039) (0.083) (0.205)
Any Rural Radio 0.717∗∗∗
(0.220)
N 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (all lang.) 0.19 0.13 0.30 0.49 0.56 0.00 0.00
p-val (sum lang.) 0.08 0.57 0.21 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00
(Robust SE)
Excl. capital. Controls: population, geographic area, distance to epicenter, region fixed effects (8 regions).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Fractionalization and Polarization are constructed based on reported ethnic
group. Language-Index is an index based on reported language.
Fractionalization measures the probability that two individuals belong to different groups.
It’s a Herfindahl index that goes from 0 (all belong to the same group), to 1 (total
diversity). It is defined as F =
∑m
i=1 ni(1− ni), where m is the number of groups and ni
is the relative size of each group.




i (1−ni). In this case the group size matters beyond
head count. It reaches its maximum when 2 equally sized groups face each other. The
correlation between both measures is 0 at intermediate levels, negative at low levels of F ,
and positive at high levels of F .
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Table E.32: Trust in people by access to Radio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Trust Neighbours 0.111 -0.129 -0.144∗ -0.048 0.114∗ 0.153 0.091
(0.151) (0.093) (0.078) (0.092) (0.061) (0.133) (0.137)
Trust Most -0.048 0.021 0.017 -0.036 -0.040 -0.352 -0.330
(0.188) (0.150) (0.143) (0.145) (0.086) (0.230) (0.226)
Trust Family -0.003 -0.273∗∗ 0.188 0.224∗ 0.134 0.354∗ 0.281
(0.206) (0.133) (0.136) (0.132) (0.101) (0.189) (0.172)
Trust Others -0.086 0.007 -0.103 -0.105 -0.001 -0.028 -0.028
(0.090) (0.063) (0.067) (0.065) (0.042) (0.083) (0.080)
Any Radio 0.381∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.171
(0.075) (0.078) (0.077) (0.042) (0.078) (0.205)
Any Rural Radio 0.545∗∗
(0.228)
N 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (all trust) 0.90 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.43
p-val (sum trust) 0.92 0.02 0.78 0.83 0.07 0.52 0.94
(Robust SE)
Excl. capital. Controls: population, geographic area, distance to epicenter, region fixed effects (8 regions).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table E.33: Trust in Institutions by access to Radio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Trust Leader 0.097 -0.102 -0.120∗ -0.146∗∗ -0.023 -0.198∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.067) (0.072) (0.071) (0.041) (0.071) (0.068)
President 0.105 0.014 0.057 0.093 0.005 0.041 0.038
(0.077) (0.088) (0.078) (0.089) (0.059) (0.122) (0.122)
Local Council -0.068 -0.045 -0.057 -0.082 -0.008 0.129∗ 0.134∗
(0.066) (0.059) (0.051) (0.051) (0.035) (0.075) (0.072)
Parliament 0.014 0.012 0.050 -0.006 -0.061 -0.002 0.036
(0.083) (0.064) (0.058) (0.067) (0.050) (0.090) (0.084)
Electoral C. -0.085 -0.112 -0.090 -0.052 0.074 -0.099 -0.144
(0.097) (0.075) (0.081) (0.091) (0.054) (0.116) (0.118)
Tax Auth. 0.082 -0.083 0.023 0.031 0.018 -0.000 -0.012
(0.087) (0.052) (0.059) (0.060) (0.036) (0.075) (0.075)
Any Radio 0.405∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.137
(0.075) (0.076) (0.080) (0.045) (0.089) (0.218)
Any Rural Radio 0.623∗∗∗
(0.229)
N 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (all trust) 0.55 0.02 0.22 0.27 0.72 0.06 0.05
p-val (sum trust) 0.29 0.00 0.17 0.14 0.91 0.24 0.21
(Robust SE)
Excl. capital. Controls: population, geographic area, distance to epicenter, region fixed effects (8 regions).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table E.34: Trust in Institutions by access to Radio - controlling for urban infrastructure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Fractionalization 0.692 -0.192 -0.730∗ -0.594 0.042 0.553 0.521
(0.511) (0.360) (0.369) (0.362) (0.169) (0.407) (0.377)
Polarization -0.306 0.104 0.357 0.171 -0.077 0.014 0.071
(0.302) (0.223) (0.229) (0.230) (0.108) (0.257) (0.240)
Peul -0.258 0.292 -0.108 -0.282 -0.223 -0.051 0.116
(0.319) (0.206) (0.148) (0.171) (0.177) (0.300) (0.278)
Susu -0.005 -0.123 0.102 -0.151 -0.355∗∗ -0.510 -0.244
(0.333) (0.237) (0.192) (0.217) (0.173) (0.344) (0.346)
Forest -0.189 0.563∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.180 -0.481∗∗∗ 0.183 0.545
(0.350) (0.241) (0.195) (0.250) (0.171) (0.328) (0.349)
Mande-Tan 0.142 1.797∗∗∗ 2.041∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗∗ 0.092 -0.183 -0.252
(0.793) (0.593) (0.394) (0.454) (0.221) (0.628) (0.573)
Malinke -0.018 -0.113 -0.034 -0.207 -0.140 0.028 0.133
(0.232) (0.155) (0.143) (0.148) (0.111) (0.228) (0.216)
Mel -0.325 0.159 0.263∗ 0.026 -0.415∗∗∗ 0.093 0.405
(0.309) (0.181) (0.153) (0.189) (0.124) (0.259) (0.291)
Trust Leader 0.113 -0.021 -0.020 -0.075 -0.093∗∗ -0.163∗ -0.093
(0.082) (0.069) (0.066) (0.067) (0.045) (0.086) (0.082)
President 0.078 0.065 0.163∗ 0.164∗ -0.060 -0.038 0.007
(0.105) (0.084) (0.091) (0.093) (0.073) (0.130) (0.109)
Local Council 0.020 0.046 0.008 -0.050 -0.085 0.121∗ 0.184∗∗
(0.091) (0.071) (0.061) (0.068) (0.054) (0.070) (0.075)
Parliament -0.042 0.047 0.114∗ 0.072 -0.047 -0.025 0.011
(0.080) (0.067) (0.061) (0.079) (0.051) (0.086) (0.077)
Electoral C. -0.044 -0.070 -0.167∗ -0.112 0.114 0.111 0.025
(0.128) (0.084) (0.100) (0.101) (0.072) (0.116) (0.098)
Tax Auth. 0.034 -0.071 0.009 0.041 0.060 0.001 -0.044
(0.089) (0.063) (0.052) (0.053) (0.039) (0.073) (0.072)
Any Radio 0.384∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ -0.028
(0.085) (0.079) (0.079) (0.050) (0.098) (0.214)
Any Rural Radio 0.751∗∗∗
(0.228)
N 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (all lang.) 0.72 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.37
p-val (sum lang.) 0.71 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.78 0.65
p-val (all trust) 0.72 0.76 0.05 0.22 0.26 0.07 0.05
p-val (sum trust) 0.27 0.98 0.31 0.74 0.12 0.96 0.53
(Robust SE)
Excl. capital. Controls: population, geographic area, distance to epicenter, region fixed effects (8 regions).
Additional controls: urban, electricity, piped water, health centers, markets, police.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Fractionalization and Polarization are constructed based on reported ethnic
group. On the other hand Peul, Susu, Forest, Malinke, Mande, Mel are constructed by
the author aggregating ethnic groups by language group. See Table E.29 for definitions.
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Table E.35: Trust in Institutions by access to Radio - controlling for urban infrastructure
With next period Trust in Local Council
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Any Radio National Private Private-Urt. Any Rural Radio Own Rural Own Rural
Fractionalization 0.747 -0.286 -0.707∗ -0.541 0.032 0.510 0.489
(0.505) (0.362) (0.369) (0.369) (0.171) (0.417) (0.398)
Polarization -0.294 0.157 0.400∗ 0.197 -0.039 0.013 0.039
(0.314) (0.226) (0.234) (0.242) (0.110) (0.270) (0.262)
Peul -0.300 0.394∗∗ -0.147 -0.276∗ -0.125 -0.080 0.003
(0.277) (0.176) (0.133) (0.142) (0.149) (0.280) (0.238)
Susu -0.030 -0.020 0.145 -0.088 -0.213 -0.586 -0.445
(0.311) (0.217) (0.206) (0.240) (0.150) (0.362) (0.363)
Forest -0.188 0.388∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.265 -0.401∗∗∗ -0.022 0.244
(0.315) (0.209) (0.192) (0.220) (0.147) (0.306) (0.303)
Mande-Tan 0.062 1.741∗∗∗ 2.033∗∗∗ 2.057∗∗∗ 0.152 -0.304 -0.405
(0.776) (0.581) (0.396) (0.425) (0.241) (0.642) (0.600)
Malinke -0.062 -0.148 -0.051 -0.219 -0.127 -0.021 0.063
(0.218) (0.153) (0.145) (0.153) (0.104) (0.227) (0.208)
Mel -0.312 0.153 0.264∗ 0.063 -0.366∗∗∗ 0.043 0.286
(0.295) (0.171) (0.151) (0.175) (0.101) (0.231) (0.241)
Trust Leader 0.104 -0.046 -0.033 -0.074 -0.088∗∗ -0.186∗∗ -0.128
(0.082) (0.065) (0.067) (0.063) (0.043) (0.089) (0.086)
President 0.062 0.075 0.168∗ 0.164∗ -0.045 -0.051 -0.021
(0.108) (0.073) (0.090) (0.091) (0.074) (0.132) (0.114)
Local Council (2015) -0.069 -0.011 -0.013 -0.037 0.001 -0.029 -0.029
(0.055) (0.043) (0.047) (0.051) (0.026) (0.061) (0.061)
Parliament -0.034 0.022 0.106 0.067 -0.067 -0.020 0.024
(0.080) (0.066) (0.067) (0.085) (0.054) (0.094) (0.091)
Electoral C. 0.000 -0.074 -0.160∗ -0.101 0.089 0.144 0.084
(0.131) (0.070) (0.093) (0.090) (0.073) (0.121) (0.104)
Tax Auth. 0.026 -0.084∗ -0.007 0.017 0.028 0.022 0.003
(0.082) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054) (0.039) (0.065) (0.059)
Any Radio 0.385∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.056
(0.084) (0.076) (0.077) (0.051) (0.094) (0.228)
Any Rural Radio 0.665∗∗∗
(0.244)
N 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
Mean 0.587 0.283 0.216 0.193 0.459 0.282 0.282
p-val (all lang.) 0.78 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.27
p-val (sum lang.) 0.59 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.50 0.85
p-val (all trust) 0.58 0.42 0.05 0.21 0.38 0.36 0.41
p-val (sum trust) 0.56 0.26 0.56 0.76 0.21 0.45 0.67
(Robust SE)
Excl. capital. Controls: population, geographic area, distance to epicenter, region fixed effects (8 regions).
Additional controls: urban, electricity, piped water, health centers, markets, police.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Fractionalization and Polarization are constructed based on reported ethnic
group. On the other hand Peul, Susu, Forest, Malinke, Mande, Mel are constructed by
the author aggregating ethnic groups by language group. See Table E.29 for definitions.
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